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Abstract
The primary focus of this dissertation is on information, its production and dissemination
in society. In the first chapter, I explore the consequences of an increase in the number
of newspapers on the quantity and quality of news provided and, ultimately, changes in
political participation, using a new panel of local newspaper presence and political turnout
in France from 1945 to 2012. My results shed new light on the role played by consumers’
heterogeneity and increasing returns to scale in news production, and have implications for
the study of the relationship between media competition and political participation.
The second chapter delves into the relationship between newspapers and civic attitudes.
I build a new geocoded dataset locating Protestant missions in 1903 to examine the long-
term consequences of the introduction of the printing press. I show that, within regions
located close to missions, proximity to a printing press significantly increases newspaper
readership today. I also document a strong association between proximity to a printing
press and contemporary economic development, and show that newspaper readership may
explain this positive relationship.
The dissemination of information – through the media – has important and various
implications. In the third chapter, I study the effect of firm and country reputation on exports
when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Measuring national reputations by
analyzing the content of US newspaper articles about foreign countries over 1988-2006, I
find that more positive news coverage of foreign countries and companies is associated with
higher unit values of their exports to the US.
Given the importance of the media, key is to improving our understanding of its
iii
business model. In the fourth chapter, I focus on one particular aspect, namely newspapers’
pricing policies. I investigate how the reliance on advertising revenues affects the incentives
newspapers have to charge a lower price per issue to subscribers than to occasional buyers.
To this end, I rely on history and exploit the introduction of advertisement on French
Television in 1968.
Finally in the last chapter, I study the emergence of market-oriented journalism and of
an independent and informative press in sub-Saharan Africa.
iv
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Introduction
This dissertation lies at the intersection of Political Economy and Economic History. Its
primary focus is on information, its production and dissemination in society. I use a broad
set of tools to address this topic. On the theory side, I apply formal models in Political
Economy as well as in Industrial Organization. In my empirical work, I construct large-scale
historical datasets; I rely on historical “quasi-natural" experiments to build sharp empirical
strategies. In particular, I collect and compile new variables based on detailed historic data
to study the evolution of the media, both in France and in sub-Saharan Africa, and how it
affects different political and economic outcomes.
Will an increase in competition in the market place for news and ideas triggered
by technical change and information technologies lead to a better coverage of general
information and an increase in political participation? There seems to be a consensus that
it will be the case. More media competition is indeed usually seen as welfare improving.
The goal of the first chapter of this dissertation (“Media Competition, Information Provision
and Political Participation") is to revisit this common wisdom, relying on the history of
the French media market. The welfare impact of media competition depends on the
incentives of the media to deliver news. In this chapter, I explore the consequences of an
increase in the number of newspapers on the quantity and quality of news provided and,
ultimately, changes in political participation. Drawing from the literature on vertical product
differentiation to model the production choices of newspapers, I show how an increase in
the number of newspapers can decrease both the quantity and quality of news provided.
I build a new county-level panel dataset of local newspaper presence, newspapers’ costs
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and revenues and political turnout in France, from 1945 to 2012. I estimate the effect of
newspaper entry by comparing counties that experience entry to similar counties in the
same years that do not. These counties exhibit similar trends prior to newspaper entry, but
newspaper entry then leads to substantial declines in the total number of journalists. More
newspapers are also associated with fewer news articles and lower hard news provision.
These effects are concentrated in counties with homogeneous populations, as predicted
by my simple theoretical framework, with little impact on counties with heterogeneous
populations. Newspaper entry, and the associated decline in information provision, is
ultimately found to decrease voter turnout. These results shed new light on the role played
by consumers’ heterogeneity and increasing returns to scale in news production, and have
implications for the study of the relationship between media competition and political
participation.
The second chapter of the dissertation (“The Long-Term Effects of the Printing Press in
sub-Saharan Africa") delves into the relationship between newspapers and civic attitudes; I
focus on sub-Saharan Africa and explore the effects of newspaper readership on political
participation and economic change using the historical development of the media. In
sub-Saharan Africa, Protestant missionaries were the first both to import the printing press
technology and to allow the indigenous population to use it. I build a new geocoded dataset
locating Protestant missions in 1903. This dataset includes, for each mission station, the
geographic location and its characteristics, as well as the educational and health-related
investments undertaken by the mission. I show that, within regions located close to missions,
proximity to a printing press significantly increases newspaper readership today. I also
document a strong association between proximity to a printing press and contemporary
economic development, and show that newspaper readership may explain this positive
relationship.
The dissemination of information – through the media – has important and various
implications. In the third chapter of the dissertation (“Improving “National Brands": Reputation
for Quality and Export Promotion Policies"), I study the effect of firm and country reputation
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on exports when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand is
determined by expected quality, which depends on both past experience with the good
and the country of origin’s reputation for quality. Asymmetric information acts as a barrier
to entry for high-quality firms but facilitates sales by “fly-by-night" low-quality firms. I
derive two types of steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. In a high-quality
equilibrium, imperfect information does not hinder entry into export markets, but there is a
distortion in profits and in the quality composition of exports. In a low-quality equilibrium,
I obtain a sorting of firms into exporting that is non-linear in quality. A range of relatively
high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction,
so that countries with bad quality reputation can be locked into exporting low-quality,
low-cost goods. Export subsidies then have a positive welfare effect on the exporting
country, by improving the average quality of its exports and its terms of trade. However,
a subsidy has the opposite long-run effects in a country that initially exports relatively
high-quality products. Moreover, measuring national reputations by analyzing the content
of US newspaper articles about foreign countries over 1988-2006, I find that more positive
news coverage of foreign countries and companies is associated with higher unit values of
their exports to the US, particularly in sectors with a larger scope for vertical differentiation.
Given the importance of the media, it is thus key to improving our understanding of its
business model. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, (“Price Discrimination in a Two-Sided
Market: Theory and Evidence from the Newspaper Industry"), I focus on a particular aspect,
namely newspapers’ pricing policies. I investigate how the reliance on advertising revenues
affects the incentives newspapers have to charge a lower price per issue to subscribers
than to occasional buyers (second-degree price discrimination). I build a model in which
a newspaper must attract both readers and advertisers. Readers are uncertain as to their
future benefit from reading, and heterogeneous in their taste for reading. Advertisers
are heterogeneous in their outside option, taste for subscribers, and taste for occasional
buyers. To estimate empirically the effect of the advertisers’ side of the industry on
price discrimination on the readers’ side, I rely on history and exploit the introduction
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of advertisement on French Television in 1968 – a “quasi-natural" experiment. I treat this
introduction as a negative shock on advertising revenues of daily national newspapers
(treated group), but not on daily local newspapers (control group). I build a new dataset on
French local newspapers between 1960 and 1974 and perform a Differences-in-Differences
analysis. I find robust evidence of increased price discrimination as a result of a drop in
advertisement revenues.
Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation (“The Economics of the African Media") lays the
foundation for future research in which I plan to explore how media content affects economic
development, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. Using the history of sub-Saharan African
newspapers as well as historical evidence from Europe and the United States, I study the
emergence of market-oriented journalism and of an independent and informative press
in sub-Saharan Africa. I document the extent to which sub-Saharan African newspapers
have followed the same development steps than newspapers in other countries, moving
from living off patronage and government favors to moving more towards mass sales and
advertising revenues. I show that the story of the sub-Saharan African media is not a simple
story of catching up and convergence. In particular, through the study of the economics of
the sub-Saharan African media, I challenge traditional views of the media. I question the
long-term sustainability of advertising-dependent media and discuss a new framework to
improve the financial sustainability of mass media while preserving the independence of
media outlets. I document the pros and cons of ownership concentration and argue in favor
of the development of synergies between national and local newspapers as well as of the
development of nonprofit media organizations.
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Chapter 1
Media Competition, Information
Provision and Political Participation
1.1 Introduction
Will an increase in competition in the marketplace for news and ideas – triggered by technical
change and information technologies – lead to a better coverage of general information
and an increase in political participation? This paper investigates the consequences of an
increase in the number of media outlets on the quantity and quality of news provided and,
ultimately, changes in voter turnout at elections.
More media competition is often seen as implying an increase in the dissemination of
information, thereby enhancing the extent of ideological diversity, promoting truth and
contributing to the political process.1 In this spirit, recent studies in political economy
have advanced the existence of a positive causal link between media entry and political
participation (Stromberg, 2004; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2009; Gentzkow et al., 2011).
However the focus of these studies is on media access – the move from 0 to 1 media outlet.
In this paper, I consider instead media competition – the move from n > 0 to n+ 1 media
1According to Hamilton (2004), ““more news is better news" appears to be an axiom favored in discussions about
the news marketplace." (p.21).
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outlets. There is indeed no reason to expect that the intensive margin of the media acts as
the extensive margin; in particular because media competition may affect the content of
media outlets.
To tackle these questions, I first provide a motivating theory model. I draw from the
literature on vertical product differentiation to study the production choices (price and qual-
ity) of newspapers under monopoly and duopoly. There are a continuum of heterogeneous
consumers and two profit-maximizing newspapers facing quality-dependent fixed costs.
Newspapers first choose simultaneously their quality and then compete simultaneously in
price. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness-to-pay for newspaper
quality. When heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay is high, the market is not
covered under competition. The entrant expands the market and newspapers differentiate
on quality to soften price competition and increase market power. One duopolist produces a
lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist, and the other one a higher-quality newspaper.
On the contrary, when heterogeneity is low, the market is covered under competition. In
the extreme case with no heterogeneity, the entrant garners half of the market and halves
the incumbent newspaper’s circulation (business stealing). Consumers derive no additional
benefit from the new newspaper, but resource use on fixed costs is doubled, reducing social
surplus. Both duopolists produce a lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist.
In an extension of the model, I divide newspaper content between “hard news" and
“soft news".2 Hard news corresponds to public affairs news, for example national and
international news or economic news, and tends to be regarded as informative in the
political process. On the contrary, soft news corresponds to entertaining or commodity
news, say about sports or fashion. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their
willingness-to-pay for these two attributes of newspapers. If there is more heterogeneity in
the willingness-to-pay for an attribute (say soft news) than for the other (say hard news),
everything else being symmetrical, I find that both duopolists reduce the quality of the
2I use here the terminology hard in the colloquial and political science meaning of hardness as a measure of
information content. Hard is not hard in the economic sense of verifiability.
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low-heterogeneity attribute (in this case hard news) compared to the monopolist.3 The
intuition is as follows: both newspapers benefit from differentiating on the dimension with
higher heterogeneity so as to relax price competition, but they offer the lowest quality of the
dimension with lower heterogeneity to contain costs.
Ultimately, if more informed voters are more likely to vote (see e.g. Feddersen and
Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999; Lassen, 2005; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006a,b), then an increase in
competition leads to a decrease in political participation at elections when heterogeneity in
the willingness-to-pay for quality is low.
This simple theoretical framework guides the empirical exercise and aids in interpreting
the results. The empirical analysis has three objectives. First, I test for and quantify the
effect of entry on the quality of newspapers, and explore how this effect varies with the
extent of heterogeneity. Second, I extend the analysis to investigate how the entry of a
newspaper affects the share of hard news in newspapers and how this effect varies with the
relative heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard and soft news. Finally, I measure
the impact of a change in the number of newspapers on turnout at elections and study the
extent to which this impact depends on heterogeneity.
To perform this analysis, I build a new panel of local daily newspapers and turnout
at local elections in France from 1945 to 2012. For several reasons, the French local daily
newspapers industry is well suited to testing the predictions of my simple theoretical
framework. First, with on average more than 70% of the egilible voters in a county reading
a local daily newspaper everyday, this industry may be key to political participation at
the county level.4 Second, during this time period, I observe many entries and exits of
newspapers that I can use for identification. Finally, I choose to focus on this industry
because of the availability of excellent data. My dataset includes every local daily newspaper
3Higher heterogeneity in the tastes for soft news may come from the fact that soft news has more dimensions
(music, sport, movies, crime,...) than the political space which can often be reduced to two dimensions.
4In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, I use the term “county" when refering to a “département". In the
administrative division of France, a “département" corresponds roughly to a county in the United States (more
on this below).
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published in France over this time period. I determine for each year between 1945 and
2012 the number of newspapers present in each French county – the natural news market; I
collect annual data on each paper’s location and circulation. For the sub-period 1960-2012, I
collect annual information on each paper’s costs and revenues, as well as on the number
of employees.5 I use this data to quantify the effect of entry on the quality of newspapers;
following the existing literature, I use the number of journalists on staff as my first proxy
for newspaper quality (see e.g. Hamilton, 2004; Berry and Waldfogel, 2010). I supplement
this data for recent years (2005-2012) with measures of newspaper content, in particular of
the size of newspapers (number of articles and of words). This data allows me to study
how the quantity of news provided by newspapers varies with the market structure. I use
the quantity of news as my second proxy for newspaper quality; more content is indeed
presumably always preferred to less (see e.g. Berry and Waldfogel, 2010). Finally, I use
newspaper content data to classify each article as hard news or soft news. This information
allows me to test the prediction of the extension of my simple theoretical framework on the
impact of newspaper competition on the share of hard news.
The first empirical challenge is to isolate the impact of newspaper entry on incumbent
newspapers. My identification strategy uses the timing of entries as shocks affecting
incumbents. I estimate the effect of newspaper entry by comparing counties that experience
an entry to similar counties in the same years that do not. Because the entry decision is
made to maximize profits, counties that experience an entry are likely to differ from other
counties, both at the time of entry and in future periods. The identifying assumption is
that newspapers in these other counties form a valid counterfactual for the incumbent
newspapers in counties that experience an entry, after conditioning for differences in pre-
existing trends, newspaper fixed effects, year fixed effets, and a large set of demographic
covariates controlling for the age composition, occupational structure and educational level
5To give a flavour of what is generally available in terms of newspaper cost and revenue data, it is worth
remembering that in their study of how economic incentives shape ideological diversity in the media, Gentzkow
et al. (2012) have no other choice but to use balance sheet data on anonymous newspapers that they match with
newspapers using circulation value. On the contrary, I have actual annual balance sheet data for French local
daily newspapers from 1960 to 2009.
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of counties. In particular, I show that counties that experience entry and these counterfactual
counties exhibit similar trends in circulation, revenues, expenses and number of employees
prior to newspaper entry. I use both an aggregate event studies and a fixed-effect model
allowing for time-varying effects of entry to perform this analysis.
The second empirical challenge is to quantify the extent of heterogeneity in the willingness-
to-pay across counties. While the theoretical framework yields a precise measure of hetero-
geneity, the choice of data is more problematic. First, I compute a measure of heterogeneity
in the willingness-to-pay for quality based on the distribution of individuals across socio-
economic groups. The higher the probability that two randomly selected individuals in
a county belong to two different socio-economic groups, the higher the heterogeneity in
this county. Second, to test the prediction of the extended version of the simple theoretical
framework, I quantify the relative heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news
and soft news. I proxy the willingness-to-pay for hard news with a measure of political
polarization: the share of the votes for extreme-right and extreme-left parties.
The empirical evidence confirms the predictions of my theoretical framework. First,
I show that entry reduces the circulation of incumbent newspapers by nearly 25%. This
business stealing is particularly strong in low-heterogeneity areas (44%), as predicted by the
model. This leads to a 20 to 36% decrease in incumbent newspapers’ revenues and expenses
and a 57% decrease in the number of journalists working for incumbent newspapers in
low-heterogeneity counties. This decrease in the number of journalists is not compensated
by an overall increase in the aggregate number of journalists working at the news-market
level. Second, using data for recent years (2005-2012), I show that an additional newspaper
leads to a 14 to 29% decrease in newspapers’ size, to a 9 to 13% decrease in the share
of hard news and to a 25 to 32% decrease in the amount of hard news. The decrease in
hard news is driven by counties in which political polarization is low. Moreover I find that
more competition leads to more newspaper differentiation and that this effect is lower in
low-heterogeneity counties in which newspapers have less space for differentiation.
Finally, I look into the impact of media competition on participation at elections. I match
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my data on the number of local newspapers with city-level data on turnout at mayoral
elections that I digitize from official records.6 My empirical strategy follows Gentzkow et al.
(2011). I look at changes in political participation in cities that experience a newspaper entry
or exit relative to other cities in the same region and year that do not. I find that an increase
in newspaper competition has a robust negative impact on turnout at local elections, with
one additional newspaper decreasing turnout by approximately 0.3 percentage points. When
considering only low-heterogeneity areas, this negative impact increases to 0.6 percentage
points. This effect is robust to a range of alternative specifications and controls which bring
confidence in interpreting it as being causal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 below relates my work
to the existing literature. Section 1.3 lays out the simple theoretical framework. In Section
1.4, I describe the French local daily newspapers industry and review the new dataset I
build for this study. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 test the predictions of the model. In Section 1.5, I
study empirically the impact of an entry on the quality of newspapers (measured by the
number of journalists and the size of newspapers) and on the content they produce (the
share of hard news). In Section 1.6, I investigate the impact of changes in the number of
newspapers on turnout at local elections. Section 2.5 discusses alternative mechanisms and
external validity. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Relation to Existing Literature
My results complement a growing literature on media and politics. Considering different me-
dia outlets, a number of papers have found that media access increases political participation
(Stromberg, 2004; Gentzkow, 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2009; Schulhofer-Wohl
and Garrido, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2010; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010; Gentzkow et al.,
6City-level data on turnout at mayoral elections is hardly available in the United States. Ferreira and
Gyourko (2009) collect information on mayoral elections between 1950 and 2005 in over 400 cities which is, to
the extent of my knowledge, the most complete dataset as of today.
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2011; Campante et al., 2013).7 My paper contributes to this literature by studying the
non-monotonicity of this finding. Moving from 0 to 1 newspaper (media access) can have
very different effects than moving from n > 0 to n+ 1 newspapers (media competition).
Under certain conditions, an increase in the competitiveness of the market may indeed lead
to a “race to the bottom" with a dumbing-down of newspapers’ content and a decrease in
political participation (Zaller, 1999; Arnold, 2002). Considering the intensive margin of the
media is thus of particular importance in today’s high-choice media environment.
To the extent of my knowledge, Drago et al. (2013) is the only paper studying the
effect of newspaper competition on electoral participation beyond the effect of newspaper
access.8 They find that the entry of local newspapers leads to an increase in turnout in
municipal elections in Italy. They also find that it increases total readership per capita. In
the theoretical framework I develop in this paper, such a market expansion could explain the
increase in turnout they obtain and might be due to high heterogeneity of Italian readership.
Determining whether it is the case requires modeling – and testing – the incentives of the
media to deliver news. This is the second contribution of my paper.
While the existing literature has focused on the economic incentives that shape ideolog-
ical diversity in the media (Strömberg, 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2006; Anand et al., 2007; Gentzkow et al., 2012; Qin et al., 2013), I model and
test empirically how an increase in the number of newspapers in a news market affects
the quality of newspapers (the size of the newsroom and the number of articles) and the
share of hard news in newspapers’ content. In my setting, newspapers face heterogeneous
consumers which differ vertically in their willingness-to-pay for quality rather than hori-
zontally in their political bias. From this point of view, my paper is related to the research
on product quality in the context of vertical consumer heterogeneity (Shaked and Sutton,
7Gentzkow et al. (2011), using a panel of local US daily newspapers, show that one additional newspaper
increases turnout at national elections but underline that the effect is ”driven mainly by the first newspaper in a
market”.
8Becker and Milbourn (2011) study the effect of increased competition in the ratings industry on the quality
of ratings and find that it tends to decrease this quality.
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1982; Tirole, 1988; Choi and Shin, 1992; Motta, 1993). Following Wauthy (1996), I offer the
complete characterization of quality choices without assuming ex ante that the market is,
or not, covered. But while in Wauthy (1996) there is no cost of producing quality, I model
competition under fixed costs of quality improvement. Newspapers indeed operate under
increasing returns to scale. Moreover, dividing the content of newspapers between hard
and soft news, I introduce a second dimension of vertical differentiation (Vandenbosch and
Weinberg, 1995; Lauga and Ofek, 2011).
Investigating newspapers’ decision to supply different type of news is important because
different consumers may sort into different news.9 Increased competition in the media
market – or reciprocally, ownership consolidation through mergers (Fan, 2013) – may affect
this decision. Using evidence from radio broadcasting, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) find that
increased concentration increases variety.10 Similarly, focusing on the impact of market size
on product quality, Berry and Waldfogel (2010) show that in daily newspapers, the average
quality of products increases with market size, but that the market does not offer much
additional variety as it grows large. They measure quality with the paper’s number of pages
and of reporters on staff. George (2007) also uses data on reporters when studying how
differentiation and variety increase with concentration in markets for daily newspapers.11
My research differs from this past empirical work in the direct use of media content to
measure the size of newspapers and the shares of hard and soft news12, in the large sample
of media outlets I cover (264 newspapers), and in my ability to study these effects over a
9Gentzkow (2006) and Prior (2005) find for example that once television and cable TV, respectively, become
available to US viewers, some of them stop watching news programs and sort into entertainment programs.
10See also Della Vigna and Kennedy (2011) on media concentration and bias coverage.
11In their study of the effect of the New York Times penetration on local product positioning, George and
Waldfogel (2006) similarly use data on the assignment of reporters and editors to topical beats.
12There is a growing empirical literature studying newspaper content but its focus is on political bias and
not on the quantity or kind of news produced. Various measures of media bias have been used, in particular
measures of newspapers’ political leanings (endorsement, candidate mentions,... ) using automated searches
of news text. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) proxy the political positions of US media outlets by the average
ideology of the think tanks they quote. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), exploiting the Congressional Record,
use similarities between language used by media outlets and congressmen. Finally, Puglisi and Snyder (2011)
propose a new method for measuring the relative ideological positions of newspapers using data on ballot
propositions.
12
long period of time (1945-2012).
1.3 Theoretical Framework: Competition and News Production
In this section, I present a simple theoretical framework that guides the subsequent empirical
exercise and aids in interpreting the results.
There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1 and two profit-maximizing newspapers
under duopoly, newspaper 1 and newspaper 2 (only one newspaper under monopoly,
newspaper m). I study the production choices (price and quality) of newspapers under
monopoly and duopoly. The analysis is based on a two-stage non-cooperative sequential
game. Newspapers first choose simultaneously their quality and then compete simultane-
ously in price.
1.3.1 Model Set-Up: Consumers
Consumers choose whether to buy a newspaper. I assume that there is unit-demand:
consumers cannot buy more than one unit of the newspaper. Moreover, in order to keep the
model tractable, I assume that there is no multi-homing: when there are two newspapers,
consumers can only buy one of the two. They cannot buy both newspapers at the same
time. Each consumer has an outside option normalized to 0.13
I assume that there is vertical differentiation.14 Consumers are heterogeneous with
respect to their willingness-to-pay for a single attribute of the newspaper: the quality of the
newspaper whatsoever the type of content.
Consumer i maximizes the following utility function:
13Assuming the existence of an outside good is a common assumption in discrete choice models. The
distinction between the outside good and the competing products is that the price of the outside good is not set
in response to the prices of the inside goods. In the absence of an outside good, consumers are forced to choose
from the inside goods and demand depends only on differences in prices (Berry, 1994).
14Products are vertically differentiated when all consumers agree about the quality ordering of the products
but differ in how much they are willing to pay for higher quality. On the contrary, products are horizontally
differentiated when consumers disagree about which type of product provides them with greater utility holding
prices constant.
13
Vi =
8>><>>:
ginj   pj, if she buys newspaper j
0, otherwise
where pj is the price of newspaper j, nj is its quality and gi is consumer i’s willingness-to-pay
for quality. I assume that g is uniformly distributed with unit density over the intervalh
g,g
i
: U ⇠
h
g,g
i
.15
In the monopoly case, consumer i buys newspaper j iff
ginj   pj   0
In the duopoly case, newspaper j’s (j = 1, 2) demand, Dj, is defined as the set of
consumer types who get greater surplus from its quality-price offering than from the other
firm’s quality-price offering or the outside option:
Dj =
n
g ⇠ U
h
g,g
i
: gnj   pj   gnz   pz 8z = 0, 1, 2
o
(1.1)
Higher types (consumers with a high g) more strongly prefer higher-quality newspapers
since they get a higher marginal benefit. They thus choose the higher-quality newspaper
under duopoly. Middle types choose the lower-quality newspaper. Finally, if the market is
not covered, lower types choose the outside option. Importantly here I am not assuming
market coverage ex ante. The extent of consumers’ heterogeneity – measured by the ratio
g
g – determines whether the market is actually covered or not. Market coverage is an
endogenous outcome of the quality game, as it will appear clearly below.
1.3.2 Model Set-Up: Newspapers
Newspapers maximize their profits by choosing their price p and their quality n:
15Assuming that consumers type are distributed uniformly allows me to remove non-uniformity of the
consumer preference distribution as a possible explanation of product positioning. With a uniform distribution,
if a firm chooses to produce a certain quality, it is not because more consumers have that quality as their ideal
product than any other. On the contrary, with non-uniform distributions, firms may tend to cluster around the
majority customer preference (“agglomeration effect") (see e.g. Ansari et al., 1994). Moreover, the uniformity
assumption is convenient for deriving analytical results.
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max
(nj,pj)
Pj =
"
pjDj (n,p) 
cn2j
2
  S
#
(1.2)
where S is the fixed cost for setting up a newspaper.16 Implicitly in this profit function, I am
considering advertising revenues as a per-reader proportional subsidy.17
Key here are the increasing returns to scale. The production cost is a quadratic function
of the quality n and is given by
cn2j
2 . This cost is fixed with respect to output. The cost of
producing the first newspaper is indeed high and increasing in quality – it depends on the
number of journalists on staff –, but once this fixed cost has been borne, the variable cost of
selling additional newspapers is limited to the cost of paper, printing and distribution, which
is relatively low (see e.g. Baron, 2006; Berry and Waldfogel, 2010). Note that this quadratic
production cost increases with quality at a faster rate than any agent’s willingness-to-pay
(consumers’ utility functions are linear in quality).
1.3.3 Timing of the Game
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Newspapers simultaneously choose their product positioning n.
2. Newspapers simultaneously choose their price.
This time ordering is standard. Price can indeed often be adjusted faster than product
characteristics can. Competing first simultaneously in quality before competing simul-
taneously in price allows newspapers to differentiate in quality in order to soften price
competition. The two-stage modeling enables the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium,
16This includes the annual costs that must be incurred in order to set up a newspaper (office space, equipment,
printing press, etc.) and to maintain a reputation as a media outlet (e.g. one needs to have a minimal number of
journalists covering core issues, etc.).
17I am implicitly assuming here that advertisers place the same value on all kind of readers. One could argue
that depending on the demographics of the readers, advertisers may place different values for example on those
who prefer soft news than on those who prefer hard news. In an extension of the model below (Section 1.3.5), I
divide newspaper’s content between hard and soft news. One simple way to take into account different values
advertisers place on different readers is simply to assume different average tastes for hard and soft news.
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when none would exist if qualities and prices were chosen simultaneously.18
1.3.4 Solving the Model
I compare the production choices of newspapers under monopoly and under duopoly. I do
not consider the cases with more than two newspapers. That is, I assume that the set-up cost
is sufficiently large (S > S) so that a third entrant would suffer losses. Whether monopoly
or duopoly prevails in equilibrium also depends on S. One can easily show that if S is
sufficiently small (S < S < S), the second entrant can make positive profits, so that there is
a duopoly. Conversely, for S sufficiently large (S > S), no entry is profitable, and there is a
monopoly (see Appendix Section A.5).
I solve the game by backward induction. I only consider pure-strategy equilibria.
Solutions fall under two cases depending on the degree of heterogeneity of consumers’
willingness-to-pay. Comparing the quality of the newspaper under monopoly (n⇤m) to
the quality of the competing newspapers under duopoly (n⇤1,n⇤2), I obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Business stealing and returns to scale in news production)
Assume n⇤m is the monopoly equilibrium and (n⇤1 ,n⇤2) is the duopoly equilibrium. 9 l,l such that
If gg   l (high heterogeneity of tastes), n⇤1 < n⇤m < n⇤2 (i.e. under duopoly, one duopolist produces a
lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist, and the other one a higher-quality newspaper).
If gg < l (low heterogeneity of tastes), n
⇤
1 < n
⇤
2 < n
⇤
m (i.e. under duopoly, both duopolists produce a
lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist).
Proof. See Appendix A.5
The only Nash Equilibrium is an asymmetric equilibrium in which one newspaper is of
higher quality than the other newspaper. Newspapers indeed always choose to differentiate
because differentiation allows them to relax price competition while a symmetric equilibrium
18The sequential game specification has also implications for what markets a second paper enters. Specifically,
I am ruling out any limit-pricing type of behavior where a first-mover positions itself to deter entry by others.
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yields Bertrand competition – and zero profits – in the second stage of the game. The key
point is thus to determine whether the high-quality duopolist produces a higher-quality
newspaper than the monopolist. The impact of competition on the quality of newspapers
depends on the degree of taste heterogeneity. Under competition, newspapers can choose
between delivering a high-quality newspaper or lowering their price. They do not want to
be close on quality since that leads to less market power. Prices increase both in the quality
of the newspaper and in the quality differential (n2   n1) for both newspapers.
What is key for the result of Proposition 1 is that I do not assume market coverage
ex ante.19 Total reading increases – the business stealing effect decreases – with gg . When
heterogeneity is high (gg   l), the market is not covered under competition. Entry expands
the market and newspapers can differentiate on quality to soften price competition and
increase market power. One duopolist produces a lower-quality newspaper than the
monopolist, and the other one a higher-quality newspaper.
On the contrary, when heterogeneity is low (gg < l), the market is covered under
competition. There is business stealing: the second newspaper reduces the incumbent
newspaper’s output. Resources used on the fixed costs of news production increase and
competing newspapers reduce their quality. Both newspapers under duopoly thus produce
a lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist. Since there is no multi-homing, each reader
is less informed than under monopoly and the social surplus is reduced.20
19The existing literature studying oligopolies in which firms sell products of different qualities often assume
ex ante that the market is, or is not, covered. For example, Choi and Shin (1992) and Moorthy (1988) assume
that firms do not cover the market. On the contrary, Tirole (1988) assumes that firms cover the market. To the
extent of my knowledge, Wauthy (1996) is the first to provide a full characterization of quality choices, without
assuming ex ante market coverage. But he assumes zero costs. On the contrary, I assume the existence of a
quadratic cost function for quality.
20This result is in line with the findings of the literature on free entry and social inefficiency. Berry and
Waldfogel (1999) quantify for example the inefficiency due to free entry in the radio market (see also Steiner,
1952). The main difference here is that while Berry and Waldfogel (1999) model the radio broadcasting industry
as a homogenous-goods industry, I introduce differentiation in newpapers’ characteristics and heterogeneity in
consumers’ willingness-to-pay for these characteristics. When heterogeneity is not high enough, then the social
inefficiency result holds.
17
1.3.5 Extension: Hard vs. Soft News
In this extension of my simple theoretical framework, I divide newspaper content between
hard news (h) and soft news (s). Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their
willingness-to-pay for these two attributes of newspapers. Consumer i maximizes the
following utility function:
Vij =
8>><>>:
qihj + aisj   pj, if she buys newspaper j
0, otherwise
where hj is the quality of hard news produced by newspaper j, sj the quality of soft news,
and pj the price.
qi is consumer i’s willingness-to-pay for high-quality hard news. It is uniformly dis-
tributed with unit density over the interval q ⇠ U ⇥q, q⇤. Similarly, ai is consumer i’s
willingness-to-pay for high-quality soft news and a ⇠ U [a, a]. I assume that q and a are
mutually independent.
Newspapers maximize their profits by choosing their price p, the quality of hard news h
and the quality of soft news s:
max
(hj,sj,pj)
Pj =
"
pjDj (h, s,p) 
chh2j
2
  css
2
j
2
  S
#
where the production cost of hard news is given by
chh2j
2 and the production cost of soft news
by
css2j
2 . As before I assume that these costs are quality-dependent fixed costs.
21 Following
the general case, newspapers first choose their product positioning (h and s) and then
simultaneously compete in price.
I allow more heterogeneity in the tastes for one attribute (say soft news) than for the
other attribute (say hard news). A simple way to do it is to assume that qi = q 8i. Everything
21To be consistent with the general case of the model, I am assuming here that consumers differ vertically
in their preferences for hard and soft news. However combining heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for
newspaper quality with horizontal differentiation in the tastes for hard news and soft news will deliver similar
predictions.
18
else is assumed to be symmetrical. The average taste for hard and soft news is the same:
q = a+a2 . The cost of producing hard and soft news is also identical: ch = cs.
To increase tractability, I only present results in a discrete setting (however there are
robust to a continuous setting). h and s can only take two values: a low value (h, s) and a
high value (h, s). I assume that
h
h, h
i
= [s, s]. There is no cost of producing a low value of
hard or soft news, and a cost c > 0 of producing a high value. There are 4 possible strategies
for the newspaper:
1. (h, s) (cost = 0);
2. (h, s) (cost = c);
3.
⇣
h, s
⌘
(cost = c);
4.
⇣
h, s
⌘
(cost = 2c).
Monopoly Consider first what happens in the monopoly case. Comparing the profits in
the 4 possible cases leads to Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 (Monopoly)
As the production cost increases, a monopoly newspaper first cuts on soft news and then cuts on hard
news. That is, the monopoly chooses:
(h⇤m, s⇤m) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(h, s) if c < cm1 (s, s, a, a)
(h, s) if cm1 (s, s, a, a) < c < c
m
2 (s, s, a, a)
(h, s) if c > cm2 (s, s, a, a)
(M1)
(M2)
(M3)
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Two things have to be highlighted. First, it is never optimal for the monopoly to choose
(h, s). Second, the value of hard and soft news provided by the monopoly depends on the
degree of taste heterogeneity aa . The cost thresholds c
m
i (s, s, a, a) (i = 1, 2) are functions of
a
a
and ss . For a given ratio
s
s , the more heterogeneity in tastes
a
a , the higher the threshold cost
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cm1 (s, s, a, a) and the lower c
m
2 (s, s, a, a). That is to say, for a given
s
s , a higher heterogeneity
a
a increases the chances of soft news being low and hard news being high.
Duopoly Lemma 2 is obtained by computing the best response functions of each newspa-
per and solving for the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (Duopoly)
For all production costs, newspapers under duopoly specialize along the soft news dimension. That is,
competing newspapers choose:
(h⇤1, s⇤1), (h⇤2, s⇤2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(h, s), (h, s) if c < cd1(s, s, a, a)
(h, s), (h, s) if cd1(s, s, a, a) < c < c
d
2(s, s, a, a)
(h, s), (h, s) if c > cd2(s, s, a, a)
(D1)
(D2)
(D3)
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Regardless of where the other newspaper is located, each newspaper’s best product
strategy is always to differentiate on at least one dimension. Newspapers always differentiate
along the dimension with the greater heterogeneity, here soft news: if one newspaper chooses
to produce s, the other newspaper’s best product strategy is always to produce s. One
can think of the attribute with more heterogeneity as playing the same role as the single
dimension. Firms differentiate along this attribute to relax price competition. The role of
the second attribute is different. Newspapers use this attribute to manage demand and cost
considerations. If the production cost is low (equation (D1)), both newspapers produce a
high value of hard news h (since it is not costly for them to do so). When the production
cost increases above cd1 (equation (D2)) then newspapers choose to offer a low value of
information h to contain costs. Finally, when the cost increases above cd2 (equation (D3)),
it becomes optimal for newspaper 2 to sell to high-end consumers only to alleviate price
competition. In this case, newspapers exploit both dimensions to differentiate.
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Monopoly vs. duopoly Combining together the results for the monopoly and the duopoly
case, I obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Specialization effect)
There is an intermediate cost interval [c˜, cˆ] s.t. 8c 2 [c˜, cˆ] both newspapers under duopoly produce
less hard news than the newspaper under monopoly:
1. Monopoly: (h⇤m, s⇤m) = (h, s).
2. Duopoly: (h⇤1, s⇤1), (h⇤2, s⇤2) = (h, s), (h, s).
Proof. See Appendix A.5
1.3.6 Corollary Prediction: Political Participation
Proposition 1 shows how newspaper quality varies with the number of newspapers and how
this effect depends on the extent of heterogeneity. When heterogeneity is low, an increase
in the number of newspapers leads to a decrease in the quality of the two competing
newspapers. If more informed voters are more likely to vote (see e.g. Parlfrey and Poole,
1987; Banerjee et al., 2010; Campante and Do, 2013), then an increase in competition leads to
a decrease in political participation.22
Proposition 3 (Media competition and political participation)
Assume consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for quality.
When heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is high, newspaper entry leads to an increase
in turnout at elections.
When heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is low, newspaper entry leads to a decrease
in turnout at elections.
22I assume that people learn information for their voting decision as a by-product of newspaper readership.
An important number of studies have indeed shown that people often learn politically relevant facts as a
by-product of nonpolitical routines (Prior, 2007). As underlined by Hamilton (2004):“The small chance that an
individual reader’s political action can influence events makes it unlikely he or she will search out the information helpful
in making a voting decision." (p.2) .
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In the Appendix to this paper (Section A.6) I combine Proposition 1 with a voting model
to formalize this prediction.
1.3.7 Summary: Empirical Predictions
The simple theoretical framework above generates three testable predictions that I bring to
the data:
1. Newspaper quality: if heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is low,
newspaper entry leads to a decrease in the quality of the two competing newspapers
compared to the monopolist.
2. Type of news produced (extension): if the heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for
hard news is lower than the heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for soft news,
newspaper entry leads to a decrease in the quality of hard news produced by the two
competing newspapers compared to the monopolist.
3. Voter turnout: if heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is low, newspaper
entry leads to a decrease in voter turnout at elections.
Before testing these predictions, I describe the French local daily newspaper industry
and present the new dataset I build for this study.
1.4 Industry and Data Characteristics
As stated in the introduction, the French local daily newspaper industry is particularly
interesting to study because of the importance of this industry and the availaility of high-
quality data. I construct an annual dataset on the evolution of the French newspaper market
between 1945 and 2012. Section 1.4.1 discusses basic industry characteristics and presents its
historical development. Section 4.3 reviews the dataset. Finally Section 1.4.3 describes my
empirical measures to proxy for heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality.
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1.4.1 Industry Characteristics and Historical Development
My sample includes 264 local daily newspapers over the 1945-2012 period. These newspapers
are general information newspapers that offer a mix of soft and hard news topics. On
average, about two thirds of the space in these newspapers is devoted to soft news (one
third to hard news) but this mix can vary widely (Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics on
newspapers’ content). The average newspaper issue contains 421 articles of relatively small
length (286 words per article). The size of newspapers is one of my proxies for quality. The
other proxy I use is the number of journalists on staff. On average, 201 journalists work in
each newspaper (Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics on papers’ costs and revenues).
Overall, the local daily newspaper industry generates e2.515 billion ($3.424 billion) in
total revenues in 2012, three times more than the national daily newspaper industry (e687
million). It represents nearly 30% of the total revenues generated by the print media industry
(e8.705 billion23). 63% of theses revenues come from sales and 37% from advertisement. Its
total circulation is around 5.5 million copies a day, compared to 1.5 million for the national
daily newspaper industry.
To get a sense of how important these circulation numbers are, it is useful to present
them in terms of market penetration. The natural news market for a local daily newspaper
in France is a county24; there are 90 counties in metropolitan France excluding the area
of Paris.25 On average, there are 2.67 newspapers per county and the total newspaper
circulation in a county is 80, 981 copies which represents 24% of the eligible voters (see Table
23I.e. $11.850 billion or 0.43% of the GDP. In comparison, according to the Newspaper Association of America,
the US newspaper media industry generates $38.6 billion in total revenues in 2012 (0.25% of the GDP).
24A county (“département" in French) is a French administrative division. The median land area of a county
is 2,303 sq mi, which is slightly more than three-and-half times the median land area of a county in the United
States. In 2010, excluding Paris, the median population of a county is 478,366 inhabitants and the median
number of eligible voters is 350,658. (French local jurisdictions are described in more details in the Appendix
section A.1).
25In my analysis, I exclude the Paris area. In this area, local daily newspapers are indeed competing in
a different way with national newspapers. Paris having a national dimension, a lot of “local" information
concerning the area of Paris is covered in national newspapers. Then there is much more competition between
the different newspapers than in the rest of France and considering only competition between local newspapers
would be misleading.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Newspapers’ Content
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Number of words per front page 370
(222)
Number of articles in the newspaper 421
(302)
Number of words in the newspaper 107044
(83165)
Average article length 286
(40)
Share of articles on hard news 34.8
(13.4)
Share of articles on soft news 66.5
(11.5)
Share of words on hard news 32.7
(13.9)
Share of words on soft news 68.6
(11.9)
Newspaper specialization (Herfindhal Index) 0.17
(0.13)
Observations 94,901 30,503 28,180
Notes: The table gives summary statistics for newspapers’ content. It presents the average and the standard
deviations (between parentheses) of the variables. Variables are values for newspapers. Time period is 2005-2012.
The share of articles on hard news is defined as the number of articles on agriculture, economics, education,
environnement, international or politics, divided by the total number of articles I classify. The share of articles
on soft news is defined as the number of articles on movies, culture, leisure activities, sports, “news in brief",
religion or health, divided by the total number of articles I classify. Newspaper specialization is an Herfindahl
index of newspaper differentation. The Herfindahl index is equal to the sum of the squares of the shares of the
different newpaper topics in each newspaper issue: agriculture, culture, economics, education, environnement,
health, international, leisure activities, movies, “news in brief", politics religion and sports.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Newspapers’ Costs and Revenues
1960-2009 1999-2012
mean/sd mean/sd
Profits 974
(37,973)
Total Revenues 44,339
(64,426)
Revenues from Sales 25,627
(49,092)
Advertising Revenues 16,893
(22,146)
Total Expenses 43,052
(55,440)
Expenses on Labor (Payroll) 24,815
(25,198)
Expenses on Intermediate Goods (Inputs) 32,236
(36,362)
Number of Employees 432
(407)
Number of Journalists 201
(123)
Share of Journalists in Employees 0.36
(0.20)
Observations 2,169 353
Notes: The table gives summary statistics for newspapers’ revenues, expenses and number of employees
and journalists. It presents the average and the standard deviations (between parentheses) of the variables.
Variables are values for newspapers. All variables (excepted the number of employees and journalists) are in
(constant 2009) thousand euros. Time period is 1960-2009 for all the variables excepted the number of journalists
(1999-2012).
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1.3 which presents summary statistics on newspaper circulation). Given that the average
ratio of reported readership to circulation is 2.93, this implies that more than 70% of the
egilible voters in a county read a local daily newspaper. Hence the issue of how changes in
the news market structure affect the provision of information by daily local newspapers is
key. Although there is a downward trend in circulation over the period 1945-2012, the total
circulation of local newspapers has always been extremely large. The number of copies sold
everyday ranges from 20 to 30% of the eligible voters during my period of interest.26
Given the importance of circulation across nearby counties – between 1945 and 2012,
42% of the local daily newspapers circulate in more than one county, and these newspapers
circulate on average across 4 counties27 – my main variables of interest are at the newspaper-
county level.
Newspaper entries and exits The central independent variable in my analysis is the
change in the number of newspapers. My sample includes 630 newspaper-county pairs. I
observe a total of 276 county-years with net newspaper entry and 361 county-years with
net newspaper exit. Figure A.11 shows for each year the number of counties with net
newspaper entry (upper figure A.11a) and the number of counties with net newspaper exit
(bottom figure A.11b). The high number of entries and exits between 1945 and 1955 comes
from the Second World War. The wartime period marks an almost wholly clean break with
the prewar media system, with the press industry effectively rebuilt from scratch once the
conflict is over.28 When I exclude this post-war period (1945-1954), I am left with a total
of 79 county-years with net newspaper entry and 222 county-years with net newspaper
26See the Appendix Figure A.16.
27More detailed summary statistics on the circulation of newspapers across counties are available in the
Appendix Section A.2.
28In the immediate postwar period, newspapers accused of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers are closed
down and their assets redistributed to owners untainted by collaboration. While the old prewar press groups
are eliminated, a new press system is reconstituted from independent companies. Of the 206 (local and national)
daily newspaper titles that had been published in France in 1939, only 28 are able to resume operations after
the war (Guillauma, 1988).
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exit.29 The entering newspapers are either new newspapers entering the newspaper market
from scratch (in 24% of the cases30) or existing newspapers entering a neighboring market.
Importantly, in more than 76% of the cases, newspapers on a given market are owned by
different owners. This share increases to 80% when considering markets with only two
newspapers.
Given that entries and exits are key for my identification strategy, it is critical to under-
stand the forces that cause them. The existing literature suggest two primary determinants
of the number of newspapers in a market (see e.g. Gentzkow et al., 2011). The first is
population. As I underline above, newspapers have fixed costs, so market size is a major
determinant of the number of newspapers in a market (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Berry,
1992). In the Appendix Table A.5, I provide evidence that, on the one hand, the market
size is a good predictor of the number of active newspapers, and that on the other hand,
newspapers move in where there is a trending population. The second determinant of the
number of newspapers is income; richer counties can command both greater consumers’
willingness to pay for newspapers and marketability to advertisers. For the recent period
2003-2010, I have county-level annual data on the total income tax revenue collected by the
government.31 This proxy for income is significantly and positively correlated with the
number of newspapers.
1.4.2 Data
In this section, I briefly describe the dataset I have constructed for this paper. I discuss
further details of the construction of the data in the Appendix (section A.1). Those readers
who feel uninterested by these technical details may want to go directly to Section 1.4.3.
29Section A.2 in the Appendix presents a more detailed overview of this data.
3065 out of the 276 county-years with net newspaper entry I observe come from this new newspapers. Among
these 65 cases, 51 are caused by new newspaper owners entering the local daily newspaper industry.
31This data is from the Finance Ministry.
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Figure 1.1: Number of Counties with Net Newspaper Entry / Net Newspaper Exit by Year
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Newspaper circulation, costs and revenues To determine for each year between 1945 and
2012 the number of newspapers present in each French county, I use various sources of
information (e.g. official registries) that I digitize and merge. I count local daily newspapers
from these sources: in each year, I extract the name and the counties in which every local
daily newspaper circulates. I match newspapers across time using their title and counties.
For each county-year, I also compute the number of local daily newspapers which serves as
my key explanatory variable.
For the period 1945-1990, newspaper circulation data comes from official data I digitize
and merge. Data for recent years (1990-2012) comes from the French press observatory. I
collect annual data on newspaper readership between 1957 and 2011 from studies on French
newspaper readers principally conducted for the advertising market. These surveys cover,
for each newspaper, information on its aggregate readership.
I compute annually for local daily newspapers between 1960 and 2009 a number of
important economic indicators, namely sales, profits, value-added, operating expenses (on
intermediate goods and labor), operating revenues (revenues from sales and revenues from
advertising) and the number of employees. This dataset is, to the extent of my knowledge,
the most complete existing dataset on newspapers’ costs and revenues. I collect data
covering the period 1960-1974 from the archives of the Ministry of Information. Between
1960 and 1974, French newspapers were asked by the Ministry of Information to report
annually on circulation, expenses, revenues and profits. From 1984 to 200932, the data
comes from the Enterprise Survey of the French national institute for statistics. I identify
newspapers in the dataset using the French registry of establishments and enterprises. For
the newspapers not covered in the Enterprise Survey, I use information from the Bureau
van Dijk’s websites (in particular ORBIS). For 24 newspapers between 1999 and 2012, I also
collect information on the number of journalists. The correlation between the total number
of employees and the number of journalists is equal to 0.94 and is statistically significant at
the 1% level. Finally I collect price data for my entire sample of newspapers between 1960
32Unfortunately, no data is available for the period 1975-1983.
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and 2012.
Given that my analysis is at the newspaper-county level, I need to construct newspaper-
county-level values of the variables. This is simple when the only newspapers circulating
in a county are headquartered in this county and do not circulate outside. It is more
problematic when a newspaper circulates across nearby counties. In this case, I use data
on the geographical dispersion of circulation; for each newspaper, I assign to the counties
in which it circulates a percentage of the value of the variable (e.g. total sales, operating
expenses,...) equal to its share of the newspaper circulation.
Newspaper content I supplement this data for recent years with measures of newspaper
content, in particular of the size of newspapers. I use three different measures of size. First,
for each newspaper issue, I count the number of words by front page. Front pages are
available daily for 51 newspapers over the period 2006-2012. I download them from the
local daily press syndicate website using an automated script.33
Second, I collect data on the entire daily content of each newspaper by using an
automated script to retrieve for each day all the articles published in the newspaper. I
download the data from two different websites which aggregate content from newspapers
(Factiva and Lexis-Nexis). I construct a dataset covering 22 different newspapers over the
period 2005-2012 with information on the total number of articles and the total number of
words per issue.34
I next use the metadata (tag) associated with each article on Lexis-Nexis (title, subject,
topic) to classify articles as hard news or soft news. The share of articles on hard news
is defined as the number of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environnement,
international or politics, divided by the total number of articles I am able to classify. The
share of articles on soft news is defined as the number of articles on movies, culture, leisure
33Using front pages is not new in the literature. To establish evidence of media capture, DiTella and
Franceschelli (2011) construct an index of how much first-page coverage of the four major newspapers in
Argentina is devoted to corruption scandals.
34Berry and Waldfogel (2010) also use the size of the paper to measure quality, but they measure it with the
number of pages, not with the number of articles per issue.
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activities, sports, “news in brief" (faits divers), religion or health, divided by the total number
of articles I am able to classify.35 (More details on the classification of articles between hard
and soft news are presented in Section 1.5.5.)
Finally, I use the article classification in sub-categories to construct a measure of newspa-
per differentiation. This measure is an Herfindhal index ranging from 0 – no specialization,
i.e. no differentiation between newspapers that all deal with all the topics – to 1 – perfect
newspaper specialization, i.e. important newspaper differentiation, each newspaper being
specialized in a given topic (e.g. music or sport). This index is equal to the sum of the
squares of the shares of the different newpaper topics in each newspaper issue.
Electoral data and demographic controls I focus on mayoral (city-level) elections. As of
today, there are 36,570 cities in metropolitan France. There are 2,282 cities with more than
3,500 inhabitants outside the area of Paris. In this paper I focus on these cities over 3,500
inhabitants since the electoral rule for mayoral elections for cities under 3,500 inhabitants is
different. For each election, I measure turnout as the ratio of cast votes to eligible voters.
I use cast votes rather than total votes since in France blank votes are not included in
turnout. Mayoral elections take place in France every six years. Between 1945 and 2012, 11
elections took place: 1947, 1953, 1959, 1965, 1971, 1977, 1983, 1989, 1995, 2001 and 2008.36
Before 1983, data on French mayoral elections have never been digitized. I construct the
first electronically available dataset on French local elections results at the city level between
1945 and 1982, using official data sources in paper format. More recent data are available in
digitized format from the Centre de Données Socio-Politiques (CDSP) of Science-Po Paris, the
Interior Ministry, and Bach (2011). On average over the period, the turnout rate is equal to
67%.37
35By construction, the sum of both shares is equal to 100.
36A mayoral election also took place in 1945. I choose not to include it in the dataset since this election took
place before the end of the Second World War in very special conditions and just two years before the 1947
election.
37In the Appendix Figure A.17, I show the evolution of the turnout rate between 1947 and 2008.
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City-level demographic data from the French census is available in electronic format from
1960 to 2012. I digitize data for the 1936, 1946 and 1954 censuses from original publications
by the French national institute for statistics. I compute the share of the population by age
group (1945-2012), occupation and degree (1960-2012). For each measure, I interpolate both
the numerator and denominator between census years using a natural cubic spline (Herriot
and Reinsch, 1973) and divide the two to obtain an estimate of the relevant share.
1.4.3 Measures of Heterogenity
The most novel feature of my simple theoretical framework is that the effect of entry depends
on the extent of heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay.
Heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality While the model yields a precise
measure of heterogeneity
⇣
g
g
⌘
, the choice of the data to quantify the extent of heterogeneity
in the willingness-to-pay for quality across counties is more problematic. If data on the
income distribution of individuals within each county were available, I could have used
the dispersion of this distribution as my measure of county-level heterogeneity.38 The
income distribution follows a Pareto distribution and one can estimate the slope of the
distribution using regression techniques. However, income data at the county level is only
available since 2003 and, moreover, it is aggregated into 6 different categories, precluding
such an estimation of the dispersion. Nevertheless, I can compute an heterogeneity measure
by using the distribution of individuals across socio-economic groups. Individuals (the
working population between 15 and 64 year old) in the census are indeed classified into
n = 6 different socio-economic groups39 and the data is available since 1960. Following the
38Tirole (1988) shows for example that g can be viewed as the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution
between income and quality rather than as a taste parameter. As far as the choice between buying and not
buying is concerned, the consumer’s preferences could be read as Vij = nj   1gi pj. On this interpretation, all
consumers derive the same surplus from the newspaper, but they have different incomes and therefore, different
marginal rates of substitution between income and quality 1gi . Wealthier consumers have a lower “marginal
utility of income" or, equivalently, a higher g.
39(i) Farmers; (ii) Artisans, shopkeepers and company managers (“artisans-commercants-chefs d’entreprises");
(iii) Senior executives and knowledge workers (“cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures"); (iv) Intermediate
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existing literature, the heterogeneity measure I use is one minus the Herfindahl index of the
share of the socio-economic groups (see e.g. Alesina et al., 2012):
Heterogeneityct = 1 
n
Â
i=1
p2ict
where pict is the share of the population from socio-economic group i in county c and year t.
Heterogeneityct increases when the evenness of the distribution of the individuals among
the different categories increases. It gives us the probability that two randomly selected
individuals in a county belong to two different socio-economic groups.
I compute the heterogeneity measure for each county for the first year for which I have
socio-economic group data in the census, namely 1960 (this also corresponds to the first
year for which I have data on newspapers’ revenues and expenses). Using the median
over all the counties, I then split my sample of counties between low-heterogeneity and
high-heterogeneity counties. Given the fact that in the model the results depend on whether
a county is below or above a heterogeneity threshold, such a binary measure of heterogeneity
is more relevant than a continuous measure. I compute this measure at the beginning of the
time period rather than on an annual basis to avoid any endogeneity issue.
Importantly, this measure of heterogeneity is not correlated with county size. However,
low- and high-heterogeneity counties differ in terms of other demographic covariates.
In the Appendix Table A.3, I perform a t-test on the equality of means for education,
socio-economic groups, age, total population and the number of newspapers of high- and
low-heterogeneity counties. I find that low-heterogeneity counties have a higher proportion
of low-educated people (who only achieve elementary primary school), a higher proportion
of farmers and of laborers, and a higher proportion of individuals below 20 years old.
Relative heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard and soft news Finally, to bring
to the data the prediction of the extended case of my simple theoretical framework, I need
occupations (“professions intermédiaires"); (v) Employees; (vi) Laborers. In the Appendix Figure A.18 I show the
evolution of the socio-economic composition of France between 1960 and 2012.
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to quantify the relative heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news and for soft
news. As I underline above, higher heterogeneity in the tastes for soft news may come from
the fact that soft news has more dimensions than the political space. I proxy heterogeneity
in the willingness-to-pay for hard news with a measure of political polarization. Using
electoral results for the 2002 presidential election (the last election which takes place before
2005 – the first year for which I have newspaper’s content data), I construct for each county
the share of the votes for extreme-right and extreme-left parties. My assumption is that the
higher this share, the higher the heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news. The
next section studies empirically the impact of an entry on the quality of newspapers.
1.5 Newspaper Competition and News Quality
In this section, I test the predictions of the simple theoretical framework described in Section
1.3 (proposition 1) and of its extension (proposition 2). I study how newspaper quality varies
with the market structure and interact the effect of the market structure with the degree of
heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay. To measure empirically the vertical quality
attribute of newspapers, I first use the total number of employees; as I show above, this
number is strongly correlated with the number of journalists on staff. The advantage of
this measure is that it allows me to use the panel dimension of the dataset to exploit the
timing of entries and exits for identification. My second proxy for quality is “quantity" –
the size of newspapers. More content is indeed presumably always preferred to less by
consumers. I use quantity to estimate both the impact of competition on newspaper quality
and on the type of news produced – hard versus soft news. I perform this analysis taking a
reduced-form approach to shed light on whether the empirical results are consistent with
the predictions of my theoretical framework. I use all the variations in the data from n > 0
to n+ 1 newspapers.
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1.5.1 Empirical Strategy
The main empirical challenge is to isolate the impact of entries and exits on incumbent
newspapers. My identification strategy relies on the timing of these events. I estimate
the effect of the entry (or exit) of a newspaper by comparing counties that experience an
entry (or exit) to similar counties in the same year that do not. Because the entry decision
is made to maximize profits, counties that experience an entry are likely to differ from
other counties, both at the time of entry and in future periods. The identifying assumption
is that newspapers in these other counties form a valid counterfactual for the incumbent
newspapers in counties that experience an entry, after conditioning for differences in pre-
existing trends, newspaper fixed effects, year fixed effets, and a large set of demographic
covariates controlling for the age composition, occupational structure and educational level
of counties, as well as for the circulation of national newspapers. I provide below evidence
that entries are orthogonal to the outcomes I study: there are no pretrends in circulation,
revenues, expenses and the number of employees before entries (Section 1.5.2).40 Given
the existence of treatment and control counties with a common underlying trend, I can
quantify the entry effect that induces a sharp deviation from this trend. As underlined
above, between 1945 and 2012, I observe a total of 276 county-years with net entry and 361
county-years with net exit, and of 79 county-years with net entry and 222 county-years with
net exit when I drop the postwar period.
1.5.2 Results: Market Expansion or Business Stealing?
According to the simple theoretical framework I propose, the entry of a newspaper on a
market may have a negative impact on incumbent newspapers if there is business stealing:
the total circulation of the entrant exceeds the increase in the news market total circulation.
To estimate whether it is the case, I use my panel data on newspaper competition and track
40Orthogonality may come from the fact that, in the spirit of a latent variable model with threshold crossing,
small increases in population create a discontinuity. While entry is discontinuous, demographic charateristics
indeed change smoothly.
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the impact of a change in competition on newspapers’ circulation. I study how a change in
the number of newspapers in a county affects (i) the circulation of incumbent newspapers
(per eligible voter) in the county; and (ii) the total newspaper circulation (per eligible voter)
in the county. I estimate alternatively an aggregate event studies and a fixed-effect model
that allows for time-varying effects of entries and exits.
Aggregate event studies The event of an entry (alternatively an exit) is the cross-sectional
dimension and the years around the event are the temporal dimension of my panel. In the
case of an entry, incumbent newspapers are defined as the newspapers circulating in the
county the year before the entry. I study how the circulation of these newspapers is affected
by the introduction of a new newspaper. Business stealing corresponds to a decrease in
the circulation of incumbent newspapers. In the case of an exit, incumbent newspapers are
defined as the newspapers circulating in the county the year before the exit excepted the
newspaper which exits. The exit of a newspaper should either increase or not affect the
circulation of incumbent newspapers. The analysis is robust to summing the variables of
interest over incumbent newspapers or to consider each incumbent newspaper separately
(in which case the cross-sectional dimension is the interaction of an event and a newspaper).
I present here the results using the sum over incumbents.
I study the effect of newspaper entry and exit separately since the impact of entry and
exit on circulation may not be symmetrical.41 One of the main reason why it may not be
symmetrical is the life cycle of newspapers. Newspapers enter large but exit small. On
average circulation in the year of entry is equal to 116% of a newspaper’s lifetime average
circulation; circulation in the last year before exit is equal to 75% of the lifetime average.
Newspaper entry I consider first newspaper entry. Let c index counties, e index entry
events, t index calendar years and j index event periods. By normalization, entry takes place
41There are some episodes during which there are simultaneously one (or more) entry(ies) and one (or more)
exit(s) in a given county a given year. When entry(ies) and exit(s) cancel out I drop the episode. My results are
robust to either considering as entries the episodes during which there are more entries than exits (net entry) or
to dropping them. Similarly, they are robust to either considering episodes of net exit as exit or dropping them.
Additional details on the construction of the episodes are available in the Appendix Section A.1.
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in j = 0. The outcome of interest, circulationcte, is the (aggregate) circulation of incumbent
newspaper(s) per eligible voter.
I estimate the following model:
circulationcte =
+10
Â
k= 10
ak1j=kcte + X
0
ctd+ gt + hc + #cte (1.3)
where gt are year fixed effects, hc county fixed effects, and #cte is the error term. The vector
of controls X0ct includes the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education,
the share of the working population between 15 and 64 year old which is senior executive
or knowledge worker and the total population in county c and year t. Standard errors are
clustered by events.
The set of coefficients ak are my coefficients of interest.42 In Figure 1.2, I first plot these
coefficients ak for the entire period 1945-2012 and without controls. The dependent variable
is total circulation (per eligible voter) in the upper figure (Figure 1.2a) and the circulation of
incumbent newspapers (per eligible voter) in the bottom figure (Figure 1.2b). Two things
need to be underlined. First, whether I consider total county circulation or circulation
of incumbent newspapers, there is no pretrend before the entry. All the ak coefficients
before the event are not statistically significant and the point estimates are close to zero.
Second, despite the fact that there is some market expansion – the total circulation per
capita increases by around 4 percentage points (Figure 1.2a) –, we observe a strong and
permanent business stealing effect (Figure 1.2b). The circulation of incumbent newspapers
per eligible voter decreases by around 7 percentage points after entry, which corresponds to
a 26% decrease.43
According to my simple theoretical framework (proposition 1), the business-stealing
effect should be especially strong in low-heterogeneity counties. In Figure 1.3, controlling
for demographics (education, socio-economic groups and population) and focusing on the
42Years around the event go from  10 to +10 but results are robust to the use of other time intervals. Results
are also robust to estimating the model in first differences rather than in level.
43Between 1945 and 2012, the average circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter the year before
an entry is 26.92%.
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1960-2012 period, I investigate the effect of entry separately for low- and high-heterogeneity
counties. It appears clearly that the business-stealing effect is much more important in
low than in high-heterogeneity places. In low-heterogeneity counties, there is no market
expansion after an entry (Figure 1.3a). There is a negative impact on the circulation of
incumbent newspapers at the time of entry, and this impact becomes stronger in the years
following the entry. 8 years after the entry, we observe a 10 percentage points decrease in
the circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter, which corresponds to a 44%
decrease.44 The business-stealing effect is much smaller in high-heterogeneity counties.
First, in these counties, there is a small market expansion following the entry: the total
county circulation per eligible voter increases by 1.6 percentage points (Figure 1.3b). Second,
the incumbent newspapers’ circulation only decreases by between 1.9 percentage points at
the time of the entry and 3.5 percentage points ten years after the entry (Figure 1.3d).
Newspaper exit Does an exit symmetrically increase the circulation of remaining news-
papers? I estimate equation (1.3) considering only episodes of exit. Figure 1.4 shows the
coefficients ak from this estimation for the period 1960-2012 controlling for demographics,
for both low-heterogeneity (1.4a and 1.4c) and high-heterogeneity counties (1.4b and 1.4d).
Contrary to what we observe for entries, the magnitude of the effects for exits are very
small (to make it appears clearly, I use the same scale for the y-axis of the figures for
entry and exit). This difference in magnitude may come from the fact that, as I underline
above, while newspapers enter large, they exit small (the circulation of exiting newspapers
follows a decreasing trend before exit). We observe an increasing trend in the circulation of
incumbent newspapers before exit in both low- and high-heterogeneity counties (Figures
1.4c and 1.4d). Incumbent newspapers recover the circulation of the exiting newspaper even
before the actual exit of the newspaper. The existence of a pretrend in the circulation of
incumbent newspapers before an exit makes the event-study approach – which relies on
the timing of the events of entry and exit – less relevant for the analysis of the effect of
44Between 1960 and 2012, the average circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter the year before
an entry is 22.55%.
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(b) Circulation of Incumbent Newspapers
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of circulation on a vector of year dummies going from
 10 to +10 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see equation (1.3) for details). In the upper figure
(1.2a), the dependent variable is total county circulation per eligible voter. In the bottom figure (1.2b), the
dependent variable is the circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter. Models include year and
county fixed effects. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time period
is 1945-2012.
Figure 1.2: Impact of Newspaper Entry on Newspapers’ Circulation (1945-2012) (raw impact without
demographic controls)
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(d) Incumbents’ Circulation
High-Heterogeneity Counties
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of circulation on a vector of year dummies going from
 10 to +10 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see equation (1.3) for details). In the two upper
figures (1.3a and 1.3b), the dependent variable is the total county circulation per eligible voter. In the two
bottom figure (1.3c and 1.3d), the dependent variable is the circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible
voter. Figures 1.3a and 1.3c show the effect of an entry on circulation in low-heterogeneity counties. Figures
1.3b and 1.3d show this effect in high-heterogeneity counties. Models include year and county fixed effects and
demographic controls. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time
period is 1960-2012.
Figure 1.3: Impact of Newspaper Entry on Newspapers’ Circulation (1960-2012), by Heterogeneity (control-
ling for demographics)
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exits (contrary to entries). In the next section I will thus focus on the impact of entry on
incumbent newspapers.
1.5.3 The Effect of Newspaper Entry on the Size of the Newsroom
How does the market structure affect the size of the newsroom? To answer this question, I
use my panel of newspaper economic indicators that covers the periods 1960 to 2009 (2012
for the number of employees). For each newspaper I observe circulation, operating expenses
(on intermediate goods and labor), revenues (from sales and from advertising) and number
of employees. I study how the entry of a newspaper on the market affects the value of these
outcomes for incumbent newspapers.
Aggregate event studies In Figure 1.5, I plot the coefficients ak that I obtain by estimating
equation (1.3) with a  9 to +9 window and different left-hand side variables for incumbent
newspapers: alternatively profits (1.5a), total revenues (1.5b), revenues from sales (1.5c);
and advertising revenues (1.5d); and in Figure 1.6 for total expenses (1.6a), expenses on
intermediate goods (inputs) (1.6b), expenses on labor (payroll) (1.6c), and the number of
employees (1.6d). For each of these eight variables, it appears clearly that there is no pretrend.
The negative effect of entry happens on impact and grows larger over time (similarly to
what happens for circulation). I find that total revenues decrease by 15, 830 (constant 2009)
thousand euros45 six years after an entry. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents descriptive
statistics for incumbent newspapers the year preceding an entry. The total revenues of
incumbent newspapers are on average equal to e77,762 thousand. The entry of a newspaper
thus leads to a 20% decrease of the total revenues of incumbent newspapers. This decrease
was expected given the decrease in incumbent newspapers’ circulation. It mainly comes from
a decrease in revenues from sales which decrease by 27% (e11,605 thousand). Advertising
revenues also decrease but only by 15% (e4,897 thousand). This decrease in revenues goes
along with a decrease in incumbent newspapers’ total expenses. Total expenses decrease
45In the remainder of the paper, to save on space, I simply use the terminology “euros" when refering to
“constant 2009 euros".
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(a) Total Circulation
Low-Heterogeneity Counties
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(b) Total Circulation
High-Heterogeneity Counties
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(c) Incumbents’ Circulation
Low-Heterogeneity Counties
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(d) Incumbents’ Circulation
High-Heterogeneity Counties
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of circulation on a vector of year dummies going from
 10 to +10 with the events of exit taking place in j = 0 (see equation (1.3) for details). In the two upper figures
(1.4a and 1.4b), the dependent variable is the total county circulation per eligible voter. In the two bottom
figure (1.4c and 1.4d), the dependent variable is the circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter.
Figures 1.4a and 1.4c show the effect of an entry on circulation in low-heterogeneity counties. Figures 1.4b
and 1.4d show this effect in high-heterogeneity counties. Models include year and county fixed effects and
demographic controls. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time
period is 1960-2012.
Figure 1.4: Impact of Newspaper Exit on Newspapers’ Circulation (1960-2012), by Heterogeneity (controlling
for demographics)
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by 24% six years after the entry (e18,916 thousand). Especially striking is the decrease in
labor expenses (payroll) which are reduced by 31%. In comparaison, intermediate goods
expenses decrease by 25% and this decrease is only statistically significant at the 10% level.
Finally, the number of employees working for incumbent newspapers decrease by 83 after
six years, a 16% decrease.
According to my model, the negative effect of an entry on incumbent newspapers’ rev-
enues, expenses and number of employees should be especially strong in low-heterogeneity
counties. Focusing on the total number of employees which is my first proxy for newspapers’
quality, I show that it is indeed the case. In Figure 1.7 I plot the coefficients ak that I obtain by
estimating equation (1.3) with the number of employees as the dependent variable separately
for low- (1.7a) and high-heterogeneity counties (1.7b). Entry has a negative effect on the
number of employees of incumbent newspapers only in low-heterogeneity areas. The entry
of a newspaper reduces the number of employees by 122 after seven years, a 24% decrease.
Fixed effects model I next show that these results are robust to estimating a fixed effects
model. The advantage of the fixed effects model are threefold. First, as I underline above,
low- and high-heterogeneity counties differ in terms of demographic covariates. The fixed
effects model allows me to control, on top of these covariates, for the interaction between
these covariates and the heterogeneity indicator. Second, with the fixed effects model, I
can control for the events of exit. Finally, this additional model can be seen as a robustness
check of my results.
Given the finding that the effect of an entry on expenses, revenues and the number of
employees grows larger over time, I allow for time-varying effects of entry on outcomes
(Laporte and Windmeijer, 2005). More precisely, to quantify the dynamics effects of the
event and control for lags and leads, I define indicator variables for different years around
the event and an indicator variable isolating the long-run effect of the shock. My estimating
equation is:
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(c) Revenues from Sales
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(d) Advertising Revenues
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of alternatively profits (Figure 1.5a), total revenues
(Figure 1.5b), revenues from sales (Figure 1.5c), and advertising revenues (Figure 1.5d) on a vector of year
dummies going from  9 to +9 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see equation (1.3) for details). All
variables are in million (constant 2009) euros. Models include year and county fixed effects and demographic
controls. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standards errors are clustered by events. Time period is
1960-2012.
Figure 1.5: Impact of an Entry on Incumbent Newspapers’ Revenues
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(a) Total Expenses
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(b) Intermediate Goods Expenses
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(c) Labor Expenses (Payroll)
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(d) Number of Employees
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of alternatively total expenses (Figure 1.6a), intermediate
goods expenses (Figure 1.6b), labor expenses (Figure 1.6c) and number of employees (Figure 1.6d) on a vector of
year dummies going from  9 to +9 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see equation (1.3) for details).
All variables (excepted employees) are in million (constant 2009) euros. Models include year and county fixed
effects and demographic controls. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standards errors are clustered by
events. Time period is 1960-2012.
Figure 1.6: Impact of an Entry on Incumbent Newspapers’ Expenses and Employees
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(a) Low-Heterogeneity Counties
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(b) High-Heterogeneity Counties
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of the number of employees on a vector of year dummies
going from  9 to +9 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see equation (1.3) for details). Figure 1.7a
shows the effect for low-heterogeneity counties and Figure 1.7b for high-heterogeneity counties. Models include
year and county fixed effects and demographic controls. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standards errors
are clustered by events. Time period is 1960-2012.
Figure 1.7: Impact of an Entry on Incumbent Newspapers’ Number of Employees, by Heterogeneity
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ycnt =
+5
Â
k= 2
bk 1entry
j=k
ct +
+5
Â
k= 2
gk 1exit
j=k
ct + ac + ht + rn + X
0
ctd+ #cnt (1.4)
where c indexes counties, n indexes newspapers and t indexes years. 1entry 2ct = 1 in the
2nd year before an entry; 1entry 1ct = 1 in the 1st year before an entry; 1entry0ct = 1 the
year of an entry; 1entry1ct = 1 in the 1st year after an entry;...; and 1entry5ct = 1 in the 5th
year after an entry and all subsequent years. The base period is the years before the entry,
excluding the 2nd and 1st years before entry (i.e. from t-3 backwards). I control for a set
of indicator variables for exit 1exitj=kct that are defined the same way.46 The set of controls
X0ct includes as before the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education,
the share of working population between 15 and 64 year old which is senior executive or
knowledge worker and the total population. The dependent variable ycnt is alternatively
newspapers’ profits, expenses, revenues and number of employees.
Table 1.4 presents the results for incumbent newspapers. For all the dependent variables,
I find no statistically significant effect for the pre-entry indicator variables 1entry 2 and
1entry 1. Moreover, as expected given the results I obtain with the aggregate event studies
specification, I find a negative and statistically significant impact of entry on the different
outcomes of interest. For circulation, the negative effect is statistically significant beginning
the year of the entry and then grows larger over time. The long-term effect of entry on
circulation (captured by the indicator variable 1entry5ct) is minus three percentage points
(column 1). This corresponds to a 30% decrease in circulation (the average circulation per
eligible voter of a newspaper in a county is 9%).
For the other outcomes of interest, the negative effect of an entry only becomes statis-
tically significant after three years. In the long run, total revenues decrease by e6, 044, a
36% decrease (column 3). The number of employees in the long run decreases by more than
70, a 57% decrease. Moreover, while entry has a strong negative effect on each individual
newspaper’ revenues, expenses and number of employees, I show in the Appendix Table
46To save on space, I only report the coefficients for entry variables since there are the only coefficients of
interest. Results are robust to controlling or not for the exit indicator variables.
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A.6 – in which the dependent variables are values aggregated at the county level – that it
has no positive effect at the aggregate market level. There are no statistically significant
changes in total county’s revenues and expenses at the time of an entry nor in the following
years. In particular, there is no increase in aggregate payroll or number of employees. Given
the fixed costs of news production, through the duplication of these costs, the entry of a
newspaper may lead to a decrease in the total amount of news produced at the county level.
Heterogeneity Finally, I study how the impact of an entry on circulation, revenues, ex-
penses and the number of employees varies with heterogeneity. For the sake of simplicity
and readability, I regroup my indicator variables for the years before and after entries into
three indicator variables: pre-entry (1entrypre-entryct = 1 in the 2nd and 1st pre-entry year),
short-run entry (1entryshort-runct = 1 in the entry year, the 1st and the 2nd post-entry year)
and long-run entry (1entrylong-runct = 1 in the 3rd post-entry year and all subsequent years).
The base period is the years before the entry, excluding the pre-entry period (i.e. from t  3
backwards). I interact these indicator variables with the heterogeneity indicator variable.47
More precisely, my empirical specification is (abstracting from the exit terms):
ycnt = bpre-entry 1entry
pre-entry
ct + qpre-entry 1entry
pre-entry
ct ⇤ Low Heterogeneityc
+ bshort-run 1entryshort-runct + qshort-run 1entry
short-run
ct ⇤ LowHeterogeneityc
+ blong-run 1entry
long-run
ct + qlong-run 1entry
long-run
ct ⇤ Low Heterogeneityc
+ X
0
ctd+ X
0
ct ⇤ Low Heterogeneitycs
+ ac + ht + rn + #cnt
(1.5)
where Low Heterogeneityc is the low-heterogeneity indicator variable equal to one for low-
heterogeneity counties and to zero otherwise. I allow the demographic covariates X0ct to
have a different impact in low- and high-heterogeneity counties.
In Table 1.5, I estimate equation (1.5) with different dependent variables at the newspaper
47In the Appendix Table A.7, I find estimates consistent with the ones in Table 1.4 using these indicator
variables rather than the yearly indicator variables.
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level: circulation, profit, revenues, expenses and the number of employees. For all these
variables, it appears clearly that the negative effect of an entry is entirely driven by low-
heterogeneity areas. While there is no impact of an entry on the number of employees in
high-heterogeneity counties, this number decreases by 89 in low-heterogeneity counties.
This is consistent with the first testable prediction of my simple theoretical framework, when
I proxy newspaper quality by the number of journalists: under low heterogeneity in the
willingness-to-pay for quality, the entry of a newspaper leads to a decrease in the quality of
newspapers.
Robustness These results are robust to using education heterogeneity rather than socio-
economic group heterogeneity. Individuals above 15 years old are classified into n =
6 different education degrees in the census.48 However, the main advantage of using
socio-economic groups rather than education degrees comes from readers’ demographic
characteristics. In the Appendix Table A.4, using survey data for the year 2006, I show
that the distribution of local daily newspapers’ readers among socio-economic groups is
almost similar to the distribution of the French population among these groups – while
interestingly and as one would have expected, there are important differences if one
considers the characteristics of national daily newspapers’ readers. On the contrary, it
appears that local daily newspapers’ readers are more educated than the average.
The results are also robust to using an alternative measure of heterogeneity derived
from Shannon’s measure of information entropy: Hct = Âni=1 pictlog
⇣
1
pict
⌘
, where pict is the
share of the population from socio-economic group i in county c and year t. This measure is
strongly correlated with the measure constructed using the Herfindahl index.
In the next sub-section, I study how the number of newspapers on a market impacts the
48(i) No diploma; (ii) “Certificat d’études primaires" which is a diploma awarded at the end of elementary
primary education in France (which was officially discontinued in 1989); (iii) “BEPC" or “brevet" which is a
diploma given to French pupils at the end of the “3ème" (which corresponds to year 10 or ninth grade); (iv)
“Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle" (CAP) or “brevet d’études professionnelles" (BEP) which are secondary
and vocational education diplomas; (v) “Baccalauréat" which is an academic qualification taken at the end
of the lycée (secondary education) and the main diploma required to pursue university studies; (vi) Higher
(post-secondary) education. In the Appendix Figure A.19 I show the evolution of the educational attainment in
France between 1960 and 2012.
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size of the newspapers, which is my second proxy for newspaper quality.
1.5.4 The Effect of Newspaper Entry on the Size of Newspapers
1.5.4.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis
How does the structure of the news market affect the quantity of news produced by
newspapers? I cannot estimate as before the impact of the entry of a newspaper given
the fact that I only have data on newspapers’ content for recent years (2005-2012). I thus
simply estimate the impact of the number of newspapers on the size of newspapers using a
cross-sectional approach. A potential issue is that there may be selection in the cross-section.
Reassuringly, the results of the previous section are robust to such an approach. Let c index
counties, d index the date (in days), t index year and n index newspapers. I assume that:
sizentd =a1 + a2Nnct + a3Nnct ⇤ Low Heterogeneityc + a4Low Heterogeneityc
+ X0cta5 + X0ct ⇤ Low Heterogeneityca6 + µt + #nctd
(1.6)
where Nnct is the number of newspapers in year t in the county c in which the newspaper n
is headquartered, X0ct is a vector of observable characteristics, µt is a year fixed effect and
#nctd is a newspaper-county-day-year shock. Low Heterogeneityc is the low-heterogeneity
indicator variable equal to one for low-heterogeneity counties and to zero otherwise.
sizentd, my key dependent variable of interest, is the size of the newspaper. I compute
three different indicators of the size: (i) the number of articles by newspaper; (ii) the total
number of words by newspaper; (iii) the total number of words on the newspaper frontpage.
To adjust standard errors for possible dependence in residuals, I cluster my standard errors
at the county-year level.
Table 1.6 shows the impact of the number of newspapers on the news market on the
size of newspapers and how it varies with the extent of heterogeneity. In the upper panel I
consider the total number of articles in the newspaper (1.6a), and in the bottom panel the
total number of words (1.6b). The results I obtain are robust to using these two measures.
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First, I find that the number of articles in a newspaper statistically significantly decreases
with the number of newspapers on the market: one additional newspaper decreases
the number of articles by 136, a 32% decrease (column 1). The total number of words
decreases by 43% and the number of words on the frontpage by 15%. Second, this effect
is driven by low-heterogeneity counties. While I find no statistically significant impact
of the number of newspapers on the size of newspapers in high-heterogeneity counties,
I find that one additional newspaper of the market decreases the number of articles in
the newspaper by more than 280 in low-heterogeneity counties (column 2). This result
is robust to controlling for year fixed effects (column 3) as well as for the demographic
covariates and their interaction with the heterogeneity indicator (column 4). Moreover, I find
similar results when considering the total number of words in the newspaper. This negative
correlation between the number of newspapers on the market and the size of newspapers in
low-heterogeneity counties is consistent with the first prediction of my simple theoretical
framework when I proxy the quality of newspapers with their size. In the next section, I
investigate how the content of newspapers varies with the market structure.
1.5.5 Extension: Newspaper Competition and the Type of News Produced
In the extension of the theoretical framework, I divide newspaper content between hard
and soft news. Classifying newspaper content between hard and soft news is an empirical
challenge per se, especially because there are “news hybrids" and because what is informative
in the political process for a citizen may not be for another one. I consider as hard
news articles which are informative for the reader at the time of the elections, even if
they sometimes incorporate entertainment elements. On the contrary, soft news is non-
informative in the political process.49
In order to study the distribution of articles by topic, I use the information provided by
49According to Patterson (2000), soft news are “typically more sensational, more personality-centered, less time-
bound, more practical, and more incident-based than other news" (p.4). Another possible terminology is the one used
by Boczkowski (2010) who distinguishes “public affairs" news (national, business, economic and international
topics) and “non-public affairs" news (sports, entertainment and crime subjects).
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Table 1.6: The Effect of the Number of Newspapers on the Size of Newspapers
(a) Number of Articles
Number of Articles in the Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of newspapers -136.45⇤⇤⇤ -61.79 -61.05 -70.17
(28.39) (74.63) (68.71) (64.00)
Number of newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity -225.04⇤⇤⇤ -221.61⇤⇤⇤ -155.84⇤⇤
(84.19) (79.88) (67.82)
Low Heterogeneity 567.13⇤⇤⇤ 549.68⇤⇤⇤ -233.82
(144.29) (145.09) (228.63)
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No Yes
R-sq 0.11 0.23 0.25 0.65
Observations 27,708 27,708 27,708 27,708
Clusters (County-Year) 106 106 106 106
Mean DepVar 421.17 421.17 421.17 421.17
(b) Number of Words
Number of Words in the Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of newspapers -46,282⇤⇤⇤ -17,858 -16,536 -15,553
(7,065) (21,239) (19,315) (19,898)
Number of newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity -66,443⇤⇤⇤ -65,104⇤⇤⇤ -52,957⇤⇤
(23,102) (21,354) (21,242)
Low Heterogeneity 158,223⇤⇤⇤ 152,088⇤⇤⇤ -41,013
(37,834) (37,126) (59,848)
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No Yes
R-sq 0.18 0.29 0.32 0.65
Observations 30,502 30,502 30,502 30,502
Clusters (County-Year) 106 106 106 106
Mean DepVar 107,044 107,044 107,044 107,044
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county-year. Time period is 2005-
2012. Models are estimated using OLS. In the upper table (Table 1.6a) the dependent variable is the number of articles
per newspaper. In the bottom table (Table 1.6b), the dependent variable is the number of words per newspaper. The
demographic controls are the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education, the share of the working
population between 15 and 64 year old which is senior executive or knowledge worker, the total population in county c and
year t and demographic controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable. Variables are described in more details
in the text.
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the website Lexis-Nexis. When I retrieve the entire content of newspapers, I also retrieve
all the metadata (tag) associated with each newspaper article, and in particular its title,
topic and subject. Combining information from the title, topic and subject, I determine for
each article its category. I create 13 different categories: agriculture, culture, economics,
education, environnement, health, international, leisure activities, movies, “news in brief"
(faits divers), politics, religion and sports. I define the share of hard news articles as the
number of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environnement, international or
politics, divided by the total number of articles classified by topics. Symmetrically, I define
the share of soft news articles as the number of articles on culture, health, leisure activities,
movies, “news in brief", religion or sports, divided by the total number of articles classified
by topics.
I then estimate equation (1.6) with the share of hard news articles, the number of hard
news articles and the number of soft news articles as my dependent variables of interest.
An important empirical issue here is the choice of the heterogeneity measure. While until
now – following the theoretical framework for proposition 1 – I proxy heterogeneity in the
willingness-to-pay for quality using socio-economic group heterogeneity, the prediction of
my extended theoretical framework does not depend on heterogeneity in the willingness-to-
pay for quality, but on the relative heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news
and for soft news: holding heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for soft news constant,
newspaper entry leads to a decrease in the quantity and share of hard news produced by
newspapers if heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news is low.50
I thus use the measure of heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news described
above, namely political polarization. Table 1.7 presents the results. The upper table presents
the results for the share of articles on hard news (1.7a), and the bottom table for the number
of articles on hard news (1.7b). As predicted by the model, I find that the share of articles
50When I estimate equation (1.6) with the share of articles on hard news as the dependent variable, I find
that this share decreases when the number of newspapers increases, but that there are no statistically significant
differences between low- and high-heterogeneity counties. I present these results in the Appendix Tables A.8
and A.9. Only the number of articles on soft news decreases statistically significantly more in low- than in
high-heterogeneity counties.
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on hard news decreases with the number of newspapers on the market. An increase by one
in the number of newspapers decreases the share of articles on hard news by around 3.5
percentage points, a 10, 5% decrease (column 1). This effect is robust to introducing year
fixed effects (column 3) and to controlling for demographics (column 5). Moreover, this
effect is stronger in low- than in high-heterogeneity counties. In low-heterogeneity counties,
one additional newspaper decreases the share of hard news by more than 18%.
The decline in the share of articles on hard news can come either from a decrease in
the number of articles on hard news or an increase in the number of articles on soft news
(possibly with no change in the number of articles on hard news). In the bottom table 1.7b, I
estimate the impact of the number of newspapers on the number of articles on hard news in
the newspaper. I find that this impact is negative and statistically significant. An increase by
one in the number of newspapers decreases the amount of articles on hard news by between
33 and 49 depending on the specifications, a 37 to 54% decrease. Moreover, I find that this
effect is higher in low- than in high-heterogeneity counties, as predicted by the theoretical
framework. Finally, in the bottom table 1.8, I investigate how the number of articles on
soft news varies with the number of newspapers. I find that it decreases with the number
of newspapers but that there are no statistically significant differences between low- and
high-heterogeneity counties once I control for year fixed effects and demographics.
Newspaper specialization These results are consistent with the predictions of the exten-
sion of my simple theoretical framework when there is more heterogeneity in the tastes for
soft news than for hard news. Another testable implication of the model is that an increase
in competition leads to an increase in newspaper specialization. In the Appendix Table
A.10, I present the results of the estimation of equation (1.6) with newspaper specialization –
measured with the Herfindahl index described in Section 4.3 – as the dependent variable.
I find as expected that more competition leads to more newspaper differentiation: a one-
standard deviation increase in the number of newspapers leads to a 0.19 standard deviations
increase in the Herfindahl index of newspaper specialization. Moreover, this effect is lower
in low-heterogeneity counties (the a3 coefficient is negative and statistically significant).
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Table 1.7: The Effect of the Number of Newspapers on Newspapers’ Content (Hard News)
(a) Share of Articles on Hard News
Share of Articles on Hard News in the Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of newspapers -3.55⇤⇤⇤ -1.38⇤⇤ -3.68⇤⇤⇤ -2.32⇤⇤⇤ -3.44⇤⇤⇤ -2.12⇤⇤
(0.73) (0.66) (0.77) (0.78) (0.79) (0.83)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Political Heterogeneity -4.87⇤⇤⇤ -3.25⇤ -3.96⇤⇤
(1.82) (1.64) (1.97)
Low Political Heterogeneity 10.02⇤⇤⇤ 6.40⇤⇤ 7.18⇤
(3.52) (3.11) (3.68)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
Observations 25,745 25,745 25,745 25,745 25,745 25,745
Clusters (County-Year) 88 88 88 88 88 88
Mean DepVar 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73
(b) Number of Articles on Hard News
Number of Articles on Hard News in the Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of newspapers -48.6⇤⇤⇤ -14.6⇤ -49.4⇤⇤⇤ -24.0⇤⇤⇤ -33.3⇤⇤⇤ -17.8⇤⇤⇤
(8.6) (8.6) (8.2) (8.1) (7.8) (5.3)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Political Heterogeneity -49.7⇤⇤⇤ -36.1⇤⇤⇤ -42.3⇤⇤
(14.4) (13.2) (19.5)
Low Political Heterogeneity 132.8⇤⇤⇤ 99.2⇤⇤⇤ 76.5⇤⇤
(32.9) (30.3) (36.3)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.36
Observations 27,170 27,170 27,170 27,170 27,170 27,170
Clusters (County-Year) 94 94 94 94 94 94
Mean DepVar 90.8 90.8 90.8 90.8 90.8 90.8
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county-year. Time period is 2005-2012.
In the upper table (Table 1.7a), the dependent variable is the share of articles on hard news which is defined as the number
of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environnement, international or politics, divided by the total number of
articles classified by topics. In the bottom table (Table 1.7b), the dependent variable is the number of articles on hard news.
The controls include demographic controls (the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education, the share of
the working population between 15 and 64 year old which is senior executive or knowledge worker and the total population
in county c and year t) and the demographic controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable. Variables are
described in more details in the text.
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Table 1.8: The Effect of the Number of Newspapers on Newspapers’ Content (Soft News)
Number of Articles on Soft News in the Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of newspapers -73.0⇤⇤⇤ -28.5⇤ -74.6⇤⇤⇤ -37.9⇤⇤ -42.3⇤⇤⇤ -27.5⇤⇤⇤
(13.6) (16.9) (13.6) (16.4) (12.0) (10.0)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Political Heterogeneity -64.2⇤⇤ -51.5⇤ -47.3
(26.2) (26.0) (34.6)
Low Political Heterogeneity 174.4⇤⇤⇤ 144.2⇤⇤ 70.6
(56.2) (56.9) (62.2)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.34
Observations 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291
Clusters (County-Year) 94 94 94 94 94 94
Mean DepVar 166.0 166.0 166.0 166.0 166.0 166.0
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county-year. Time period is 2005-
2012. The dependent variable is the number of articles on hard news. The controls include demographic controls (the share
of the population with higher (post-secondary) education, the share of the working population between 15 and 64 year
old which is senior executive or knowledge worker and the total population in county c and year t) and the demographic
controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable. Variables are described in more details in the text.
This finding is in line with the intuition of the theoretical framework: when heterogeneity is
low, there is less space for differentiation and newspaper specialization is thus lower. In the
next section, I look into the impact of a change in the number of newspapers on political
participation.
1.6 Media Competition and Electoral Turnout
According to the third prediction of my simple theoretical framework, under low willingness-
to-pay for quality heterogeneity, the entry of a newspaper leads to a decrease in turnout at
elections.
1.6.1 Specification and Identification Strategy
To test this prediction, I match my panel data on newspaper competition with mayoral
election results from 1947 to 2008 and track the impact of a change in competition on
turnout. Let w index cities, c index counties and t 2 {1, ..., 11} index election years (one
time unit representing six calendar years). The outcome of interest, ywct, is voter turnout in
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city w in county c at time t. The key independent variable of interest is Nwct, the number of
newspapers in city w in county c at time t. Since turnout varies at the city level while the
number of newspapers varies at the county level (if two cities are in the same county, they
have the same number of newspapers), I cluster the standard errors at the county level.
I assume that
turnoutwct = a1Nwct + a2Nwct ⇤ Low Heterogeneityc + a3Low Heterogeneityc
+ X0wtd1 + X0wt ⇤ Low Heterogeneitycd2 + rw + µrt + #wct
where rw is a city fixed effect, µrt is an election-region fixed effect, X0wt is a vector of
observable characteristics at the city level, d1 and d2 are vectors of parameters and #wct is
a city-county-year shock. Low Heterogeneityc is the low-heterogeneity indicator variable
equal to one for low-heterogeneity counties and to zero otherwise.
Similarly to what is done in Gentzkow et al. (2011), I estimate the model in first differences.
My estimation equation is then:
Dturnoutwct = a1DNwct + a2DNwct ⇤ Low Heterogeneityc
+ DX0wtd1 + DX0wt ⇤ Low Heterogeneitycd2 + Dµrt + #wct
(1.7)
where D is a first-difference operator. The vector of controls X0wt includes as before the share
of the population (15+-year old) with higher (post-secondary) education, the share of the
working population between 15 and 64 year old which is laborer and the total population.
Controls are defined at the city level.
1.6.2 Main Results
Table 1.9 presents the results. In the upper table (1.9a), I show the effect of an additional
newspaper on local turnout. Column 1 presents this effect without considering heterogeneity.
I find that one additional newspaper decreases turnout by approximately 0.3 percentage
points. In columns 2 and 3, it appears clearly that this negative effect is driven by low-
heterogeneity counties. I find no statistically significant impact of a change in the number of
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newspapers on turnout at elections in high-heterogeneity counties. On the contrary, when
I focus on low-heterogeneity counties, I find that the effect of an entrant on the market is
minus 0.6 percentage points and is statistically significant at the five-percent level.
The average turnout rate at local elections is 67%. The Appendix Figure A.17 shows
how it varies between 1947 and 2008. It oscillates between 70% and 77% during the period
1947-1977 and since then has been declining. In the 2008 election it was equal to 62%.
Related to the 15 percentage points decrease in turnout between 1947 and 2008, the 0.6
percentage points negative effect of a typical entry is thus of importance. Note moreover that
this negative turnout effect is only due to the introduction of an additional local newspaper.
If I extrapolate my results to other medias, this suggests that the large increase in media
competition during recent decades can potentially explain a siginificant fraction of the
historical decline in turnout.
My identification relies on changes in the number of newspapers over time. As a result
it is correct as long as the timing of these changes is random. In the bottom table (1.9b),
I undertake a falsification test using the timing of the changes which seems to confirm
that it is indeed the case. I estimate the impact of a future change in the news market on
current turnout. The coefficients I obtain are all non significant. This suggests that changes
in the number of newspapers are not driven by election results and brings confidence in
interpreting the coefficients of the upper table (1.9a) as causal effects.
In this paper I estimate the impact of local newspapers on local elections because in the
television and internet era, local newspapers remain the most important source of informa-
tion only about local politics; information on national politics is widely available throug
other media outlets. In the Appendix, I show that there is no statistically significant effect of
a change in the number of local daily newspapers on turnout at national (Congressional or
Presidential) elections.
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Table 1.9: The Effect of a Change in the Number of Newspapers on Voter Turnout
(a) Effect of Newspaper Entry/Exit on Voter Turnout
Turnout
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Newspapers -0.003⇤ -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity -0.005⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003)
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Controls*Heterogeneity No No Yes
R-sq 0.37 0.37 0.37
Observations 3,565 3,565 3,565
Clusters (County) 87 87 87
Mean DepVar -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
(b) Falsification Test
Turnout at Previous Election
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Newspapers -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Controls*Heterogeneity No No Yes
R-sq 0.35 0.35 0.35
Observations 3,058 3,058 3,058
Clusters (County) 87 87 87
Mean DepVar -0.030 -0.030 -0.030
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1947-2008.
Models are estimated in first differences. All specifications include election-region fixed effects. The controls include demo-
graphic controls (the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education, the share of the working population
between 15 and 64 year old which is senior executive or knowledge worker and the total population in city w and year t)
and the demographic controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable. In the upper Table (1.9a), the dependent
variable is turnout. In the bottom Table (1.9b), I perform a falsification test: the dependent variable is turnout at the previous
election.
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1.6.2.1 Diagnosing Bias Using Pre-trends
Finally, as an additional check supporting a causal interpretation of my findings, I use
pretrends. If the relationship between DNwct and Dywct comes only from a causal effect,
DNwct cannot be correlated with past values of Dywct. On the contrary, if the observed
relationship is driven by omitted components, DNwct and past values of Dywct may be
correlated.
In Figure 1.8 I plot the coefficient ak from the following specification:
Dturnoutwct =
+1
Â
k= 1
akDNwc(t k) + DX0wtd+ Dµrt + D#wct (1.8)
where variables are defined as in equation (1.7). I perform the analysis for the entire sample
(upper Figure 1.8a) and for low-heterogeneity counties only (bottom Figure 1.8b). The
prediction that newspaper entry decreases turnout corresponds to the negative spike in
the plot at k = 0. Importantly, there are no significant trends before or after the event.51
Moreover, the effect is of higher order of magnitude for low-heterogeneity counties, as
predicted by the model.
1.6.2.2 Magnitude of the effects
My estimates suggest that increasing newspaper competition by introducing an additional
newspaper to a county decreases mayoral turnout per eligible voter by about 0.3 percentage
points on average, and 0.7 percentage points in low-heterogeneity counties. The average
share of individuals reading at least one newspaper is 70%. Following the logic of Gerber
and Green (2000)’s intent-to-treat calculation (see also Gentzkow et al., 2011), my point
estimate in low-heterogeneity counties corresponds to a (0.7/0.70) = 1 percentage point
effect.
To get a better sense of what the magnitude of my estimates implies, I also compute the
corresponding persuasion rate (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; DellaVigna and Gentzkow,
51With only 11 elections in the sample, it is not possible to estimate equation (1.8) with a k higher than 1.
63
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
0
0.
01
Ch
an
ge
 in
 tu
rn
ou
t p
er
 e
lig
ibl
e 
vo
te
r
-12 -6 0 +6 +12
Years relative to change in number of newspapers
(a) Entire Sample
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
0
0.
01
Ch
an
ge
 in
 tu
rn
ou
t p
er
 e
lig
ibl
e 
vo
te
r
-12 -6 0 +6 +12
Years relative to change in number of newspapers
(b) Low-Heterogeneity Counties
Notes: The figures show coefficients from a regression of change in turnout per eligible voters, controlling for
demographics, on a vector of leads and lags of the change in the number of newspapers (see equation (1.8) for
details). Models include region-election fixed effects. Error bars are +/  2 standard errors. Standards errors
are clustered by county. Time period is 1947-2008.
Figure 1.8: Turnout and Newspaper Entries/Exits
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2010). The persuasion rate captures the effect of the persuasion treatment on the relevant
behavior, adjusting for exposure to the message and for the size of the population left to be
convinced. In my case, everyone is exposed the same way to newspapers so I do not need to
adjust for exposure to the message. The change in behavior is from voting to not voting, so
the set of potentially affected individuals is the set of those who turn out which represents
on average 67% of the population. The 0.7 percent of eligible voter who do not vote as result
of an increase in newspaper competition therefore implies a negative persuasion rate of
(0.7/0.67) = 1 percent.
These estimates are lower bounds. The entry of a newspaper indeed raises the share of
individuals reading at least one newspaper by about 8 to 12 percentage points. While the
“intensive" margin of newspaper competition – through the decrease in the quality of the
information provided to readers – has a negative effect on the probability of voting, this
“extensive" margin – the increase in the number of readers – may have the opposite effect,
since previously non-informed citizens now have access to a source of information. I am
not capturing here the positive effect of the extensive margin of entry but while the focus
of the literature has been on the extensive persuasion rate – media access leads to higher
turnout at elections – I show that the intensive margin of the media – the change in media
quality – can reverse the extensive effect.
Abstracting from the change in the share of hard versus soft news in newspapers, I
finally compute the number of citizens who change their behavior from voting to not voting
due to a decrease by one in the number of journalists. Depending on the specifications,
the entry of a newspaper leads to a decrease by about 25 to 76 employees working for a
newspaper in a given county, which corresponds to a decrease by about 9 to 27 journalists.
As I underline above, the treatment effect of the entry of a newspaper is a 1 percentage
point decrease in turnout, which represents on average 3,300 voters in a county. In other
words, each newspaper cost cut of one journalist leads to about 122 to 367 citizens stopping
turning out.
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1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Alternative Mechanisms
Clearly I have not established that my simple theoretical vertical differentiation framework
is the only theory that could generate a negative correlation between newspaper competition
and a decrease in turnout at elections. Other theories – I discuss them in turn in this section
– may rationalize this finding. But I believe that it is difficult to find an alternative theory for
the result about the effect of the interaction between the market structure and the extent of
heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality.
The issue of a dumbing-down of the content of news has been raised both for newspapers
and television. Zaller (1999) points out that increased market pressure is sometimes
associated with cutbacks in reporting and editorial quality which lead to a race to the
bottom (see also Arnold, 2002). Focusing on television, Popkin (2007) highlights that
competition changes content; he shows that in the 1990s, network news cover less legislation
than in the 1970s while celebrity coverage has increased (see also Hamilton, 2004; Jones,
2010). How to explain such a race to the bottom in quality selections? The argument I
develop in this paper is that under low heterogeneity, competition leads to the division of
the readership into smaller groups which reduces the revenues available to each newspaper
to produce a high-quality paper. On the one hand, this simple theoretical framework
rationalizes the observed decrease in the quality of competing newspapers compared to the
monopolist in low-heterogeneity counties; on the other hand, it provides an explanation for
the negative correlation between the number of newspapers in a market and the share of
hard news in newspapers when consumers differ less in their taste for hard than for soft
news.
An alternative argument is that the race to the bottom may simply reflect a general
decline in tastes for hard news compared to soft news. I can rationalize this argument
easily in the extension of my simple theoretical framework in which I divide newspaper’s
content between hard news and soft news. In this framework, under the assumption that
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the average willingness-to-pay for high-quality soft news (a) is higher than (rather than
equal to) the average willingness-to-pay for high-quality hard news (q), everything else
being equal, newspapers choose to produce more soft news than hard news. This argument
may explain part of the historical decline in hard news coverage, but not the impact of
the market structure on the share of hard news, since the monopolist and the duopolists
react to a change in the average willingness-to-pay the same way. On the contrary, my
simple theoretical framework can account for the decrease in the share of hard news under
increased competition.
A second argument that is often put forward in the literature is the role played by
advertising: “In broadcast markets, viewers aged 18-34 command higher advertising rates. News
outlets may cater to the preferences of these younger viewers who are much less likely to express
interest in traditional hard news stories." (Hamilton, 2004). Recent papers in the literature
model the market for news as a two-sided market and study how advertising affects content
(see e.g. Ellman and Germano, 2009). Taking into account different values advertisers may
place on different readers is beyond the scope of this paper but is the goal of ongoing
research (Angelucci et al., 2012). However, just as a general decline in tastes for hard news,
advertising cannot account for the impact of the market structure on the share of hard news.
Finally, the observed race to the bottom in quality selections has been linked to the move
from nonprofit to profit news organizations (see e.g. Hamilton, 2004; Jones, 2010). According
to Hamilton (2004), “media companies once covered public affairs in part because this brought
prestige to the firm’s owners and regulatory protection in the case of licensed broadcasters. Now
that newspapers and television channels are part of large publicly traded firms, the focus on profits
demanded by shareholders means less attention to public affairs reporting." In my simple theoretical
framework, I assume that newspapers are profit maximizing. This assumption is driven
both by the move from nonprofit to profit news organizations in the United States and by
the evidence from France where news organizations, especially local daily newspapers, are
profit-maximizing firms. Having said that, assuming in my simple theoretical framework
that newspapers are benevolent and operate under a positive-profit constraint will lead to
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similar predictions under low heterogeneity.
Polarization and self-segregation Importantly, one could argue that an increase in media
competition may lead to changes in turnout at elections independently of any impact on the
quality of information. The first channel through which it may happen is polarization and
self-segregation. Through the implied fragmentation of the market, an increase in media
competition may reduce common experiences and lead to the polarization of views among
groups which avoid hearing information that might contradict their priors (Sunstein, 2002;
Hamilton, 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Prior, 2007; Sunstein, 2009). The widening
of media choice and the elicited self-segregation of citizens can affect voter turnout in at least
two ways. First, increased media choice leads to lower turnout among people who prefer
soft news to hard news because it reduces their exposure to hard news and their acquisition
of political knowledge (Prior, 2007). This argument is relevant in the case of television
where there are entertainment channels entirely dedicated to soft news; less for local daily
newspapers which always offer a mix of soft and hard news. Second, by confirming readers’
prior beliefs, increased media competition may lead to an increase in the polarization of
voter preferences and through this channel to an increase in political participation.52 This
view relies on the assumption that media outlets are biased; I show below that it is not the
case of the French local daily newspaper industry. Moreover I do find that increased media
competition leads to a decrease – not an increase – in participation.
Information overload Finally, even if an increase in media competition were to increase
the amount of information available to readers it could nevertheless lead to a decrease
in voter turnout through information overload. The burden of a heavy information load
may indeed confuse readers and hamper decision making. We know from the literature
on communication that the communication’s informativeness increases with the receiver’s
attention effort and that “informational overload may be as detrimental to a receiver as information
52Determining whether citizens have polarized is still an open empirical question and is beyond the scope of
this paper. For opposing views on the extent of political polarization in the United States, see e.g. Abramowitz
(2010) and Fiorina and Abrams (2012).
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underload" (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005). Informational overload may indeed both distract
attention and discourage absorption. Moreover, by being at odds with the information
already held, an additional piece of information may obstacle the decision making. Anyhow
these theoretical arguments cannot rationalize the empirical findings of the paper. First, I
establish that under low heterogeneity competition leads to a decrease – not an increase – in
the quantity of information provided by each competing newspapers. Whether summing
information over competing newspapers leads to an increase or a decrease in the total
amount of information available in a market is a complicated empirical issue that I do not
tackle in this paper. But the existing empirical evidence shows that different media outlets
tend to cover similar issues so if anything competition leads to a duplication rather than
a proliferation of information. Moreover, the availability of more media outlets does not
imply that citizens consume more outlets. In particular, evidence from the consumption of
local daily newspapers in France shows that consumers tend to single-home.
1.7.2 External Validity
A final question is whether we should expect the patterns I have uncovered in the case of
local daily newspapers and local elections in France to be repeated in other contexts. First,
should these patterns hold in other countries? And second, should they still hold in the
internet era? There are good reasons to think this could be the case.
My simple theoretical framework suggests that the effect of the market structure on
political participation operates through two main ingredients: newspapers operate under
increasing returns to scale and they face heterogeneous consumers that differ in their
willingness-to-pay for quality. The negative effect of competition on turnout should be
expected when heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality is low. The
extent of heterogeneity can vary from countries to countries and specific patterns will differ
depending on context. The finding in Drago et al. (2013) of a positive effect of newspaper
competition on electoral participation in Italy may be explained by high heterogeneity of
Italian readership. More evidence is certainly in order and it will be interesting to interact
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the effect of market structure they obtain with a measure of heterogeneity to check whether
it is indeed the case. Similarly, while Gentzkow et al. (2011) find no effect of newspaper
competition on turnout at national elections, it would be of interest to test for the presence
of an effect on local turnout and to study the interaction between the market structure
and heterogeneity. The fact that newspapers operate under increasing returns to scale is
obviously not specific to the French local daily newspaper industry – nor it is specific to the
newspaper industry in general; other media outlets also face quality-dependent fixed costs.
Media bias A characteristic that may be more specific to French local daily newspapers is
that they are independent – there is no political bias in these newspapers during my period
of interest. As noted by Éveno (2003), since 1947 “the story of biased newspapers has been the
one of a slow decline". The last biased local daily newspapers disappeared in France in the
1950’s. Moreover, according to Hamilton (2004), nonpartisan reporting also dominates in
American newspaper markets.53 (The picture is different in American television markets
where the logic of niche programming has given rise to the Fox News Channel.) These
empirical facts drive my choice of abstracting from horizontal differentiation in my simple
theoretical framework.54
Adding horizontal differentiation to my simple framework will as a matter of course
lead to new predictions. Determining how it will affect the quality of information is a
complex issue. On the one hand, horizontal differentiation may allow newspapers to escape
price competition and to increase their profits – and so the revenues available to produce
high-quality. On the other hand, Neven and Thisse (1989) have shown that under vertical
and horizontal differentiation, firms choose maximimal differentiation along one dimension
53According to Hamilton (2004), nonpartisan reporting emerged as a commercial product in American
newspaper markets: “In the late nineteenth century the rise of advertising, innovations in printing technology that
increased the importance of scale economies, and demographic changes in the size of the reading public made it more
profitable for newspapers to adopt “objective" or nonpartisan approaches to public affairs. (...) Objectivity evolved in the
market as a commercial product, as publishers frequently found it more profitable to remove partisan coverage in order to
attract more readers." (p.25).
54Abstracting from horizontal differentiation also allows me to keep the model tractable while identifying a
new effect of newspaper competition on the provision of information.
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and minimal differentiation along the other. If the horizontal range is broad enough relative
to the quality range, then both firms choose the same quality. Neven and Thisse (1989)
abstract from the cost of producing quality but such a cost may lead both firms to produce
the minimum quality, in line with the prediction of my simple framework.
Internet With the internet – of which some people believe it will allow voters to find all
the information they need at the time of the elections – does the information provided in
local daily newspapers still matter? There are various ways to tackle this issue. First, it is
important to highlight that online news is still in its infancy (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2013).
Digital platforms account for only 8% of time spent consuming news in the US (Edmonds,
2013). The Internet represents less than 5% of the total revenues of the print media industry
in France in 2012. Moreover I provide evidence in the Appendix of the relatively low internet
penetration rate among French local daily newspaper readers compared to national daily
newspaper readers. Using survey data, I also show that local daily newspaper readers
think they are better informed through daily newspapers than through other media. Local
newspapers are likewise still important for local news in the United States. According to
the State of the Media Report 2013 of the Pew Research Center, “papers in smaller markets, like
those Warren Buffett is buying, can remain the go-to source for local news and a strong vehicle for
local advertisers."
Individuals are much more likely to search on the Internet for soft news or information
about product purchases than for hard news (Hamilton, 2004). Internet expands the overall
audience for the national daily newspapers but not for the local daily newspapers. In France,
I find that in hard copy sales, the top five daily newspapers account for 9% percent of the
total circulation of daily newspapers. The top one daily newspaper is a local newspaper
– Ouest France – and accounts for 3.3% of this total circulation. Moreover, its circulation is
2.3 times the one of the top two newspaper, Le Monde (a national daily newspaper). The
picture is different when I turn to websites. In terms of the number of visits to a website –
or similarly of number of pages viewed –, the top five websites garner more than 53% of the
total traffic, with 21% for the top one who is Le Monde. Moreover the most popular websites
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are websites of national daily newspapers.55 The Internet is a way for consumers around
the country to gain access to national papers and national information (or entertainment).
Not to gain access to more local information.
Finally, especially for newspapers, the internet brings greater competition, raising the
issue of the potential welfare losses that may arise from excessive competition and the
duplication of costs. News sites – like newspapers – face fixed costs of content that depend
on quality. Furthermore the internet increases the relative importance of these fixed costs:
on the internet the cost of paper and distribution approach zero. Obviously this does not
mean that the advent of the internet has not affected the provision of information; with
the notable exception of Seamans and Zhu (2013), there is no empirical evidence on how
media outlets adjust their content in response to increased competition in an online word.56
But this means that the amount of information provided by local newspapers is still an
important determinant of local political participation in the internet era.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate both theoretically and empirically how an increase in the number
of newspapers in a market affects the quantity and type of news provided and, ultimately,
changes in political participation. Modeling the production choices of newspapers in a
vertical product differentiation framework, I show that if the heterogeneity of consumers’
willingness-to-pay for a high-quality newspaper is low, an increase in the number of
newspapers leads to a decrease in the size of newspapers (number of articles). Moreover,
dividing the content of newspapers between hard news and soft news, I find that if
consumers differ less in their taste for hard than for soft news, an increase in the number of
newspapers may lead newspapers to produce a lower share of hard news. The evidence I
55Hamilton (2004) finds a similar picture for the United States: “in hard copy sales, the top 5 among America’s
largest 100 newspapers account for 21.5 percent of the total circulation. In terms of linking activity, the top 5 websites of
these newspapers garner 41.4 percent of the total traffic."
56Esfahani and Jeon (2013) offer a model of multiple issues to investigate how news aggregators affect the
quality choices of competing newspapers on the Internet.
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obtain from a variety of identification strategies using a new dataset of French local daily
newspapers between 1945 and 2012 is consistent with these predictions. I also find that
under low heterogeneity, an increase in the number of local newspapers leads to a decrease
in political participation at local elections.
The findings of this paper may benefit the public debate by questioning the view that
more media competition is necessarily socially efficient.57 They obviously do not imply
that media competition is less desirable than media monopoly as the latter raises other
important issues, in particular media capture (Besley and Prat, 2006) and monopoly rents.
But they may have important policy implications. In my view, future research should study
the relevance of policy interventions to compensate for the welfare losses that may arise
from excessive competition under certain conditions, such as subsidies for the press, support
for news agencies, tax credits for journalists or antritrust exemptions in the spirit of the
American Newspaper Preservation Act (1970) permitting newspaper competitors to enter
into a joint operating agreement and to combine business operations.
57See e.g. the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States which has sought to
diffuse ownership of media outlets among multiple firms in order to diversify the viewpoints available to the
public: “In sum, the modified broadcast ownership structure we adopt today will serve our traditional goals of promoting
competition, diversity, and localism in broadcast services. The new rules are (...) necessary in the public interest." (Federal
Communication Commission, 2003).
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Chapter 2
The Long-Term Effects of the Printing
Press in sub-Saharan Africa1
2.1 Introduction
This article delves into the relationship between newspaper readership and civic attitudes,
and how it might affect economic development. To this end, we investigate the historical
development of the media and study the long-term consequences of the early introduction
of the printing press in the 19th century in sub-Saharan Africa.
The long-term consequences of religious incentives for economic success have been
widely studied in the social sciences, the most well-known theory being Max Weber’s
“Protestant Ethic" (Weber, 1930). In addition, according to the principle of the Sola Scriptura,
central to the Protestant doctrine, every Protestant should be able to read the Bible. Recent
work has emphasized this incentive to increase literacy as an alternative explanation for the
economic success of regions that first converted to Protestantism (Becker and Woessmann,
2009; Bai and Kung, 2011; McCleary and Pesina, 2012; Woodberry, 2012; Cantoni, 2013).
These studies consider Protestant conversion as a whole. Instead of using such a binary
approach, we exploit different types of missionary treatment. Missions invested in numerous
1Co-authored with Valeria Rueda
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activities. We focus on the introduction of the printing press and show that it still has
consequences on newspaper readership nowadays. We discuss other long-term effects
of the printing press; we document in particular a strong association between proximity
to a printing press and contemporary economic development, and show that newspaper
readership might explain this positive relationship. For this purpose, we built and geocoded
an entirely new dataset of Protestant mission settlements. For each settlement, we document
the exact geographic location, the educational, health-related and printing investments,
as well as geographic and historical characteristics. Producing these data is our first
contribution. Our second contribution is to identify the long-term effects of the printing
press using a sharp empirical strategy relying on our reading of history.
Protestant missionary activity played a central role in the development of a written
tradition in sub-Saharan Africa. Because they needed to print Bibles and educational
material, Protestant missionaries were among the first to bring the printing press to Africa.
They made it accessible to the indigenous populations by both exposing them to the
printing technology and granting them access to it (Woodberry, 2012). Investing in printing
necessitated a large fixed cost. Protestant missionaries imported the press from Europe
and it could not be easily exported to other regions due to transportation costs, and to
the specific know-how required to use it. This early availability of the printing technology
enabled the local development of a culture of writing and information diffusion, beyond the
single field of religious literature (Reports of the LMS, 1913). Publishing material for Africa
was indeed central to the missionary ambitions since the commencement of their work (Fahs
and Davis, 1935); mission presses not only published Christian texts but were also the first
to produce all sorts of written material and newspapers in indigenous languages (Maake,
2000).2 Local newspapers thus developed first around missionary printing presses, yielding
a persistent geographic concentration of publishing activities and newspaper readership.
2Fahs and Davis (1935) mention that “the term “Christian literature” was used [by missionaries on the field] in
the widest sense, included all printed matter needed for the pioneer work of evangelization and for the development and
expansion of the Church, from tracts, leaflets, school books to such publications as in the strict sense of the matter may be
designed “literature"".
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Using contemporary individual-level data from the Afrobarometer, we find that proxim-
ity to the closest location of a mission with a printing press has a positive and statistically
significant impact on the probability of reading the news. A one-standard deviation increase
in the proximity to a mission with a printing press increases the probability of reading
the news on a monthly basis from 3 to 14% of a standard deviation, depending on the
specifications. In contrast, proximity to a mission without a printing press has no significant
impact on newspaper readership. Moreover, we also find that a one-standard deviation in-
crease in the proximity to a mission with a printing press increases contemporary economic
development from 10 to 15% of a standard deviation. We show that newspapers might
explain this association.
Our econometric analysis attempts to move beyond two forms of selection. First,
historical and geographical characteristics might have determined mission station location
preventing us from comparing regions close and far from these settlements. Protestant
missionaries did choose to locate in geographically favored areas (Johnson, 1967; Nunn,
2010). Second, Protestant stations invested in different activities such as printing, health
and education. There may be endogenous selection of missions into printing.
To address selection from missions’ location we restrict our sample of analysis to regions
near historical mission settlements. These are regions for which there is a Protestant mission
within alternatively a 200-kilometer (124 miles), 150-kilometer (93 miles) and 100-kilometer
(62 miles) radius. Because regions near Protestant missions shared similar geographic,
institutional and cultural environments, this restriction isolates the specific effect of the
printing technology from other possible long-term determinants of newspaper readership
embedded in specific mission locations.
To address selection of missions into printing, we first control for observable covariates.
The set of observable covariates include geographic and historical characteristics as well
as distance to historical mission stations that invested in health and educational facilities.3
3In the online Appendix, we also use insights from Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2013) to assess the bias
due to unobservables using the sensitivity of the treatment to added controls. From this approach, it seems
unlikely that the entire estimated effect of the distance to the printing press is driven by unobserved variables.
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Despite our attempts to control for observable factors, our estimates might be driven by
unobserved determinants of long-term development and proximity to a historical mission
settlement endowed with a printing press. To deal with this problem, we instrument the
proximity to the closest printing press. In the 19th Century, missionaries formed numerous
societies that were not equally inclined to the same activities. For each mission, we estimate
the probability that it was endowed with a printing press using the share of missions from
the mission’s society equipped with a printing press in all the regions of the world outside
sub-Saharan Africa. Our results are robust to the IV approach.
Related literature Woodberry (2004, 2012) and Woodberry and Shah (2004) first document
the role of Protestant missionaries on the consolidation of liberal democracy and emphasize
the introduction of the printing press and newpapers as a potential mechanism. They
identify the relationship between Protestantism and democracy using a cross-country
identification strategy. On the contrary, we estimate the long-term effects of the printing
press in sub-Saharan Africa using a variety of within-mission empirical strategies; in particular,
our econometric analysis moves beyond selection from missions’s location and selection of
missions into printing. Our empirical work relies on the building of a new geocoded dataset
and on the use of several previously-unexploited historical archives. Moreover, we explore
various channels that may explain persistence and document the effect of the printing press
on economic change.
Our results also complement a growing literature documenting the persistence of
development paths in developing countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002;
Porta et al., 2008). While this literature mainly compares regions with different institutional or
colonial history, we highlight access to the printing press as a specific long-term determinant
of newspaper readership, political participation and economic development, even within
regions sharing the same institutional framework. As noticed by Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009),
Huillery (2009) and Huillery (2011), historical events can explain heterogenous development
dynamics. Recent micro-oriented studies therefore isolate specific channels through which
a development dynamic was durably established (Nunn, 2008; Huillery, 2009; Dell, 2010;
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Cogneau and Moradi, 2011; Alesina et al., 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011,
2013; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). Of particular importance for sub-Saharan Africa are
early investments. Wantchekon et al. (2012) highlight for example the durable impact of
the first schools in Benin. With the notable exception of Dittmar (2011), who shows that
European cities where printing presses were established in 1450-1500 grow faster between
1500 and 1600 than similar cities which were not early adopters, there has been no research
on the long-term consequences of the printing press. While the focus of Dittmar (2011)
is on the 16th and 17th Century Europe, we identify the effect of the early arrival of the
printing press on contemporary outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. Consistently with the
hypothesis from historians of sub-Saharan Africa (Omu, 1978; Tudesq, 1995), we are the
first to show empirically that proximity to the missionary press is associated with higher
newspaper readership today. Moreover, we find that contemporary economic development
is higher in regions close to the missionary press. Media and the quality of information have
recently been shown to affect economic and democratic development (Casey, 2013)4. Using
different econometric specifications, we show that newspaper readership might be a channel
explaining the relationship between proximity to the printing press and contemporary
economic development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents some historical back-
ground on missionary history in sub-Saharan Africa and the development of newspapers.
Section 4.3 describes the data, in particular our new geocoded dataset of missions and
discusses the determinants of missions’ location and investments. In Section 2.4, we provide
empirical evidence of the long-term impact of proximity to a printing press on newspaper
readership. We discuss extensively endogenous selection of missions into printing. Sec-
tion 2.5 presents the long-term relationship between proximity to the printing press and
economic development, and analyzes channels explaining this relationship. Section 2.6
concludes.
4See also the first chapter of the dissertation.
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2.2 Historical Background and Persistence
The introduction of the printing press Protestant missionaries pioneered in the devel-
opment of a written tradition for sub-Saharan African languages. Wherever they went,
Protestants quickly formalized indigenous languages and printed Bibles and educational
material in these languages. Following the principle of the Sola Scriptura, every Protestant
should be capable of reading and interpreting the Bible (Eisenstein, 1980; Woodberry and
Shah, 2004; Woodberry, 2012). On this topic, Eisenstein (1980, p.158) writes: “(...) Christian
missionaries continued to set up printing presses in remote parts of the world to turn out Gospels and
Psalters as had been done in Mainz four hundred years earlier". On the contrary, for the Catholic
religious practice, reading the Bible is not necessary. This difference between Protestants
and Catholics appears on the title page illustration of Actes and Monuments5 (Foxe and Day,
1563) showing “devout Protestant with books on their laps and Catholic with prayer beads in their
hands" (Eisenstein, 1980, p.173).
Protestant missions facilitated the access to the printing press, acting as the intermediaries
of its diffusion. For example, in South Africa, several mission societies acquired the printing
press in Cape Colony between the 1820s and the 1870s. The Methodists acquired a printing
press in Grahamstown in the 1830s. The Anglicans acquired presses for several stations
in the eastern Cape in the 1860s and 1870s. In the later 19th and early 20th centuries,
missionary societies outside the Cape Colony were also active in publishing, especially in
Natal (Switzer, 1984).
Investing in printing technology was a better strategy than importing books, as trans-
portation was long and native languages were mostly unknown in Europe. Due to tech-
nological constraints, printing presses could hardly be built in sub-Saharan Africa and
had to be imported from Europe. Missionaries mainly imported hand press machines;
nevertheless, importation was far from easy.6 Wooden printing presses were, for instance,
5The Actes and Monuments, popularly known as Foxe’s Book of Martyrs, is a work of Protestant history and
martyrology by John Foxe, first published in English in 1563.
6At the time of Protestant missions’ settlement in sub-Saharan Africa, there existed three kinds of printing
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highly inflammable materials. In 1819, Thomas Stingfellow and Robert Godlonton, both
English settlers and qualified printers, set sail for South Africa with a large crate containing
a second-hand wooden press. Their “inflammable" machine was however impounded in
Table Bay by the Acting Governor, calling a halt to their printing project before it even
started (Gordon-Brown, 1979). Similarly, the Wesleyan missionaries in Grahamstown (South
Africa) decided to import an iron printing press at the end of the 1820s. But their project
was almost as complicated. When Reverend Stephend Kay arrived with the machine in
1830, the missionaries realized that certain characters required for the Xhosa language were
missing from the typing range. The printing press therefore could not be used for almost
three years, the time it took for the missing material to arrive to Grahamstone.
This anecdotal evidence illustrates the complexity of starting the printing activity in
sub-Saharan Africa. The printing press was, furthermore, a costly object to transport because
of its size and weight. It is difficult to have exact information on the size of the press. Some
useful information is nevertheless given in Moran (1973) who details the sizes as found
in catalogs. The platen of one of the smallest wooden presses found in the 1820s (the
Brooke) was 30cm⇥3.8cm⇥45cm (1ft⇥112 in⇥1ft5in) while it was 91cm⇥30cm (3ft⇥1112 in)
for the largest one. Iron presses were larger. For example, the size of the Columbian press
introduced between 1812 and 1814 and which, according to Moran (1973),‘‘looks much like
others of the period", ranges from 53cm⇥40cm (21in⇥16in) to 106cm⇥68cm (42in⇥27in).
Printing presses were also costly. According to Moran (1973), at the beginning of the
19th Century, wooden presses cost between £60 and £70. When Stanhope introduced his
first iron press around 1800, its price was £90. The price began to drop with competition; in
1808, however, it still ranged from £21 to £73. A few years later, at the end of the 1810s, the
price of the Columbian press, another iron model, ranged from £100 and £125. In 1820 the
price was still above £75. In the 1840s, the Albion press – following the Columbian Press
– varied in size from Amateur (15cm⇥12cm or 7⇥512 in) to Double Royal (100cm⇥58cm or
presses: the wooden press directly inherited from the old Gutenberg’s printing press (Clair, 1976); the iron
press, the most famous one being the Stanhope press which appeared around 1800; and the more technological
steam press that uses a rolling cylinder in printing to overcome excessive manual strain.
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40in⇥23in). The price of the Double Royal was £75.7 In 1830, the average annual income
in the United Kingdom per adult was £30, while the average annual wage was £20. The
average worker (blue-collar) annual wage was £15.8 According to Maddison’s historical per
capita GDP series, average incomes in Africa around 1820 were about five times smaller
than in the United Kingdom. In other words, a printing press cost on average twenty-five
years of a worker’s wage.
Printing presses were costly and sizable and missionaries had to import them from
Europe. Furthermore, specific knowledge was required to use them. When bringing a
printing press to sub-Saharan Africa, the owner had to train apprentices and do much of
the mechanical work himself: “the editor, printer, publisher and proprietor were all combined in
one person" (Gordon-Brown, 1979). Printing presses were often operated by settlers who had
experience on a printing office in England. Moreover, specific educational investments had
to be made. Printing schools were established by Protestant missionaries for the indigenous
population to acquire the specific knowledge required. In 1896, four printing schools were
already active in South Africa (Cape Colony), Zanzibar and Malawi (Lake Nyasa) with close
to 300 students (Church Missionary Society, 1896). As a consequence, printing presses were
not available to the native population outside Protestant mission stations with a printing
press.
The introduction of the first newspapers Because Protestant missionaries made printing
presses available to the indigenous population, most of the first indigenous newspapers
were printed and sponsored by mission centers. Woodberry (2012) qualifies conversionary
Protestants as being “a crucial catalyst initiating the development and spread (. . . ) of newspapers".
The first newspaper intended for black readers, the Umshumayeli Wendaba (“Publishers
of the News"), written in Xhosa, was published as an irregular quarterly in 1837 and printed
7Not to refer to the prices of the cylinder machine which were used in the United States at the time. The
simplest Koenig machine, the single cylinder, cost £900. A double machine cost £1,400 and the most advanced
one £2,000.
8See e.g. Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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at the Wesleyan Missionary Society in Cape Colony.9 The Iwe Irohin (“The Newspaper") was
founded in 1859 as a publication directed by Reverend Henry Townsend from the Anglican
Church missionary society in Nigeria. Isigidimi samaXhosa (“The Xhosa Messenger"), the
first African newspaper edited by Africans, was first released in January 1876 and printed
at the Lovedale Mission Press in South Africa. Eight years later, in November 1884, the
English/Xhosa weekly Imvo Zabantsundu (“The African Opinion") was published. It was
the first black-owned newspaper in South Africa. The Imvo Zabantsundu was edited by
John Tengo Jabavu, former editor of the Isigidimi, and perhaps “the most widely known
mission-educated African in Southern Africa" at the time (Switzer and Switzer, 1979).
In regions where Protestant missions were less active, the first newspapers appeared
only at the beginning of the 20th Century and no indigenous newspapers were created
before World War I. Before the war, the printing presses were mostly owned by the colonial
powers. The first paper in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) to be owned and edited by an African, the
Eclaireur de la Cote d’Ivoire, was first published in 1935 (Mytton, 1983).
This lag of more than one century in the timing of creation of the first indigenous
newspapers might explain the persistent effect of the proximity to a printing press on
newspaper readership today. Newspapers take time to consolidate. In most sub-Saharan
African countries, the newly-established government tried to take control of the press after
independence. These nationalizations did not succeed in countries where newspapers were
well established, stable and independent before colonization. In Nigeria, for instance, despite
the 1966 coup d’état, the ensuing military regime and the development of a state-owned
press, independent newspapers managed to survive. Similarly, even during Apartheid in
South Africa, the black press and anti-Apartheid white-owned presses continued to exist.
The Daily Dispatch, the SASO Newsletter or The World regularly diffused their anti-Apartheid
stances. This was not the case in former French colonies.
9The London Missionary Society and Methodist missions also produced the earliest journals aimed at the
Tswana Christian community from their stations at Kuruman and Thaba’Nchu. Mokaeri Oa Becuana, Le Muleri
Oa Mahuku (“The Teacher of the Bechuana, the Announcer of the News"), which started in 1857, is regarded as
the oldest newspaper in the Tswana language (Switzer, 1984).
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Reading habits exhibit strong persistence over time. A survey on newspapers made by
the Lumina Foundation across Lagos, Enugu, Oyo, Edo, Kogi, Kaduna and the River States,
highlights the persistence of reading habits in southern and middle-belt Nigeria. 59% of the
respondents replied that they read newspapers as a family-inherited culture (Fraser, 2008).
The persistence of newspaper readership is of particular importance today despite
growing questioning of the future of newspapers in the internet era. Sub-Saharan Africa is
one of the few places in the world where the newspaper market is still growing. This market
expands as literacy steadily increases whereas other media like television or internet require
capital that most sub-Saharan Africans do not have. Moreover, as suggested by Bratton et al.
(2005), it is harder for governments to control newspapers while they can control radio or
television by restricting supply and imposing a government monopoly.
Testing for the long-term impacts of the historical printing press on newspaper concentra-
tion ideally requires information on newspaper supply. Such information is not available at
the local level in sub-Saharan Africa. The few datasets available only provide information on
the main national newspapers. In the Appendix, we provide cross-country evidence of the
persistence of newspaper supply.10 Figure B.5 shows the cross-country correlation between
the number of newspapers that have existed and the average distance of the cities surveyed
in the Afrobarometer to the closest historical mission settlement with a printing press. The
figure displays a negative correlation between the average distance to the printing press and
the total number of newspapers recorded. Figure B.6 shows the correlation between the date
of publication of the first newspaper and the average distance of the cities surveyed in the
Afrobarometer to the closest historical Protestant mission station with a printing press. We
observe a positive correlation between the distance to the printing press and the publication
date of the first newspaper: the closer a location is to a historically attested printing press,
the sooner the first newspaper is recorded. This suggestive evidence supports the notion
of the early emergence of newspapers around mission stations and the persistence of the
10In the Appendix, we present the few data sources on sub-Saharan African newspapers that are available
and that we digitize and merge together.
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concentration pattern. In the remainder of the paper, newspaper readership is our variable
of interest.
2.3 Data and Missionary Locations
2.3.1 Data
2.3.1.1 Historical data
Missionary activity We construct the mission-level data from the Geography and Atlas of
Christian Missions (Dennis et al., 1903). We geocode the maps of sub-Saharan African regions
from this atlas. The maps locate all the Protestant mission stations in 1903 (an example of
these maps is provided in the Appendix Figure B.2).
As opposed to other available geographic datasets of Protestant missions (Nunn, 2009a),
ours contains detailed information for each mission settlement. In the Geography and Atlas
of Christian Missions, each mission station is uniquely identified in a statistical appendix
providing information on the mission’s size (number of students, of missionaries, etc) and
a detailed record of its activities and investments. For example, we know whether each
mission had a printing press, a school, a high school, a dispensary, or a hospital. The
exhaustive list of variables and a reproduction of one page of the statistical index are
provided in the Appendix Figure B.1. We digitize this information for the entire world and
geocode it for Africa. Our sample of sub-Saharan African missions includes a total of 723
Protestant missions out of which 27 were equipped with a printing press in 1903. Figure 2.1
shows the location of mission stations and their printing presses in 1903. This dataset is,
to the extent of our knowledge, the most exhaustive recording of missionary investments
in the world, and it is geocoded for Africa. We hope this dataset will be of use for future
research.
Since very few Catholic missions are recorded in the Geography and Atlas of Christian
Missions, we use data from Béthune (1889) to locate them. This source does not provide
information on the investments conducted. This is not an empirical issue since Catholic
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missionaries had no role in bringing the printing press. Moreover, our specifications always
controls for the distance to the closest Catholic mission.
Population density Historical population density comes from the HYDE 3.1 database
(Goldewijk et al., 2011). This database provides rasters of estimated historical population
density on a 0.5 by 0.5 degree latitude longitude grid. The estimates are the results of a
bio-geographic model that combines information on population density at the national
and subnational levels with climatic and geographic data to infer a local estimate of the
population density (Goldewijk, 2005; Goldewijk et al., 2011). For the national-level population
density, data are from the Maddison Project Database, McEvedy and Jones (1978) and Livi-
Bacci (2001). Sub-national level data come from censuses. The HYDE 3.1 database provides
56 rasters covering the period from 10000 BC to AD 2000. According to the documentation,
the data is reliable for Africa starting from AD 1700. Figure B.3 in the Appendix gives
examples of the population density maps in 1700, 1800, 1900 and 2000. We extract all
these estimates in a buffer of 10 km around each mission and around each town from the
Afrobarometer.
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of population density, as estimated in the HYDE 3.1
database, around missions depending on whether they had a printing press. Missions start
to diverge in the late 19th Century. Population density is estimated to be systematically
higher around missions with a printing press after missions started to settle (the average
arrival date of missions in Africa is 1850). Such divergence between missions with and
without the printing press supports our hypothesis of a positive impact of the missionary
printing press for long-term development. However, this is only suggestive evidence.
Publication records We gather information on the number of publications printed at the
mission press until 1923, twenty years after the publication of Geography and Atlas of Christian
Missions. The Bibliography of Christian Literature (Rowling and Wilson, 1923) inventories all
the books and reviews, religious or not, published by the missionaries. From this source,
we identify 18 presses from our original sample that had a publication record in 1923.
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Figure 2.1: Mission Stations With and Without a Printing Press in 1903
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Figure 2.2: Population Density around Missions, using HYDE 3.1 data
These printing presses were probably the most productive or the ones with the most stable
production across time.
Historical controls The Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) provides precolonial character-
istics at the ethnic group-level such as initial population density. The slave trade data come
from Nunn (2008). We geocode this data at the mission-level. Geocoded town-level data are
from Nunn (2008).
2.3.1.2 Contemporary data
Newspaper readership Data on newspaper readership are from the 2005 Afrobarometer
surveys. There are 17 sub-Saharan African countries in these surveys: 10 former English
colonies (Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
and Zimbabwe), 4 French (Benin, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal), 2 German (Botswana and
Namibia) and 1 Portuguese (Mozambique). Surveys are based on interviews conducted in
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the local languages from a random sample of either 1,200 or 2,400 individuals of voting age
in each country. Overall, they cover approximately 21,000 individuals sampled to constitute
representative groups at the national level.
The Afrobarometer provides individual-level subjective data on media consumption and
civic attitudes. On average only 34% of the individuals surveyed read a newspaper at least
once a month. The Afrobarometer also provides information on a set of individual controls:
education, age, sex and ethnicity, among others. This data is geocoded at the district level.11
Table B.2 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for these variables.
Light density at night To proxy for contemporary economic development, we follow
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and use satellite images of light density at night.
The data come from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan
System of the National Geophysical Data Center. This system reports images of the earth at
night captured from 8:30pm to 10:00pm local time. The satellite detects lights from human
settlements, fires, gas flares, lightning, and the aurora. The measure ranges from 0 to 63 and
is calculated for every 30-second area (approximately 1 square kilometer). The resulting
annual composite images of lights are created by overlaying all images captured during
a calendar year, dropping images where lights are shrouded by cloud or overpowered by
the aurora or solar glare (near the poles), and removing ephemeral lights like fires and
lightning (the map used is presented in the Appendix Figure B.4). We construct average
light density in 2012 for each mission and each Afrobarometer town. This measure is the
average light density reported on the night light raster in a 10 km buffer around each
location. Following Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), we use the natural logarithm
of average light density.
Appendix Figure ?? plots our measure of average light density for Afrobarometer towns
as a function of the distance to the printing press. The plot presents first suggestive
11Individual-level readership data allows us to control for other individual characteristics. There is no data
on African newspaper circulation available at the district level. Moreover, as our identification strategy uses
precise geographic variation, we need extensive district-level information and such information is not available
for newspaper circulation.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Distance from the Afrobarometer Town to the Closest Mission and to the
Closest Printing Press.
Mean sd Median Min Max
Distance to Mission, 100km 1.338 1.733 0.710 0.007 12.897
Distance to Printing Press, 100km 4.456 3.014 3.705 0.016 16.891
Mission < 150 km 0.718 0.450 1.000 0.000 1.000
Mission < 150 km and Printing < 150 km 0.109 0.312 0.000 0.000 1.000
Observations 21330
Notes: The table gives summary statistics for the distance of Afrobarometer towns to Protestant missions. The
variables in the first two rows respectively describe the distance to the closest mission and the closest mission
with a printing press in hundreds of kilometers. The last two rows describe two binary variables equal to one if
the city is located in a 150 km radius of respectively any mission or a mission with a printing press.
evidence of the negative relationship between the two variables. In Section 2.5.3, we present
econometric evidence identifying this relationship.
Geographic characteristics Finally, to control for geographic characteristics at the town
and mission level, we use the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) data. The data are
geocoded and provide information on annual precipitation levels, the average suitability
for rainfed crops, the number of agriculture growing days per year and the accumulated
temperature in the year.
2.3.2 Determinants of Missions’ Location and Investments
Protestant missions were the first to make the printing press available to the indigenous
population and to sponsor the first indigenous newspapers. Before turning to the empirical
analysis, we analyze the determinants of mission location. We also compare missions that
invested in the printing technology and missions that did not. On average, towns from the
Afrobarometer are located 133.8 km away from the closest mission settlement and 70% of
them are located 150 km away or closer to the closest mission settlement (Table 2.1). As a
baseline, we use the 150 km threshold to define towns close to a mission.
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Mission location A number of factors played a role in determining the location of mission
settlements. Among them are access to a clean water supply, the ability to import supplies
from Europe, the abundance of a fertile soil that could be used to grow crops, and a high
altitude with a temperate climate (Johnson, 1967). Moreover, mission locations exhibited
a form of path-dependence. The routes of initial missionary explorers determined which
parts of Africa were the best-known to Europeans, as well as the locations of the earliest
mission stations from which larger networks of stations were developed. The colonial
railway network is another factor that affected mission locations, as well as the slave trade
(Johnson, 1967; Nunn, 2010).
These known trends are for the most part confirmed in our data. In Table 2.2 we
perform a t-test on the equality of means for geographic and historical characteristics of
towns located near (less than 150 km) and far (more than 150 km) from a historical mission
settlement. As for the geographic characteristics, we find that missions locate in places with
a lower prevalence of malaria and a more favorable climate (measured by the accumulated
temperature and the annual precipitation level). They also locate in places more suitable for
agriculture (measured by the suitability for rainfed crops and the number of agricultural
growing days). Moreover, they locate closer to the coast. As for the historical determinants
of mission location, slave exports are higher in places near missions. We also find that
missions have a higher probability to be located near historical railway networks, and a
lower probability to locate near an explorer’s route.
An open question in the literature is the general effect of population density. Some
missionaries intentionally built missions in more remote locations where the “word of God"
otherwise would not have reached; whereas other missionaries recognized the benefits
associated with dense populations and targeted these groups (De Gruchy, 1999; Nunn,
2010).
According to Table 2.2 regions near historical mission settlements had on average a higher
population density and more favorable geographic conditions. In our empirical analysis
we only focus on regions near historical mission settlements. Moreover, our specifications
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always control for all the geographic and historical characteristics described in Table 2.2.
Location of the printing press Did missions with a printing press locate in regions with
specific geographical or historical characteristics correlated with determinants of newspaper
readership? Table 2.3 compares the geographic and historical characteristics of missions
with and without a printing press and perform a t-test on the equality of means. Missions
with the printing press were not, on average, located in more geographically favored areas.
None of the geographical indicators are significantly different between the two groups,
except for malaria ecology which is higher for missions that invested in the printing press.
Historical characteristics exhibit a different pattern. Slave export and railway contact
have similar means between the two groups, as well as initial population density. On the
contrary, missions with a printing press have more favorable historical characteristics: they
are closer to historical cities and explorer routes. All our specifications control for these
characteristics.
2.3.2.1 The printing press and other investments
Did missions with a printing press conduct different types of investments or have different
characteristics? Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics comparing investments and charac-
teristics of missions with and without a printing press. Mission characteristics are similar
between the two groups, except that missions with a printing press also have a much higher
probability of being Bible Societies.
Missions with a printing press have on average more schools, both in level and per
student than missions without, as well as more teachers per student. We use various
empirical strategies to check that our results are not driven by these higher investments
in education. Finally, missions with a printing press have more health facilities in level.
However they do not invest more in health per capita. Our specifications always control for
missions’ characteristics and investments.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of the Location of Missions
No Mission Mission Diff/se
Geographic Characteristics
Accumulated Temperature / 1000 10.921 13.476 -2.555⇤⇤⇤
(0.76)
Annual Precipitation level / 1000 1.227 1.287 -0.060
(0.11)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops 5.606 5.046 0.560⇤⇤⇤
(0.10)
Number of Growing Days / 100 1.803 4.182 -2.379⇤
(1.17)
Distance Capital, 100km 4.451 3.142 1.309⇤⇤⇤
(0.15)
Distance Coast, 100km 5.768 3.402 2.366⇤⇤⇤
(0.16)
Malaria 17.025 9.723 7.302⇤⇤⇤
(0.49)
Historical Characteristics
Slave Exports, per capita 0.083 0.116 -0.032⇤⇤
(0.01)
Railway Contact 0.288 0.470 -0.182⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
Explorer Contact 0.582 0.357 0.224⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
Initial Population Density 12.753 20.700 -7.948⇤⇤
(2.59)
Distance 1400 City, 100 km 3.394 5.106 -1.712⇤⇤⇤
(0.15)
Distance 1800 City, 100 km 4.367 7.320 -2.953⇤⇤⇤
(0.30)
Observations 1979
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares geographical and historical characteristics of places
with and without missions. Column 1 presents the results for places without missions. Column 2 presents the
results for places with a mission. In Column 3 we perform a t-test on the equality of means (standard errors in
parenthesis). Variables are described in the Appendix.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of the Location of Missions With a Printing Press
No printing Printing Diff/se
Geographic Characteristics
Accumulated Temp /1000 12.808 13.184 -0.376
(3.025)
Annual Precipitation/ 1000 1.246 1.384 -0.138
(0.441)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops 4.992 4.750 0.242
(0.356)
Number of Growing Days / 100 3.952 2.192 1.761
(4.842)
Distance to Capital, 100 km 2.702 2.655 0.047
(0.374)
Distance to the Coast, 100 km 2.310 2.747 -0.437
(0.534)
Malaria Ecology 5.187 10.295 -5.108⇤⇤⇤
(1.509)
Historical Characteristics
Slave Exports, per capita 0.074 0.042 0.031
(0.107)
Railway Contact 0.237 0.107 0.129
(0.081)
Explorer Contact 0.143 0.286 -0.143⇤
(0.069)
Initial Population Density 11.803 13.760 -1.958
(8.008)
Distance to 1400 City, 100 km 8.872 6.969 1.903⇤
(0.932)
Distance to 1800 City, 100 km 15.587 10.704 4.883⇤⇤
(1.890)
Observations 679
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares geographic and historical characteristics of places
where missions with and without a printing press locate. Column 1 presents the results for missions without a
printing press. Column 2 presents the results for missions with a printing press. In Column 3 we perform a
t-test on the equality of means (standard errors in parenthesis). Variables are described in the Appendix.
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Table 2.4: Characteristics and Investments of Missions With and Without a Printing Press
No Printing Printing Diff/se
Mission Characteristics
Arrival Date 1878 1872 7
(4)
Bible Society 0.05 0.36 -0.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.05)
Number of Native Workers 3.42 1.79 1.64
(3.20)
Total Population 328 413 -86
(120)
Investment in Education
Schools 0.26 1.64 -1.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.17)
Number of Students 321 397 -76
(119)
Schools per Student (%) 0.32 1.35 -1.03⇤⇤
(0.37)
Teachers per Student (%) 10.09 18.86 -8.77⇤
(4.38)
Investments in Health
Health Facilities 0.19 1.46 -1.28⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
Physicians per Capita (%) 0.35 0.95 -0.61
(0.58)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) 1.52 2.30 -0.78
(1.27)
Observations 679
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares the characteristics and investments of missions with
and without a printing press. Column 1 presents the results for missions without a printing press. Column
2 presents the results for missions with a printing press. In Column 3 we perform a t-test on the equality of
means (standard errors in parenthesis). Variables are described in the Appendix.
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2.4 Newspaper Readership and the Printing Press: Empirical Anal-
ysis
2.4.1 Specification and Identification Strategy
Let i index individuals, j index the village in which individuals live12, e index the ethnicity
and c index the country. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Equation 2.1 describes our preferred identification equation:
Newsijec = aDistance Printing Pressj
+b1Distance Missionj + X 0i b2 + Y 0j b3 + Z0eb4 + dc + uijec
(2.1)
“Distance Printing Pressj" is the logarithm of the distance from village j to the closest
mission with a printing press. Distances are measured in kilometers. The parameter a is
our parameter of interest. It captures the impact of the proximity to a printing press on
newpaper readership today.
“Distance Missionj" is the logarithm of the distance from village j to the closest mission.
The distances are computed using the geocoded information described in Figure 2.1 and
Section 3.1.
We control for a large set of covariates that might determine individual behaviors today
and historical mission settlement. The choice of the control set is inspired from Nunn (2008)
and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011).
The vector of individual controls X0i includes the age of the surveyed individuals, their
age squared, their sex, their level of education, their religion (two binary variables indicating
whether the individual is Protestant or Catholic), their television and radio consumption,
and two indices ranging from 0 to 4 indicating the intensity of cash and water constraints.
These two indices are proxies for living standards and geographical constraints.13
12In the Afrobarometer, individuals are assembled by the smallest unit among villages, cities or districts. We
defined this unit using the latitude and longitude provided in the Afrobarometer. We call “village" this unit in
the remainder of the paper.
13This set of individual level controls is similar to the one used in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
95
The vector of village-level controls Y0j includes a wide range of historical and geographical
factors that may have played a role in determining both mission center locations and long-
term economic development. At the village level, we control for the distance to the capital
city, whether the village is located in an urban area, current and historical distance to the
coast14, the historical exposure to the trans-Atlantic and Indian slave trades, the precolonial
population density (in 1700), and the population density in 2005.
At the ethnicity-level (vector of ethnicity-level controls Z0e), we control for the malaria
ecology of the land, average elevation, and the share of land within 10 km of water.
The three vectors of individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls (X0i, Y0j and Z0e) plus
the country fixed effects constitute the baseline set of controls.
2.4.2 OLS Estimation
2.4.2.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.5a presents OLS estimates of the impact of the proximity to a mission with a printing
press on newspaper readership. In all the specifications we include the baseline controls.
Column 1 shows that a 1% increase in the proximity to the closest mission with a printing
press is associated with an increase in the probability of reading a newspaper by nearly 1.4
percentage points. Controlling for the proximity to the closest mission increases slightly
the point estimate to 1.5 percentage points; there is no effect of the proximity to a mission
without a printing press (Column 2). This negative coefficient is statistically significant
and economically meaningful. A one-standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the
proximity to the printing press increases the probability of reading newspapers by 3.6%
of a standard deviation (Column 2). In the following tables we include the proximity to a
mission without a printing press in our baseline set of controls.
Reducing the sample to individuals close to a Protestant mission As shown in Sec-
tion 5.3, regions near historical mission settlements have on average a higher population
14Historical distance to the coast is the distance to the coast of the respondent’s ethnicity.
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density and better geographic conditions than regions further. Moreover, all the mission
stations invested in activities, especially education, that are probably correlated with long-
term development. Therefore, we restrict our sample of analysis to regions near historical
mission settlements. Such restrictions aim at correcting for possible selection in mission
location. The rest of the analysis is conducted within regions near missions.
In Columns 3 to 5 of Table 2.5a we present the results of the estimation of equation (2.1)
when the sample is restricted to individuals near a Protestant mission. Near is sequentially
defined as being in a village with at least a Protestant mission in a 200 km (Column 3),
150 km (Column 4), and 100 km (Column 5) radius around the village. These restrictions
represent, respectively, 80%, 70% and 60% of the sample.
For all the different specifications, we find a negative and statistically significant impact
of an increase in the proximity to a printing press. The point estimates vary between 1.3 and
1.5 percentage points. Considering individuals living in a village with at least one mission
in a 150 km radius around the village (Column 4), we find that a one-standard deviation
increase in the proximity to the closest printing press increases newspaper readership by
3.1% of a standard deviation. A variance decomposition of the results shows that the
proximity to the printing press and the other covariates together explain 21.3% of the total
variation in newspaper readership. Of these 21.3%, 0.4 to 2.9% is explained by the distance
to the printing press.
The Appendix Table B.2 reports the estimated coefficients for all the covariates. All the
coefficients are of the expected sign. Table B.2, reports the standardized coefficients (beta
coefficient) for all the covariates. The impact of the distance to the printing press is of the
same order of magnitude as the intensity of cash constraints, the distance to the capital
and smaller than the urban area dummy. The effect of the respondent’s level of education
is around ten times higher. This difference is not surprising since distance to the printing
press captures a historical effect that might have been attenuated over time. The effect
of the interaction between proximity to the printing press and education is discussed in
Section 2.5.
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As the sample is restricted to regions close to historical mission settlements, the effect
found can be lower than the real ones if the printing press has a spillover effect across
regions. If the effect of the printing press vanishes in regions outside the threshold but
is present in regions considered, then our estimates might indeed be downward biased
because of spatial externalities (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2011).
2.4.3 Endogenous Selection of Missions into Printing
A crucial empirical challenge is the possibility of endogenous selection of missions into
printing. Therefore, we augment regression (2.1) with an extensive set of covariates. We
then develop an instrumental variable approach.
2.4.3.1 Selection on Observables
We augment our baseline set of controls with additional potential determinants of the
location of the mission stations and of the missions with a printing press among mission
stations. These determinants include a binary variable equal to one if any part of the railway
network was built on land historically inhabited by the ethnic group and zero otherwise;
a binary variable equal to one if an European explorer traveled through land historically
occupied by the ethnic group; and the distance to the closest precolonial city (cities in 1400).
We also control for the distance to the closest missionary investments that may be
correlated with long-term development: different types of schools (high school, boarding
school, college, etc) and health facilities. Similarly, we add geographic and investment
characteristics of the closest mission: the annual precipitation level, the suitability for rain-
fed crops, the number of agricultural growing days and the accumulated temperature, the
number of native workers, students, teachers and physicians, the total population of the
mission and the arrival date of the mission. Finally, we add the logarithm of the distance to
the closest Catholic mission in 1889.
Table 2.5b shows the results of the estimation of equation (2.1) when all these additional
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Table 2.5: Distance to a Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, OLS Estimation
(a) Baseline Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All 200km 150km 100 km
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.014⇤⇤ -0.015⇤⇤ -0.013⇤ -0.015⇤⇤ -0.013⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance Mission 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 15086 15086 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1809 1809 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.360 0.360 0.357 0.353 0.357
F-Statistic 205.5 201.6 185.4 174.9 158.3
(b) Estimation with Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.018⇤⇤ -0.023⇤⇤⇤ -0.021⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.359 0.356 0.361
F-Statistic 137.6 130.2 120.0
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by village. The
baseline controls are the individual-, village-, and ethnicity-level controls described in the text. All specifications
include country fixed effects. In columns 1 and 2 we present results for the entire sample. In columns 3 to 5
the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living 200 km (column 3), 150 km (column 4) and 100 km
(column 5) away from a historical mission settlement.
99
controls are added. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls and they are
more statistically significant. Moreover the magnitude of the effect is larger. The point
estimates vary from 1.8 to 2.3. A one-standard deviation increase in the proximity to the
closest printing press increases newspaper readership by 5.2% of a standard deviation when
considering the 100 km threshold (Column 3).15
2.4.3.2 IV Estimation
Despite our attempts to control for observable factors, our estimates might be driven by
unobserved factors correlated both with long-term development and proximity to historical
location of a mission with a printing press. We thus develop an instrumental variable
approach. This approach is based on our historical readings of the different preferences of
missionary societies for the printing press.16
In the early period of missionary expansion, missionaries faced numerous difficulties
despite the support of an increasing number of church ministers (Ellis, 1844). Travels were
often costly and required careful planning. Moreover, independent missionaries could
face the hostility of colonial powers, especially fearing anti-slavery positions. In the late
18th Century, they also endured the hostitility of the clergymen who disagreed with the
conversion methods used by the evangelists.
As a result of the raising popularity of the missionary work and the struggles mission-
aries faced, different associations of missionaries and evangelists started to emerge in the
late 18th Century. The first societies were mostly launched under the impulsion of the
evangelists, for instance the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS) founded in 1792 by William
Carey. Many of them had no denominational affiliation and emerged as the association of
15In the Appendix Table B.18 we report the coefficients for all the different distances. Only distance to the
printing press matters for newspaper readership nowadays
16Bai and Kung (2011), in their study of protestantism and economic prosperity in China, similarly compare
the effects different Protestant denominations had on economic outcome, different denominations emphasizing
Calvinist principles differently. We improve this empirical strategy in two important ways. First, while Bai and
Kung (2011) work at the denomination level, we work at the society level (see more on this below). Second and
most importantly, we are able to measure the exact investments made by each society.
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churchmen convinced of the importance of the missionary work. In 1795, several meetings
between different churchmen (among which John Love, John Townsend, John Eyre and
George Townsend) established the founding principles of the London Missionary Society
(LMS). These principles reflect the will to overcome denominational barriers and join efforts
for the purpose of missionary work. This will is clear in the founding letter of the LMS
signed in 1795:
“We [. . . ] declare our earnest desire to [. . . ] unite together, purposing to use
our best endeavors that we may bring forward the formation of an extensive and
regularly organized society, to consist of evangelical ministers and lay brethren of
all denominations, the object of which society shall be, to concert and pursue the
most effectual measures for accomplishing this important and glorious design.”
(Ellis, 1844, p.19).
In the early 19th Century, numerous and diverse societies had been created. The Church
Missionary Society (CMS), for instance, was founded in 1800 by the Church of England in
response to the raising popularity of the missionary work (Stock, 1899). The aim of these
organizations was to coordinate efforts and funds of the missionary work. Their priorities
differed and depended on the preferences and means of the societies’ command. The CMS,
for instance, “in the absence of missionaries,[. . . ] fell back upon the printing press as an agent of
evangelization" from the start of its activity (Stock, 1899, p.75). Similarly, The Duff, the first
vessel sent abroad by the LMS to Tahiti, carried “a valuable collection of articles of clothing,
books, printing apparatus, and useful tools" (Ellis, 1844, p.40). On the contrary, the Christian
Missionary Alliance, founded in 1887 by the wealthy Reverend Albert B. Simpson, had not
invested in a single printing press ten years later, even though it had already settled 52
missions around the globe (Dennis et al., 1903).
IV strategy There are 5,535 missions in the entire world outside sub-Saharan Africa (6,258
including sub-Saharan Africa) reported in the Geography and Atlas of Christian Missions. Only
2.3% of these missions had a printing press.17 These missions were affiliated with 262
17This is slightly lower than in sub-Saharan Africa where the percentage of the missions with a printing
press was 3.7%.
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different societies among which 69 are present in both sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of
the world. Moreover, the arrival date of missions with a printing press to Africa and to the
rest of the world is almost identical (1877 for both samples).
Let “Society PPm" be the share of missions from mission m’s society equipped with (at
least) a printing press in all the regions of the world outside sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-
Saharan Africa, we know the originating society for 679 out of our 723 missions (44 missions
were either affiliated to a society existing only in sub-Saharan Africa or not affiliated to
a society). Among the 69 originating societies recorded, 16.8% had a printing press in at
least one of their missions. Our instrumenting assumption is that the larger this share, the
more likely it was for a mission associated with this society to invest in a printing press in
sub-Saharan Africa. In the Appendix Table B.9 we find a statistically significant and positive
correlation of “Society PP” with the probability that a mission has a printing press.
Let “Village Printingj(k)" be the sum of Society PPm for all the missions historically
located less than k km away from village j. For each village j, we call mj(x) any mission
station historically located x km away from j. The variable “Village Printingj(k)" is defined
in equation (2.2):
Village Printingj(k) = Â
xk
Society PPm(x) (2.2)
Figure 2.3 represents the construction of the instrumental variable. Take the example
of two different villages j1 and j2 and two different distances given by the radii k0 and k1.
If we consider the smaller radius k0 then village j1 has a higher probability – as estimated
by Village Printingj1(k0) – to be closer to a mission with a printing press than village j2. By
construction, the larger the radius, the higher the potential value of Village Printingj(k).
“Village Printingj(k)" is used as an instrument for “Distance Printing Press". The exclu-
sion restriction is that the share of missions from a society having invested in a printing press
outside sub-Saharan Africa (“Society PPm") is not correlated with long-term determinants
of newspaper readership in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, societies that invested the
most in printing presses should not be the richest, nor have invested more, nor be located
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Notes: Figure 2.3 provides an illustrative example of how we construct the “Village Printingj(k)" variable. In
the Figure, we consider the case of two different villages – j1 and j2 – and of two different distances given by
the radius k0 and k1.
Village Printingj1 (k0) = 0.16 = 0.1+ 0.05+ 0.01.
Village Printingj1 (k1) = 0.23 = 0.05+ 0.1+ 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.05.
Village Printingj2 (k0) = 0.
Village Printingj2 (k1) = 0.02 = 0.01+ 0.01.
Figure 2.3: Instrumenting the Distance to the Printing Press Using Missions’ Society: A Graphical
Illustration
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in places with the best geographic characteristics. We provide evidence supporting the
exclusion restriction in Table 2.6 and Appendix Tables B.7. Table 2.6 compares the average
investments of missionary societies outside sub-Saharan Africa depending on whether they
invested in the printing press. There is no significant difference other than the arrival date.
In 1903, societies that had invested in the printing press had settled, on average, earlier
than those that did not. Similarly, Table B.7 in the Appendix reports OLS estimates of the
mission-level regression of “Society PP" on mission characteristics, investments, geographic
and historical characteristics. None of the coefficients are statistically significant. Societies
that invested the more in printing outside sub-Saharan Africa did not systematically conduct
other type of investments in sub-Saharan Africa, nor did they settle in more geographically
favored regions.
Results Table 2.7 presents the results using a 50 km radius for the construction of “Vil-
lage Printing (k)".18 Table 2.7 Panel A gives the results of the first stage of the estimation. All
the coefficients are negative and statistically significant. A one-standard deviation increase
in “Village Printingj(50)" decreases the distance to the closest printing press by 5.7% of a
standard deviation for regions located less than 150 km away from a historical mission
settlement (Column 2).
Table 2.7 Panel B presents the results of the second stage of the estimation. The positive
impact of the proximity to a printing press on newspaper readership is robust to the
instrumentation strategy. If anything, the results tend to be larger than those obtained
in the previous sections. A one-standard deviation increase in the distance to the closest
printing press decreases individual newspaper readership nowadays by 10% of a standard
deviation for regions located less than 150 km away from a historical mission settlement
(Column 2). Results for regions located less than 200 km or 100 km away from a historical
mission settlement are of similar magnitude.
The magnitude of the IV coefficients is larger than the OLS’s. The OLS estimates might
18In the Appendix Tables B.10 and B.11, we show that the results are robust to the use of other radii.
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Table 2.6: Investments of Societies With and Without a Printing Press
No Printing Printing Diff/se
Mission Characteristics
Arrival Date 1867 1842 25⇤⇤
(8)
Bible Society 0.10 0.09 0.01
(0.06)
Number of Native Workers 1.38 1.42 -0.04
(1.43)
Total Population 220 172 48
(61)
Investment in Education
Schools (any kind) in mission 0.37 0.51 -0.14
(0.11)
Number of Students 215 166 49
(61)
Schools per Student (%) 0.54 0.66 -0.12
(0.24)
Teachers per Student (%) 9.87 11.07 -1.19
(3.42)
Other Investments
Health Facilities 0.26 0.46 -0.20
(0.16)
Physicians per Capita (%) 0.56 0.19 0.37
(0.59)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) 2.22 0.91 1.30
(1.49)
Observations 69
Notes: The table compares average investments performed by societies in the entire world depending on
whether they invested in the printing press somewhere in the world before 1903. Societies compared are those
also present in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 2.7: Impact of the Proximity to a Printing Press, IV Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Distance Printing Press
Village Printing (50) -0.549** -0.524** -0.412**
(0.174) (0.192) (0.200)
Panel B: Dependent Variable is News Readership
Distance Printing Press -0.045** -0.040** -0.042*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Observations 11925 10583 9059
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1401 1267 1093
R2 First Stage 0.638 0.635 0.632
F First Stage 58.734 61.653 59.942
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by village. The table reports the first and second stage of the IV estimation of the impact of
the distance to a printing press on newspaper readership. The distance to a printing press is instrumented
by Village Printingj(50). The construction of the variables “Village Printingj(50)" and "Denomination PPm" is
described in more details in the text. The controls are the individual-, village-, ethnicity- and mission-level
controls described in the text.
be suffering from attenuation bias due to measurement error in mission locations. This
measurement error might come from the “manual" construction of the dataset or errors in
placement from the historical maps. It might make it more difficult to gauge the effect of
the proximity to a mission with a printing press in the OLS estimation. The instrumentation
would then be correcting for the attenuation bias, hence increasing the point estimates.
Taken together, all the results from Section 2.4 are consistent with the idea that the
introduction of the printing press has a long-lasting effect on newspaper readership.
2.4.3.3 Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks. This section briefly describes them; the detailed
results for these tests are in the Appendix.
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In the Appendix Section B.3.1, we check that the results of Table 2.5b are robust to
using a matching strategy. As opposed to the OLS estimator that imposes linearity in the
parameters, the matching estimator allows for non-linear effects of observables (Acemoglu,
2005). Our results robust to using matching (Table B.17).
Moreover, in the Appendix Section B.3.2, we use insights from Altonji et al. (2005) and
Oster (2013) to assess the bias from unobservables using the sensitivity of the treatment to
added controls under the proportional selection assumption. The resultsmake it unlikely
that the entire estimated effect of the distance to the printing press is driven by unobserved
variables.
Some of the contemporary controls, especially education, may be bad controls in the
sense of Angrist and Pischke (2009). This issue would arise if any of the contemporary
controls were also outcomes. Appendix Table B.20 presents the results of the estimation of
equation (2.1) with the additional observables added in Table 2.5b but without education,
religion, cash constraints, water constraints, population density in 2005, distance to the
capital, watching the news on television and listening to the news on the radio in the
controls set. The results are not significantly different from those presented in Table 2.5b.
Because missions that invested in the printing press might be larger, we also check that
our effect is not driven by the mission size. As a falsification test, we estimate equation (2.1)
with the distance to the 30 largest missions as the main explanatory variable.19 The results
are given in the Appendix Table B.21. Distance to the largest missions has no effect on
newspaper readership nowadays.
Appendix Table B.23 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2.1) for a sample
restricted to former British colonies. Our results are robust to this restriction and the
magnitude of the effect remains unchanged. Our results thus cannot be entirely attributed
to the colonizer’s legal origins.
We also estimate equation (2.1) using two-way clustering at the closest mission and the
19The size of the mission is the total number of students, missionaries and indigenous teachers and workers.
Within these 30 largest mission, only two have a printing press.
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village levels. Clustering the standard errors at the mission level might be relevant should
the closest mission be also considered as a treatment. Table B.22 shows that our results are
robust to this two-way clustering strategy. Our results are also robust to a Probit rather than
an OLS specification (Appendix Table B.19).
Finally, Appendix Table B.24 presents the results of the estimation of equation (2.1) when
the dependent variable Newsijc is a binary variable equal to one if individual i in village
j and country c listens to the news on the radio (Columns 1 to 3) or watches the news on
television (Columns 4 to 6) at least once a month. We find no statistically significant effect
of the printing press on listening to the news on the radio or watching them on television.
2.5 Discussion
Is newspaper readership today really measuring regional persistence in newspaper reading
habits? Or are our results driven by an increase in education in regions close to the printing
press, even within regions close to missions? This section first explores the possible channels
explaining the effect of the printing press on newspaper readership. It then investigates the
relationship between proximity to a printing press and political participation. Finally, it
documents the long-term consequences of the printing press on economic development and
studies the channels explaining this relationship.
2.5.1 Printing Press and Newspaper Readership: Channels of Transmission
Education As one of the missionaries’ objectives was to maximize conversion through
reading the Bible, they taught literacy to the native population (Woodberry, 2004).20 A num-
ber of recent studies emphasize the positive consequences on human capital of conversion
through reading the Bible (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Bai and Kung, 2011; McCleary
and Pesina, 2012; Woodberry, 2012). In the sub-Saharan African context, Nunn (2009b) finds
that Protestant missions increased educational attainment (see also Nunn and Wantchekon,
20The role of missionary activity on literacy was significantly reduced later in the Century (around the 1940s)
when imaging technology developed (McCleary and Pesina, 2012).
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2011). Human capital accumulation, fostered by missionary activity, might thus be driving
our results. We show in this section that it is not the case.
Two aspects of our econometric analysis account for the effect of education on newspaper
readership, independently of proximity to the printing press. First, education is included in
our baseline set of controls. Second, we control for the number of teachers and the number
of students in the nearest mission and the distance to the nearest mission with a school
or a high school. These controls capture the historical regional determinants of education.
Moreover, as a falsification test, we estimate the impact of the proximity to a printing press
on education. Table 2.8 shows no statistically significant effect of the distance to a printing
press on education.
This result does not imply that missionaries had no long-term impact on education and
human capital accumulation. Consistently with the existing literature (Wantchekon et al.,
2012), we find a positive and statistically significant impact of the proximity to a mission
with a high-school on education (Table 2.8). For regions located less than 150 km away from
a mission, a one-standard deviation increase in the distance to the closest mission with a
high school increases education today by 6.9% of a standard deviation. Moreover, distance
to the printing press can only affect newspaper readership if people are educated enough to
read the news. In Table 2.9a, we interact the distance to the printing press with a binary
variable equal to one if the education level of the individual is above the median (equivalent
to having completed elementary schooling). As expected, proximity to a printing press only
affects newspaper readership when education is high enough.
Publication records Is newspaper readership today really capturing the regional historical
development of the newspaper and printing industry? To answer this question, we use
a proxy for the regional development of the publishing industry; we gather information
on the number of publications printed at the mission press until 1923. In the publication
record data, we find that 18 missions with a printing press (out of the 27 missions equipped
with a printing press in 1903) had a publication record in 1923. The missions where these
printing presses were located did not exhibit any particular type of geographical or historical
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Table 2.8: Proximity to a Printing Press and Education, Controlling for Observables
Education
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150 km 100 km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.024 -0.032 -0.034
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Distance Any Schools -0.018 -0.019 -0.018
(0.050) (0.049) (0.051)
Distance High/Boarding School -0.084⇤ -0.092⇤ -0.092⇤
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
Observations 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.381 0.396 0.389
F-Statistic 127.4 119.6 102.5
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by village. The controls are the individual-, village-, ethnicity- and
mission-level controls described in the text. The dependent variable is the level of education nowadays. In
Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living 200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column
2) and 100 km (Column 3) away from a historical mission settlement.
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characteristics nor did they specialise in any kind of specific investments (online Appendix
Tables B.3 and B.4). We therefore interpret the presence of such records as a proxy for the
activity of the printing presses: printing presses with a publication record in 1923 were
probably the most active. Table 2.9b shows the result of regression (2.1) when we add
distance to the closest mission with a publication record (“Distance PP with Publication”)
as a control. The coefficient associated with “Distance PP with Publication” is negative
and statistically significant. Moreover, once we control for the distance to a mission with
a printing press and a publication record, the coefficient associated with the distance to
a printing press is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the impact of the
distance to a printing press on newspaper readership may be explained by the development
of publishing activities.
The results of Table 2.9b have to be taken carefully since they rely heavily on the only
archival source we found to track the middle-run evolution of the publishing activities of
missions with a printing press. However, they are in line with our assumption that the
long-term impact of the printing press on newspaper readership may be due to the early
development of the newspaper industry around missions with a printing press.
2.5.2 Political Participation
The literature on the determinants of political participation in sub-Saharan Africa has mainly
focused on the role of ethnicity (Gibson and Long, 2012; Ichino and Nathan, 2013a) and
clientelism (Ichino and Nathan, 2013b). We contend that media access – through proximity
to a printing press – might be another important determinant of political participation.
Information may indeed affect political outcomes (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Enikolopov
et al., 2011) and participation at elections (Stromberg, 2004; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel,
2009; Gentzkow et al., 2012).21
We estimate the impact of the distance to a printing press on three different measures of
21With the notable exception of Reinikka and Svensson (2005), there has been very little quantitative work
in economics on mass media focusing on Africa although Africa is an exemplary place to study newspaper
activity.
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Table 2.9: Proximity to a Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Interactions
(a) Baseline Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.009 -0.011 -0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
1{High Education} x Distance PP -0.016⇤ -0.023⇤⇤⇤ -0.025⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
1{High Education} 0.167⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤ 0.205⇤⇤⇤
(0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
Observations 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.362 0.359 0.364
F-Statistic 142.6 134.2 123.6
(b) Interaction with Publication Records
(1) (2) (3) (4)
200km 200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press 0.011 0.010 0.012
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Distance PP with Publication -0.047⇤⇤⇤ -0.060⇤⇤ -0.060⇤⇤ -0.055⇤
(0.013) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Observations 9195 9195 7992 6782
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1043 1043 927 795
R2 0.360 0.360 0.356 0.360
F-Statistic 97.77 97.07 92.37 87.27
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by village. The controls are the individual-, village-, ethnicity- and
mission-level controls described in the text. The dependent variable is the level of education nowadays. In
Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living 200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column
2) and 100 km (Column 3) away from a historical mission settlement.
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political participation22: registration for elections23; voting in past elections24; and a proxy
for political participation at the local level (“Actions as Citizen"25). We also estimate its
impact on a measure of satisfaction with the democratic system (“Satisfaction"26) as well as
on a proxy for the quality of political discussion at the local level (“Listen"27).
Proximity to the printing press might have affected political participation through
newspaper readership. However, the historical dynamics associated with the arrival of the
printing press might also affect directly political participation. For instance, the introduction
of the printing press may have increased nationalism through the strengthening of a common
language (Anderson, 1991).28 Moreover, newspaper readership may have increased political
participation, but the latter may also exhibit a persistent pattern.
Results We aim at determining whether there is a relationship between distance to a
printing press and political participation and, if so, the extent to which this relationship
is captured by contemporary newspaper readership or if, on the contrary, the historical
22Each variable is described in a subsequent footnote. The description provides the question used in the
Afrobarometer to construct the variable. The variables are summarized in the online Appendix Table B.1.
23Understanding that some [Ghanaians/Kenyans/etc.] were not able to register as voters for the [20xx]
elections, which statement is true for you? You were registered to vote, You did not want to register, You could
not find a place to register, You were prevented from registering, You were too young to register, Did not register
for some other reason, Don’t Know/Can’t remember.
24With regard to the most recent, [20xx] national elections, which statement is true for you? You voted in
the elections, You decided not to vote, You could not find the polling station, You were prevented from voting,
You did not have time to vote, Did not vote for some other reason, You were not registered, Don’t Know/Can’t
remember.
25Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether
you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the
chance: attend a community meeting; go together with others to raise an issue; attend a demonstration or
protest march.
26Binary variable indicating that an individual both thinks that his country is a democracy and is “fairly" or
“very satisfied" with “the way democracy works".
27Binary variable indicating whether respondent disagreed with the statement: “As far as politics is
concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to you?”
28“If we consider the character of these newer nationalisms which, between 1820 and 1920, changed the face of the Old
World, two striking features mark them off from their ancestors. First, in almost all of them “national print-languages"
were of central ideological and political importance." (p.67) Similarly, Eisenstein (1980) argues that “it is not accident
that nationalism and mass literacy have developed together. The two processes have been linked ever since Europeans ceased
to speak the same language when citing their Scriptures or saying their prayers" (p.165).
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dynamics associated with the printing press have a persistent effect on political participation
per se.
Following equation (2.1), we estimate the following equation:
Civicijec = a1 Read Newsi + a2 Distance Printing Pressj
+a3 Distance Printing Pressj ⇥ Read Newsi
+b1Distance Missionj + X 0i b2 + Y 0j b3 + Z0eb4 + dc + uijec
(2.3)
where Civicijec is any of the civic attitudes outcomes defined in the previous paragraph, and
Read Newsi is a binary variable equal to one when the individual reads newspapers. The
marginal effect of distance to the printing press among newspaper readers is a2 + a3.
Table 2.10 presents the results of OLS estimation. Distance to the printing press only
has a negative and statistically significant effect on “Listen" and “Actions", i.e. political
participation at the local level. A one-standard deviation increase in distance to the printing
press decreases “Listen” by 4.3% of a standard deviation. A one-standard deviation increase
in distance to the printing press decreases “Actions” by 3.5% of a standard deviation among
newspaper readers and by 7.6% of a standard deviation among non readers. In other
words, contrary what one could have expected, the persistent effect of the distance to a
printing press on political participation is stronger among non-newspaper readers than
among readers. Understanding why it is the case is beyond the purpose of this paper.
In the next sub-section, we finally investigate the long-term consequences of the intro-
duction of the printing press on economic development.
2.5.3 Contemporary Economic Development
According to Dittmar (2011), between 1500 and 1600, European cities where printing presses
were established in the 1400s grew 60% faster than otherwise similar cities . We investigate
here the link between distance to the printing press and economic development in sub-
Saharan Africa and discuss the potential channels explaining this relationship.
As shown in Section 4.3, Figures 2.2 and ?? suggest that there is a negative correlation
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between distance to the printing press and economic development nowadays. Moreover,
Figure 2.2 is consistent with the interpretation of distance to the printing press having
generated a regional dynamic fostering economic development. There is indeed no evidence
of any pre-existing gap in population density between regions close to missions with and
without a printing press.
Table 2.11 shows the estimated coefficients from the regression of city-level light density
on “Distance Printing Press". A one-standard deviation increase in distance to the printing
press significantly decreases light density by 10.7% of a standard deviation (Column 1).
This estimate is robust to instrumenting distance to the printing press using the IV strategy
described in Section 2.4.3.2 (online Appendix Tables B.12, B.13, and B.14).
How to explain such a long-term effect of the printing press on economic development
among regions close to missions? Weber’s hypothesis of The Protestant Ethic suggests that
religion per se might be the driver. Such interpretation would only hold if religiosity
was higher close to the printing press. However, recent studies have challenged this
interpretation. Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Cantoni (2013) show in the European
context that the link between protestantism and economic development is mainly due to
human capital accumulation.29 Building on Habermas (1989), Dittmar (2011) argues that
proximity to the printing press has enabled the development of a culture of information
exchange and of an urban, bourgeois public sphere. We argue that newspaper readership
may be another channel explaining the positive relationship between proximity to a printing
press and contemporary economic development. In particular, if newspaper readers are more
informed citizens more likely to cross party lines when voting – Casey (2013) shows that it
is indeed the case in the Sierra Leonean context30 – then, through an increase in newspaper
readership, proximity to a printing press may have increased political accountability, leading
29Becker and Woessmann (2009) use county-level data from late-nineteenth-century-Prussia and use distance
to Wittenberg as an instrument for Protestantism. Cantoni (2013) uses population figures of 272 cities across the
Holy Roman Empire in 1300-1900.
30Using differential radio coverage, she shows that increased information about candidate competence
presents a counterpoint to tribal loyalty and strengthens accountability.
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to a more equitable allocation of public spending and higher economic development.
Columns 2 to 8 of Table 2.11 examine these potential channels – religiosity, education,
political participation and newspaper readership – through which the printing press may
have affected economic development. For each town j, we define a set of binary variables
1{High z} equal to one whenever the value of z in town j is higher than the median.
The only variables capturing the effect of the distance to the printing press on economic
development are newspaper readership and the share of Protestants in town j (Columns 3,
7, and 8). Protestantism affects negatively economic development nowadays, contradicting
Weber’s assumption. The interaction term of distance to the printing press and newspaper
readership is negative and statistically significant. It is almost identical to the effect in
Column 1, suggesting that the development of the media is the main channel through which
the printing press has a long-term impact on economic development.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of the early introduction of the printing press by Protestant
missionaries in the 19th Century. The evidence we obtain from a variety of identification
strategies is consistent with our hypothesis that the early introduction of the printing press
has long-term effects on newspaper readership. Moreover, we document a long-term impact
on contemporary economic development. We show that the early development of the
newspaper industry and reading habits can explain part of these long-term effects of the
printing press on economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Our results suggest that a
better understanding of African media development will be key for the future of African
democracy and economic change.
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Chapter 3
Improving "National Brands":
Reputation for Quality and Export
Promotion Strategies1
3.1 Introduction
Why are consumers willing to pay more for indistinguishable "Made in Germany" than
"Made in China" products? In which way is building a solid reputation for reliability and
quality key to a developing country’s economic success – and how can it be achieved?
Conversely, can a history of exporting cheap low-quality goods be an obstacle per se to
national development strategies aimed at upgrading quality over time? These questions find
no clear answers in standard models of international trade, which assume that consumers
are perfectly informed about the characteristics of every available product and leave no
role for country reputations. However, as an old and large literature on experience goods
has shown, starting with Nelson (1970), quality is not fully known to consumers prior to
purchase for a wide range of goods. Inferring the quality of a good on offer requires time
and is achieved both through search and through experience. For these categories of goods,
1Co-authored with Dorothée Rouzet
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country-of-origin affects product evaluations and consumers’ decisions. Indeed, many
survey-based studies in the marketing literature, summarized by Roth and Diamantopoulos
(2009), emphasize the role of country-of-origin labels in setting consumer perceptions of
quality.
In this paper, we argue that a "national brand image" matters because it provides
an anchor for the expected unobservable quality of imports. Consumption decisions, in
practice, are based on a limited information set about the characteristics of goods or varieties.
To understand the determinants of demand faced by entrants as well as incumbents in
an industry, we need to consider the information available to consumers at the time of
purchase: information gathered as a result of past consumption experience and word-of-
mouth diffusion, but also the producer’s brand name and the country where the good
was manufactured. Together, these elements determine perceived quality, which affects
consumption more than true quality when the latter is not observable. Specifically, for new
and unknown foreign brands, the main piece of information available to consumers is the
"made in" label, which indicates the country of manufacturing and creates a key role for
national reputations. We call "national reputation" the common component of consumers’
perceptions of the quality of goods produced within a given country. Usual examples of
such priors are the widespread perceptions that "German goods last a lifetime" or " hinese
goods break down quickly". Country reputations determine the quality that buyers expect
from a product before they learn any information specific to this variety. In the long-run,
reputations should adjust to the actual average quality of exported goods.
Using newspaper content analysis to proxy for national reputations, we provide evidence
that a better reputation is associated with higher unit prices on exports to the US, after
controlling for other determinants of within-sector vertical specialization across countries.
Moreover, this relationship is stronger for sectors with more quality differentiation, which
lends support to the asymmetric information foundation of our model.
We proceed to analyze the impact of asymmetric information on the demand for im-
ported goods and on the long-run quality composition of a foreign country’s exports. Quality
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uncertainty leads to consumption patterns where both brand reputation and country-of-
origin matter, and where incumbents are able to charge higher prices than unknown brands.
As long as quality is gradually observed through consumption, asymmetric information
about quality distorts demand relatively more for new entering firms without established
brand names, compared to the perfect information case. It raises profits of low-quality
firms benefiting from good country-of-origin labels, but is an obstacle to exporting for
high-quality firms unable to signal their type in low-reputation countries.
Broadly speaking, we are addressing three main questions. First, how does a poor
"national brand" act as a barrier to entry into foreign markets? Second, under which
conditions do quality expectations have self-fulfilling effects, keeping some exporting
countries into low-quality traps? Finally, which policy instruments can help countries
overcome the adverse impact of such information asymmetries?
More specifically, we consider a two-country model with a continuum of potential
foreign exporters heterogeneous in quality and a constant flow of new entrants per period.
Quality is exogenous and known to firms but not observed by consumers before purchase.
Hence, import demand depends on perceived quality, which has two components. Goods
imported from a given country are first evaluated according to a country-wide prior,
which is determined by the average quality of the country’s exports in a long-run industry
equilibrium. Importers then learn about the true quality of firms that have exported in the
past. The fraction of informed consumers increases with the time a firm has been active
on the market. The effect of the country prior will thus prevail for new exporters and
fade over time as buyers gain familiarity with individual foreign brands. On the supply
side, potential foreign exporters decide whether to enter the market and when to exit,
taking into account the impact of their decisions on expected future sales. If active, they
sell at a price determined by the buyer’s quality expectation. We assume that the cost of
producing one physical unit of the good is monotonically increasing in quality, but the cost
per quality-adjusted unit is decreasing in quality. Thus, although our focus is on vertical
differentiation, quality and productivity are positively related in our model.
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Our main channel is a distortion in entry and sales due to unobservable quality. Asym-
metric information fosters entry by low-quality firms, which earn higher profits than under
perfect information by free-riding on high quality expectations. It depresses profits of the
highest-quality firms, forced to incur initial losses in order to reveal information about their
type. At the industry level, there are two types of steady-state equilibria with endogenous
country reputations. In a high-quality, high-reputation equilibrium, imperfect information
does not hinder entry of high-quality firms into export markets but generates excess entry
by low-quality firms. In a low-quality, low-reputation equilibrium, a range of firms with
above-average quality are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction.
With costs too high to allow for positive profits in the first periods, and quality too low
for initial losses to be recouped with future profits, this set of firms choose never to be
active. The sorting of firms into export status is therefore non-linear: only the lowest-quality
and the highest-quality firms are active. Furthermore, there can be multiple low-quality
equilibria, such that countries with bad quality reputation can be locked into exporting
low-quality, low-cost goods.
The model yields interesting policy implications. In particular, imperfect information
about the quality of imported goods provides a justification for export promotion policies
in economies specialized in low-quality products. Some export-led growth strategies for
developing countries, pursued in the past by East Asian economies, rely on exporting low-
quality, low-cost goods and gradually moving up to higher quality, higher unit value goods.2
China is attempting to follow the same path. Without policy intervention, though, we show
that it may not be feasible if the economy is trapped in a self-fulfilling low equilibrium, in
which the country’s reputation for low quality prevents high-quality firms from entering
export markets. A successful export promotion policy then involves either subsidizing
exporters’ initial losses, or investing public resources into raising the country’s perception
abroad. Indeed, we find that export subsidies improve the average quality of exports, raise
unit prices received by exporting firms and have a positive welfare effect in countries that
2We dwell in more details on the Japanese and South Korean examples in Section 3.2.
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are initially in a low-quality equilibrium.3 However, subsidies have the opposite long-run
effects in countries exporting high-quality goods. In the latter case, the induced entry by
low-quality firms creates a negative externality on all exporters, lowering average quality,
reputation and aggregate profits.
Moreover, we show that large reputation shocks, for instance triggered by heavily
mediatized events or by a government-sponsored national promotion campaign, can have
self-fulfilling features. Small reputation shocks only have short-lived effects. But when there
are multiple steady-states, a large positive reputation shock in a low-quality equilibrium
raises prices received by all firms and allows more firms with above-average quality to enter,
thereby driving up the true average quality of exported goods. Reputation and quality
increase jointly until the economy settles in a higher steady-state.
This paper relates to two main strands of literature. In a closed economy framework,
several early papers (Shapiro, 1983; Riordan, 1986; Farrell, 1986; Liebeskind and Rumelt,
1989) have studied entry and pricing strategies for experience goods, for which quality is
unobservable a priori and is only revealed through repeated consumption. Bergemann and
Välimäki (1996, 2006) incorporate the experimentation and learning processes by consumers.
Furthermore, there is evidence of the benefits of a reputation for quality in terms of brand
premia (Imbs et al., 2010) and image spillovers across products of the same brand (Sullivan,
1990). We develop these insights further by considering the demand for imports, where
initial priors depend on country-of-origin and reputations are built not only for specific
firms but also for exporting countries as a whole.
In the international trade literature, vertical quality differentiation has recently been
studied by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011); Johnson (2012); Verhoogen (2008); Hallak and
3The case for export subsidies is mixed in the existing literature. Brander and Spencer (1985) first introduced
the idea of welfare-enhancing subsidies in a Cournot strategic rivalry, and Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006)
developed an infant-industry argument for protective trade policy. Flam and Helpman (1987) find that the
desirability of export subsidies is ambiguous, depending on the production structure. Demidova and Rodriguez-
Clare (2009) show that subsidies improve productivity in a model with heterogeneous firms, but are nonetheless
detrimental to welfare due to losses in terms of trade and variety. Recently, Aghion et al. (2012) make a more
specific case for targeted industrial policy towards more competitive sectors. The main arguments for active
trade policy relying on coordination failures and externalities are reviewed and assessed in Harrison and
Rodrguez-Clare (2009).
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Sivadasan (2009); Kugler and Verhoogen (2012); Manova and Zhang (2012) and Fajgelbaum
et al. (2011). However, these papers assume perfectly observable quality and deal with the
choice of quality by exporters. Instead, we abstract from the endogenous quality choice
by firms and study the implications of asymmetric information on the equilibrium quality
range of exports.
The literature most closely related to this paper deals with the policy implications of
asymmetric information about the quality of foreign goods. Grossman and Horn (1988)
examine the infant-industry argument in a two-period model with moral hazard in the
choice of quality, and find no case for temporary or permanent protection. However, the
extensive margin of trade in their model concerns only low-quality firms, while we show
that a subsidization policy can also encourage entry by high-quality firms in an infinite-
period setting with overlapping generations of firms. Although Bagwell and Staiger (1989)
point out that asymmetric information may lead to insufficient entry by high-quality firms,
they focus on a single-firm, single-consumer interaction with two quality levels and do not
allow for reputation externalities between firms. We show that these externalities, from
the entry decisions of heterogeneous firms to buyers’ beliefs, lie at the core of the effects
and of the policy implications of unobservable quality. Chisik (2003) develops the idea
of a "reputational comparative advantage" whereby country labels act as a coordinating
device for exporters, but also assumes away within-country reputation externalities by
building a single-firm model. Lastly, Dasgupta and Mondria (2012) develop a two-period
model with similar features to ours, where the quality of new exporters is unobservable
and that of continuing exporters is known by a fraction of consumers. However, their paper
deals with firm reputations and the role of intermediaries in providing quality assurance,
taking as given the first-period price. We take the analysis further by endogenizing country
reputations in an infinite-horizon setting and characterizing steady-state equilibria.
Other papers introducing imperfect information in trade have addressed different issues
such as uncertainty about demand conditions for firms entering a foreign market (Hoff, 1997;
Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia, 2008), reputation-building for distributors in the importing
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country (Araujo and Ornelas, 2007), or marketing costs incurred to make consumers aware
of the existence of foreign goods (Arkolakis, 2010). Rauch and Watson (2003) focus on
the tendency of buyers in developed countries to start small in building partnerships with
suppliers in less developed countries, in order to learn about their ability to fill large orders.
Finally, there are some empirical studies of the effect of perceptions of foreign countries on
trade flows. Guiso et al. (2009) and Disdier and Mayer (2007) find a relationship between
bilateral trust or bilateral opinions and imports, but do not consider the quality aspect of
countries’ reputations. Specific reputation shocks have only been analyzed through event
studies, such as the negative perception of France in the US at the onset of the Iraq war
(Michaels and Zhi, 2010) and recalls of Chinese toys (Freedman et al., 2009).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents motivating
historical evidence and stylized facts on the importance of national quality reputation for
exporters. Section 3.3 lays out our modelling framework and Section 3.4 analyzes high-
quality and low-quality steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. Section 3.5
explores the effects of export promotion policies on quality, reputation and profits. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Motivation
3.2.1 Historical Motivation: Creating "National Brands"
Since their creation, country-of-origin labels have been related to protectionist concerns.
When the "Made in Germany" label – now an internationally recognized signal of quality
– was introduced, it was as a policy instrument against German exports. The label was
originally created in the United Kingdom by the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887 to sig-
nal foreign products, then considered by the British society as inferior to domestic ones.
Ironically, a few years later, in 1894, a commission of the German Reichstag reported that
German manufacturers found the label to be of good use: having achieved superior quality,
they were better able to distinguish themselves from British manufacturers. Even more
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surprinsingly, as reported by Umbach (2003), "English manufacturers even began to forge the
label, printing it on their English-made products". The "Made in Germany" label had turned
from a signal of poor quality into a signal of the best quality.
Similarly, at the end of World War II, "Made in Japan" goods had a reputation for being
cheap low-quality goods. Japanese companies were suffering from an inferior "national
brand". On the contrary, currently, Japanese cars and electronics are ranked among the
most reliable in all consumer surveys. More generally, Japan’s pattern of specialization in
manufactures has evolved dramatically, shifting from unskilled labor-intensive goods to
human capital and R&D-intensive products (Balassa and Noland, 1989). Japanese companies
achieved such a dramatic change by privately imposing strict quality norms. They formed
export cartels which provided product quality guarantees, by setting product design and
quality standards, establishing industry brand names, guaranteeing delivery schedules and
mediating disputes between individual exporters and foreign buyers (Dyck, 1992). Providing
product quality assurances to importers stimulated growth in exports and improved terms
of trade. Hence, as argued by Lynn and McKeown (1988), the ability to establish collectively
a reputation for product quality was key to Japan’s export success. This ability was the
outcome of both private companies and government initiatives: in the public policy realm,
not only did antitrust laws permit the formation of export cartels, but export restrictions
were exercised under the Control Law4.
Government initiatives also played a key role in the shift in South Korea’s pattern of
trade specialization since the 1970s. Public investment subsidies were tied to exporting
activity, as Korean governments were determined to favor the emergence of the country
on the international trade scene.5 These policies resulted in the channeling of credit at
negative interest rates to South Korean conglomerates and provided them with insurance
4The first paragraph of Article 48 of this law sets that "any person desiring to export goods of any designated
type, or goods destined for any special areas, or to export goods by means of any designated form of transaction or payment,
may be required to obtain the approval of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry" (Matsushita, 1979).
5Pack andWestphal (1986), Westphal (1990), Levy (1991), and Rodrik (1995) have documented the importance
of government investment subsidies in Korea.
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against business risk, particularly in the export market (Aw et al., 1998). This export-led
development strategy is often pointed as having been the hallmark of the East Asian miracle
growth (e.g. World Bank, 1993). Incidentally, Korea’s determination to play a growing
international role was showcased by hosting the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988.6 From a
historical point of view, the 1988 Olympics symbolized the success of over three decades of
active government intervention in the economy.7
In a similar way, the 2008 Beijing Olympics reaped a huge prestige bonanza for China,
being (again) the most-viewed televised event ever – in the United States, the cumulative
audience amounted to over two-thirds of the population – and representing China’s grand
entrance onto the world stage. However, an interesting takeout of this example is also its
limitations. China is struggling to move up the value chain in its exports.8 Although a
large-scale national promotion event can help improve a country’s image abroad, it is far
from sufficient to overcome a bad reputation when the economy seems stuck in a low-quality
trap, whereby high-quality firms suffer from the country’s reputation in their attempts to
export. The strategy of Lenovo, the only Chinese company to get a worldwide sponsorship
for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, is revealing in this respect. With a Western-sounding name,
the legacy of the I.B.M. brand name and technology, and a chief executive who hails from
Dell and NCR, the Lenovo Group is not a company that most Americans would assume is
Chinese. This is exactly what the company aims for (although Lenovo’s largest shareholder
is the Chinese government), aware of the fact that the typical American consumer associates
Chinese products with cheap and unreliable: "They want to be viewed as a global company,
6On a related note, Rose and mark M. Spiegel (2011) show that hosting the Olympics boosts a country’s
subsequent exports and find support for the hypothesis that hosting mega-events (or applying to do so) serves
as a policy signal.
7On September 17, 1988, over a billion people worldwide watched the Olympics opening ceremony, telecast
from Seoul, the then largest television audience in history (Larson and Park, 1993) and a global advertisement
for the country’s image. South Korea "emerged from the Games in triumph both as host and competitor. (...) [It] has
been bent on showing the world that it is no longer a place to overlook. The Games are only part of that" (New York Times,
10/08/1988).
8Schott (2008) documents that the prices that US consumers are willing to pay for Chinese exports are
substantially lower than the prices they are willing to pay for OECD exports in the same product category.
Furthermore, the gap or "OECD brand premium" has been increasing over time.
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not a Chinese company, in the West or they’ll never be able to beat the cheap rap"(New York Times,
06/20/08). In some sectors, Chinese firms are even relocating factories or assembly lines in
Europe to obtain the “made in Europe” label, as in the plan for a “Châteauroux Business
District” in France.9 Hence, whether China can, in the coming years or decades, successfully
follow the same path as Japan and South Korea in the past, remains an open question.
3.2.2 Stylized Facts: National Reputations and Unit Prices
Moving beyond anecdotal motivations, we provide some additional evidence of the im-
portance of country-of-origin reputations in current trade patterns. This section shows
that the quality of a country’s exports, as measured by unit prices, is not only determined
by observable fundamentals such as the country’s income level and factor endowments.
Perceptions, mediated by news sources, also seem to play a role – either because the media
are a supplier of information beyond observable country characteristics or because of a pure
reputation effect. Both of these interpretations are associated with asymmetric information
in the demand for imports, which is the foundation of our model.
More specifically, news coverage of a country provides a proxy for national reputations.
For consumers, the media are providers of information about safety scandals or successful
businesses in foreign countries, work practices and the general reliability of foreign goods.
For firms sourcing inputs from foreign suppliers, news also reflect information relevant
to risks of delays, disruption of supply chains or corruption practices, which affect their
expected value from the importer-exporter relationship. Our working hypothesis is that
media coverage is a channel through which country perceptions are formed, confirmed or
changed, affecting the demand for goods produced in countries that receive massive positive
or negative news coverage.10 We establish that controlling for the determinants of unit
9“Un ‘made in France’ très convoité”, L’Express, 01/11/2012.
10This empirical approach is inspired by the literature on media bias. The broad insight from this growing
literature is that media coverage affects real outcomes, such as political participation (Della Vigna and Kaplan,
2007), political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002), or stock market reactions to earnings announcements
(Dyck and Zingales, 2003).
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values and specialization into higher-quality goods that have already been identified in the
literature, better reputation is associated with higher unit prices on exports. This relationship
does not need to be interpreted causally but rather as an equilibrium outcome under
asymmetric information: in our model, the relationship between the national reputations
of exporting countries and the quality of their exports runs both ways to generate a price-
reputation dependence.
3.2.2.1 Data
We collect news coverage data from the Factiva website, which aggregates content from
over 31,000 news sources. We developed a script that searches all US news and business
publications for articles covering a given foreign country, in a given year, and including a
keyword from a list of relevant terms.11 We gather data on 146 countries over 1988-2006,
excluding countries of less than 1 million inhabitants, which receive almost no coverage in
US media. The list of 116 keywords was identified through a systematic listing of recurring
terms and phrases in the coverage of foreign countries and companies in the New York Times,
the Wall Street Journal, Business Week and the Boston Globe. We sort them into four categories.
The "political" category relates to the foreign country’s general political context and is split
between positive terms (e.g. "democratic transition") and negative terms (e.g. "corruption").
The "quality" category deals specifically with quality issues, improvements or scandals. We
distinguish between positive (e.g. "quality control") and negative (e.g. "class-action suit")
terms.12 To avoid misclassifying negative articles as positive and vice versa, we exclude
articles where a negating word appears around the keyword. For quality-related keywords,
11Or any word sharing the root of the keyword. For instance for the keyword "counterfeit", the script also
searches for "counterfeited", "counterfeiting", etc.
12Examples of search results on China are: "World briefs - Houston Chronicle, 31 December 1996, 486 words,
(English)... BEIJING – China is preparing this week to carry out a series of legal reforms hailed by some as a step toward
greater rule of law and protection of individual rights. ..."(political, positive); "Brilliance China Automotive Holdings
Limited Announcement - PR Newswire, 5:16 AM, 31 December 2003, 3733 words, (English) ...relationship with the
JinBei group of companies and will be in a better position to monitor and exercise more stringent quality control over
the automotive components that it purchases from the JinBei group of companies. Accordingly, the Directors consider..."
(quality, positive).
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we conduct the searches both at the aggregate country level and in articles dealing with
specific industries for 11 sectors13.
We obtain a total of over 2.5 billion relevant articles published in US news sources.
We count the number of articles with positive or negative keywords per country-year for
political and quality categories, and per country-year-industry for quality categories. We
define current news variables with the number of articles in each category in the current
year. Article counts are then normalized by the sum of all articles in the same category
and same period across countries. The normalization accounts for the positive trend in the
number of articles in the database over time.
Specifically, for country c, industry i, year t and k 2 {positive, negative}, we construct
the following variables:
industry quality newsc,t,i,k =
# quality articlesc,t,i,k
Âc2C # quality articlesc,t,i,k
(3.1)
political newsc,t,k =
# political articlesc,t,k
Âc2C # political articlesc,t,k
(3.2)
We match the news data with US import data at the 5-digit SITC level from Robert
Feenstra, described in Feenstra et al. (2002). We calculate f.o.b. unit values at the 10-digit HS
level where quantity units are homogeneous across observations. We then construct sectoral
indices of export unit values for each country c by calculating the average, across all 10-digit
products exported in the 5-digit sector, of c’s unit prices relative to those of all countries
exporting the product to the United States.
Our independent variables include gravity variables from Head et al. (2010)14 and
international and civil conflict variables from the Correlates of War database. The correlation
of votes at the United Nations General Assembly controls for the degree of political alliance
13Aerospace/Defense; Automobiles; Chemicals; Clothing/Textiles; Computers/Electro-nics; Consumer
Products; Food/Beverages/Tobacco; Machinery/Industrial Goods; Paper/Packaging; Pharmaceuticals; and
Telecommunications.
14Distance, GDP, population, common border, common official language, former colonial ties, common legal
origin, common currency and GATT/WTO membership. Note that GDP, market size and remoteness are also
determinants of firms’ choice of export quality across destinations, as shown by Manova and Zhang (2012).
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with the United States. Following Schott (2004) on the determinants of unit prices, we
include the capital/labor ratio of the exporting country and the fraction of its population
having achieved at least secondary education. These data are constructed respectively from
Penn World Tables 7.0 and from Barro and Lee (2010). Finally, the length of quality ladders
from Khandelwal (2010) measures the extent of quality variation within 5-digit sectors,
and therefore the scope for vertical differentiation.15 Table 3.1 provides some descriptive
statistics.
3.2.2.2 Unit Prices, Reputation and Quality
Table 3.2 reports the results of the industry-level specifications. As mentioned above, we
include as independent variables GDP per capita, capital/labor endowment and education
attainment, which affect the quality range of a country’s production. We also include year
and sector fixed effects and cluster standard errors by country. We show that export unit
values, after controlling for these and gravity variables, are correlated with the type of news
that appear in US printed media about the exporting country and its companies.
In column 1, we find that within industries, countries where a sector receives better
coverage in US media charge higher unit values on the sector’s exports, relative to countries
receiving less favorable coverage. The coefficient is larger for negative quality news, about
quality defects or scandals, than for positive news, about successes and quality control. We
also find that unit prices are higher on imports from political allies (high correlation of UN
votes) and lower on imports from countries with higher capital-labor ratios.16
In column 2, we interact the news variables with Khandelwal’s quality ladder measure.17
15Khandelwal estimates the quality of US imports from price and market share data. Conditional on price, a
product with higher market share is assigned higher quality. In our framework, it is more precisely a measure
of perceived quality. The scope for vertical differentation (length of quality ladders) is then calculated from the
heterogeneity in estimated product qualities within products.
16This result on capital-labor ratios seems to contrast with the existing literature. However, we can replicate
Schott (2004)’s finding that higher capital-labor ratios are associated with higher unit values when the indepen-
dent variables only include, beyond the capital/labor ratio, year and sector fixed effects, as in his paper. When
we add country fixed effects or control for gravity variables, the positive coefficient on the capital-labor ratio
disappears.
17Since the quality ladder variable is calculated at the industry level and is time-invariant, its direct effect is
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Export unit value index 89.287 107.237 0.002 2795.957
Positive industry quality news 1.703 0.986 0 4.021
Negative industry quality news 3.126 3.578 0 40.323
Positive political news 1.554 0.888 0 4.001
Negative political news 0.401 0.680 0 3.097
Quality ladder 2.072 0.8776 0 5.803
Capital/labor ratio 60.952 36.482 0.438 153.856
Skilled fraction of population 50.161 19.156 2.001 92.656
UN vote correlation 0.223 0.347 -0.680 0.882
Notes: Positive and negative industry quality news are defined and normalized as in equation (3.1) and political
news as in equation (3.2). Quality ladder is the length of industry-level quality ladders from Khandelwal (2010).
A longer quality ladder implies that the sector has more dispersion in quality, hence is more
vulnerable to concerns about unobserved quality. Consistent with our interpretation in
terms of asymmetric information, we find that the effect of industry-level news is magnified
in sectors where there is more scope for vertical differentiation. According to the point
estimates, a 10% increase in the quantity of positive (respectively, negative) quality-related
news relative to other foreign countries is associated with a 0.3% increase (respectively 0.5%
decrease) in the unit value of exports in a sector at the mean of quality ladders. For the
sector with the longest quality ladder, i.e. the most vertical differentiation, the corresponding
values are respectively a 0.8% increase and a 1.3% decrease in unit value.
It may be that these results are affected by the total volume of news coverage of a
country if some countries are more heavily covered by US media because of a cultural or
geographical proximity not captured by our controls, and are also more frequent and trusted
trading partners. Controlling for the total amount of news concerning the country-sector
pair, however, does not change any of the relevant coefficients (columns 3 and 4). Finally,
in columns 5 and 6, we include political news at the country level, and find insignificant
coefficients, confirming that the most relevant information is quality-related news rather
captured by industry fixed effects in the regressions.
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than general country images. Note that we already proxy for political goodwill towards
foreign countries with the correlation of UN votes.
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In Table 3.3, we repeat the exercise with aggregate country news per year (both political
and quality-related) instead of news covering specifically the industry. We find again that
positive news about quality are associated with higher unit prices on exports and negative
quality news with lower unit prices. Political news coverage does not enter significantly
after including the UN vote measure of alliances. The coefficients do not vary in a significant
manner according to the length of quality ladders. Thus, these results seem to indicate that
national reputations are formed at the country-sector level rather than at the overall country
level.
To sum up, we have shown that countries with a better quality reputation, mediated by
news coverage, have higher unit prices after controlling for known determinants of country-
wide quality. The link is stronger in sectors with large scope for vertical differentiation,
supporting our interpretation of country reputations as a component of expected quality.
Naturally, although reputation shocks may not be directly related to changes in the actual
quality distribution of a country’s exports, long-run perceived and actual quality go hand-in-
hand and the contents of media articles are related to both. What we have shown is that after
controlling for observable country characteristics, there is still a role for quality perceptions
to influence unit prices. These results support the presence of imperfect information in
international trade transactions. We proceed to formalize these insights in a model with
asymmetric information.
3.3 Model Setup
3.3.1 Firms
We develop a model with two countries, Home and Foreign. We focus on the industry
equilibrium in an export-oriented sector in Foreign, for which Home is the importer. The
industry is composed of overlapping generations of foreign exporters. We do not model
explicitly the domestic market of foreign firms: all firms in the industry produce for export
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only.18
There is a constant number E of potential exporters being born every period. Each new
firm draws a quality parameter q from a distribution G (q) with support on [qm,•) and
density g (q), and has the option to produce a good of quality level q.19 At the beginning of
every period, firms decide whether to stay active and export, or shut down. Each firm has
capacity 1, so that it can choose to sell either one unit or nothing.
If it produces and sells, a firm j of type q incurs a cost wq+ k, including both production
and transport costs. k includes all costs that are independent of quality, while wq is the
portion of costs that increases with the quality of the product (e.g. quality control processes,
better intermediate inputs, more skilled workers). Hence, profits at period t+ s of an active
firm j born at date t are:
pt+s (j) = pt+s (j)  wq (j)  k (3.3)
where pt+s (j) is the price at which firm j sells its output. The price-setting mechanism is
described in the next subsection.
A firm can freely exit at any period and realize zero profits from this period onwards.
However if it chooses to exit the export market in a given period, it cannot re-enter later.20
Moreover, each firm has an exogenous probability 1   d of disappearing every period,
independent of both quality and the firm’s age. The probability that a firm still exists from
one period to the next, conditional on not choosing to exit, is d. There is no additional
discount rate.
18We could easily extend the model to allow firms to serve their domestic market as long as the decisions to
enter the domestic and export markets are separable. The key assumption is that there is no information flowing
between buyers located in different geographic markets. In particular, a firm having established a reputation in
its domestic market would not be able to transfer this reputation to export sales.
19For simplicity we do not model the choice of quality. We can think of the exogenous quality draw as
determined on the domestic market before considering the decision to export, or as a technology blueprint
which comes from an R&D process with uncertain outcome: all firms invest the same sunk cost in R&D and
randomly, some come up with better quality products than others.
20This assumption is inconsequential for the steady-state analysis. It rules out coordination problems among
high-quality firms along the transition path.
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3.3.2 Buyers
In Home, there is a pool of importers each of which demands one unit of the good. We
assume that there are no tariffs.21 Potential demand for imported goods in Home is assumed
to be large, in the sense that the market size is sufficient for all foreign exporters to find
a buyer at a price that does not exceed the expected value of their goods. The true utility
from consuming the product is q but is not observable before purchase. We can think of q
as characteristics that are observed only upon consumption, or for durable goods, as the
inverse of the probability of breakdown per period.
At the beginning of every period, each active firm is randomly matched to a buyer in
Home. The firm cannot sell to another importer in that period, nor can the buyer purchase
from another exporter before the next period. The firm then sets the price equal to the
expected value of the good for its buyer. The indirect utility buyer i receives from variety j
is:
ui (j) = q (j)  p (j) (3.4)
which can be derived from an additively separable utility function where buyer i
consumes a numeraire good and one unit of the imported differentiated good. As q (j) is
not observed, the maximum price that an importer i is willing to pay for the output of firm
j at time t+ s is given by its expected quality from the perspective of the buyer:
pt+s (j) = Eit+s
h
q (j) |Iit+s
i
(3.5)
where Iit+s is the information set of buyer i at time t+ s. We assume that firms hold all
the bargaining power and receive the full expected surplus of the transaction.22.
There are two types of buyers, informed and uninformed. Uninformed buyers (noted
21Ad valorem tariffs are introduced in Appendix C.3.
22Long-term contracts between exporters and importers are ruled out in this setting: all contracts are
one-period sales contracts and firms are matched to customers for one period only. In particular, there cannot
be price schedules resembling an introductory pricing strategy, whereby buyers would pay a low price in the
initial period and offer a sequence of prices contingent on their future consumption experience.
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U) have no information specific to firm j: they do not know its quality or how long it has
been an active exporter. The only information at their disposal is the "national reputation",
i.e. a prior µt+s about expected quality among all foreign exporters. µt+s is common across
buyers and will be endogenized in Section 3.4. Informed buyers (noted I) know the true
quality of firm j, either because they have past experience from consumption of good j or
because they have received information from another importer who has. Hence, the relevant
information sets of both types of buyers are:
IUt+s (j) = {µt+s}
I It+s (j) = {q (j) , µt+s}
The price received by firm j matched with buyer i in period t+ s is therefore equal to its
quality if i is informed, and to the country’s reputation if i is uninformed. Equation (3.5)
can thus be rewritten as:
pt+s (j) =
8><>: µt+s if i 2 Uq (j) if i 2 I (3.6)
In the first period when a firm j enters the market, all importers are uninformed about
j. Then, if firm j has exported s times in the past, a fraction r (s) of buyers are informed,
where we make the following natural assumption:
Assumption 1: r0   0, r (0) = 0, and lim
s!• r (s) = 1.
The fraction of informed buyers increases as the firm gains export experience. 23 Note
that a concave r (s) would capture the idea that a firm having already exported is more
likely to be matched again with one of its previous buyers or with someone close to a
previous buyer in terms of informational diffusion. Hence the rate at which the scope of
23A possible microfoundation for the r (s) function is that importers belong to distinct groups within which
information diffusion takes place. The fraction of informed buyers rises according to the probability of sampling
a buyer from an uninformed versus an informed group. See Appendix C.2 for a formal development.
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informed buyers expands would decrease with the number of periods the firm has been on
the market. However, the only conditions needed for our analysis is that r is monotonically
increasing and takes values between 0 and 1.
For expositional simplicity we drop the j notation in the next sections and refer to “firm
q” instead of “firm j with quality parameter q” whenever possible.
3.3.3 Timing
For a given cohort of firms born at date t, the timing of moves proceeds as follows:
• At t, each new firm j draws a parameter q (j) and decides whether to export or not.
• For each s   1, at time t+ s:
– Each active firm j is matched with a buyer i and observes whether i is informed
or uninformed.
– The price is set at Eit+s
⇥
q (j) |Iit+s
⇤
, and production and sales take place.
– For each good j that was sold, the fraction of informed buyers rises from r (s) to
r (s+ 1) .
– The exogenous death shock is realized. Firms that survive decide whether to stay
active.
– New firms are born (cohort t+ s).
3.3.4 Perfect Information
Under perfect information, all q (j) are observable by all parties. All firms receive a price
p⇤t+s (j) equal to true quality regardless of how long they have been exporting:
p⇤t+s (j) = q (j) for all s
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Therefore, it follows from (3.3) that firms are active exporters if and only if q   q⇤, where
the perfect information threshold is defined as:
q⇤ ⌘ k
1  w (3.7)
Under perfect information, the model therefore predicts a sorting of firms into non-exporters
and exporters similar to that of Melitz (2003). We can define productivity as the inverse
of the cost per unit of quality w+ kq . The firms with the highest quality q are also those
with the highest productivity. Firms above the quality threshold q⇤, or equivalently below
the quality-adjusted cost threshold w+ kq⇤ , are and remain exporters, while firms below the
threshold never export.
3.3.5 Imperfect Information: Price and Profits
Under asymmetric information, suppose µt is the buyers’ prior about the expected quality of
a good from the foreign country at time t. This prior is the national reputation or “national
brand”and is taken as exogenous by individual firms. We derive its equilibrium value in
the next section, as a function of the quality distribution of exports. The price offered to a
firm j born at date t is either the country-wide prior if the buyer is uninformed, or its true
quality if the buyer is informed. The probability of receiving a price which reflects the firms’
true quality increases with the firm’s export experience. In the first period in which firm j is
active, no buyer has any information specific to the firm, so that the price only depends on
the prior:
pt+1 (j) = µt+1 (3.8)
Then in the following periods, conditional on firm j still being active, the pricing equation
(3.6) implies that the price received by firm j is set according to the following rule:
pt+s (j) =
8><>: q with probability r (s  1)µt+s with probability 1  r (s  1) for s   1 (3.9)
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where r (s  1) is the fraction of informed buyers for a firm that has previously exported
s   1 times. In particular, a firm that exports for the first time faces only uninformed
importers (r (0) = 0). As lims!• r (s) = 1, the expectation of the price converges to the
perfect information price q (j) over time if firm j stays in the market indefinitely.
Expected profits of firm j in future periods, conditional on remaining active, are the
difference between its expected price and its production cost:
Ejtpt+s (j) = (r (s  1)  w) q (j) + (1  r (s  1)) Etµt+s   k (3.10)
Expected profits place a larger weight on true quality and a smaller weight on national
reputation as the firm gains tenure into exporting. It immediately follows that if reputation
is time-invariant, a firm with quality above the country prior (q (j) > µ) expects to realize
an increasing sequence of profits over time, while a firm with quality below the country
prior (q (j) < µ) expects decreasing profits. For all active firms, if µ is constant, the price
is monotonically converging towards q and profits are monotonically converging towards
their perfect information value (1  w) q   k.
We also assume that the updating parameter is large enough relative to the cost of
producing quality:
Assumption 2: r (1) > w
This assumption ensures that expected profits from repeat purchases – as opposed to
initial purchases – are increasing in true quality.
3.4 Industry Equilibrium
In this section, we define a steady-state industry equilibrium as one in which national
reputation is pinned down by the average quality of a country’s exports and the quality
distribution is stationary. We lay out the existence conditions for high-quality and low-
quality steady-state equilibria and characterize the price, entry and exit patterns in each
equilibrium type.
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3.4.1 Equilibrium Definition
Country reputations are taken as exogenous by individual firms. In each period t, let
Mt (q, s) be the number of active firms of quality q having previously exported s times.
Given an underlying quality distribution G (q) and pdf g (q), we derive qt as the average
quality of exports across quality levels and cohorts of firms:
qt =
R •
qm
q

•
Â
s=0
Mt (q, s)
 
dqR •
qm

•
Â
s=0
Mt (q, s)
 
dq
(3.11)
Country reputations evolve according to the actual quality of exported goods in the
previous period24:
µt+1 = µt + h
 
qt   µt
 
(3.12)
where h < 1 and qt is the average quality of foreign firms’ exports at period t. Reputation
rises (respectively, falls) from one period to the next if the average quality of exported goods
in the previous period was higher (respectively, lower) than expected. Setting h < 1 captures
the slow-moving aspect of reputations and only matters for equilibrium stability. Along
with qt, this determines µt+1 according to (3.11).
In each period, a firm of quality q having exported s times in the past stays active if
the expected present value of doing so, PVt (q, s) , is positive. The firm is free to exit at
any future date. Let T (q) be the exit date (possibly infinity) that maximizes the firm’s
intertemporal problem. Then PVt (q, s) is the discounted sum of current and future profits
in (3.10) up to the optimal exit date:
PVt (q, s) =
T(q)
Â
u=0
du [(r (s+ u)  w) q + (1  r (s+ u)) Etµt+u   k] (3.13)
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, Etµt+u = µt+u for all u. There are E new firms per
period, with quality draws distributed according to the pdf g (q). A new firm of quality q is
24This equation is a reduced form for consumers’ updating process, where the implied simplifying assump-
tion is that h is constant. This hypothesis is not necessary for our main steady-state results and only ensures
that equilibrium stability holds under general conditions.
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active at t+ 1 if PVt+1 (q, 0) > 0. Hence the number of active new firms per quality level is:
Mt+1 (q, 0) =
8><>: Eg (q) if PVt+1 (q, 0) > 00 if PVt+1 (q, 0)  0 (3.14)
Among incumbent firms of quality q having exported s times, dMt (q, s  1) survive from
period t to period t+ 1. They remain active if PVt+1 (q, s) > 0 in equation (3.13). Thus the
number of active old firms is, for s   1:
Mt+1 (q, s) =
8><>: dMt (q, s  1) if PVt+1 (q, s) > 00 if PVt+1 (q, 0)  0 (3.15)
Equations (3.12), (3.11), (3.14) and (3.15) determine qt+1 and µt+2. We can then define the
industry steady-state as an equilibrium with constant reputation and a constant distribution
of quality.n
µ, {M (q, s)}s,q
o
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if:
(i) For all q 2 [qm,•) and all s   0, if Mt (q, s) = M (q, s) and Etµt+u = µ for all u   0,
then Mt+1 (q, s) = M (q, s) in (3.14) and (3.15);
(ii) If Mt (q, s) = M (q, s) for all q 2 [qm,•) and all s   0, then qt = µ in (3.11).
Condition (i) ensures that the number of firms in each quality-age segment is constant in
the steady state. Condition (ii) states that the average quality resulting from an equilibrium
distribution of active firms is equal to the equilibrium country reputation. It guarantees that
µ is constant in a steady state. In other words, a steady state with national reputation µ
is a rational expectations equilibrium if the average quality of active exporters is equal to
buyers’ quality expectation. The endogenous entry and exit decisions induced by µ justify
the reputation ex post.
From this point on, we assume that the quality draw of entrants has a Pareto distribution
with support on [qm,•) and shape parameter a > 1:
G (q) ⌘ 1 
✓
qm
q
◆a
(3.16)
We note µ0 the unconditional expectation of quality draws: µ0 ⌘ aa 1qm.
144
3.4.2 High-Quality Equilibrium
We call “high-quality equilibrium” (HQE) a steady-state equilibrium where the country
reputation µ exceeds the perfect information quality threshold q⇤.n
µ, {M (q, s)}s,q
o
is a high-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ > q⇤ and
n
µ, {M (q, s)}s,q
o
is a steady-state equilibrium according to Definition 3.4.1.
We first characterize firms’ entry and exit decisions in a high-quality equilibrium given
µ. We then proceed to derive the existence conditions for a HQE.
3.4.2.1 Entry and Exit
In a HQE, national reputation is high and time-invariant, i.e. µt = µ > q⇤ for all t. Therefore,
a firm with quality equal to the country’s reputation would be viable in a perfect information
setting. All firms receive high prices as they enter the export market, which encourages
entry. Formally, we prove the following.
Lemma 3 In a HQE with country reputation µ > q⇤, (i) All entrants are initially active; (ii) Firms
with q < q⇤ expect to exit after a number of periods T (q) weakly increasing in quality q; (iii) Firms
with q > q⇤ stay in the market until hit by the exogenous shock.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.1.
The sorting of firms according to their quality parameter is represented in Figure 3.1.
Low-quality firms below q⇤ find it profitable to enter initially as they have low production
costs and can therefore reap positive profits as long as buyers do not have information about
their type. The higher the country reputation, the higher the price they receive in the first
period. As first-period profits are decreasing in quality, low-q firms always find it profitable
to enter the market as fly-by-nights. However, given the expected profit equation (3.10) and
Assumption 2, profits from repeat purchases are increasing in quality and converging over
time towards their perfect information value. Hence, all firms below q⇤, which would not
survive under perfect information, face a decreasing sequence of profits converging to a
negative value. They will eventually see their expected present value of profits turn negative
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Figure 3.1: Sorting of firms by q with high national reputation
and exit. The number of periods T (q) that a firm with quality q < q⇤ stays active is pinned
down by the condition that its expected profit is positive for the first T (q) periods it exports,
and negative in all following periods.
Let us define qT as the highest quality type that exits after selling for T periods – or the
lowest quality type that exits after selling for T + 1 periods:
qT = max
⇢
k  (1  r (T)) µ
r (T)  w , qm
 
for T   1 (3.17)
and limT!• qT = q⇤.
For high-quality firms above q⇤, it is always profitable to enter and keep exporting.
Firms between q⇤ and µ have expected profits declining over time, but positive in every
period. Firms above µ have expected profits increasing over time. The highest quality firms
incur losses in the initial period but recoup these losses in later periods once enough buyers
have received information about their type. Their expected intertemporal profits are always
positive. Thus, firms above q⇤ never exit before they are forced to by the exogenous shock,
as their per-period profits are converging towards the strictly positive perfect information
level.
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3.4.2.2 Average Quality
In a steady state indexed by µ > q⇤, the number M (q, s) of active firms of quality q having
already exported s times is derived from Lemma 3 and equations (3.14) and (3.15):
M (q, s) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
dsEg (q) if q < q⇤ and s < T (q)
0 if q < q⇤ and s   T (q)
dsEg (q) if q   q⇤
(3.18)
so that the total number of active firms of quality q is 1 dT(q)1 d Eg (q) if q < q
⇤, and 11 dEg (q)
if q   q⇤. Using (3.11) and (3.16), we derive the steady-state average quality of exports in a
HQE as a function of µ and exogenous parameters:
q (µ) = µ0
0BB@1 
•
Â
T=0
dT+1
⇣
qm
qT
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqT+1⌘a 1 
1  •Â
T=0
dT+1
h⇣
qm
qT+1
⌘a   ⇣ qmqT+1⌘ai
1CCA (3.19)
where q0 ⌘ qm and qT, qT+1 are defined by (3.17). The average quality of active firms is
higher than the mean of the unconditional distribution of q, as lower-quality firms exit
earlier than high-quality firms. However, it lies below the perfect information average export
quality.
3.4.2.3 Existence Conditions
There exists a HQE if there is a fixed point of q (µ) in equation (3.19) such that µ = q (µ) > q⇤.
Proposition 4 establishes existence conditions.
Proposition 4 There is a unique HQE if and only if q (q⇤) > q⇤, or equivalently if and only if
a
✓
qm
q⇤
◆
+
d
1  d
✓
qm
q⇤
◆a
> a  1 (3.20)
Proof: see Appendix C.1.3.
An equilibrium steady-state reputation is a reputation µ such that q (µ) = µ. The
intuition of the proof is as follows. Starting from a reputation above q⇤, raising µ has a
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negative effect on actual quality. Improving national reputation, for a given distribution of
q draws, does not affect the decisions of firms above q⇤ to stay or exit, as they are already
remaining active as long as possible. However, it encourages lower-quality firms to stay
longer: for firms below q⇤, a higher µ raises all T (q), implying that low-quality firms wait
longer before exiting the market. In short, the incentives of high-quality firms are not
affected but those of low-quality firms result in a higher export duration of firms producing
“bad” varieties. Hence, the average quality of exported goods falls when µ increases. It
follows that q (µ) is strictly decreasing on [q⇤,•) and therefore if q (q⇤) > q⇤, there is a
unique fixed point of q (µ) in the high quality region. This fixed point is the unique HQE.
The HQE existence condition (3.20) holds for d high enough, a low enough, and/or w
and k low enough. A high d implies that exogenous exit is relatively less prevalent than
endogenous exit, increasing the relative mass of high-quality firms. A low a means that
there is high dispersion in the prior distribution of q and therefore more firms at the right
tail of the distribution pushing up the mean. A low w reduces the relative cost advantage
of low-quality firms, as well as the loss incurred in initial periods by high-quality firms.
Lower w and k also lower the perfect information threshold q⇤ , making it more likely that
the economy ends up in a high-quality equilibrium.
3.4.3 Low-Quality Equilibrium
We call “low-quality equilibrium” (LQE) a steady-state equilibrium where the country
reputation falls short of the perfect information quality threshold q⇤.n
µ, {M (q, s)}s,q
o
is a low-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ < q⇤ and
n
µ, {M (q, s)}s,q
o
is a steady-state equilibrium according to Definition 3.4.1.
As in the high-quality case, we first detemine the entry and exit patterns given µ and
then derive existence conditions.
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Figure 3.2: Sorting of Firms by q with Low National Reputation
3.4.3.1 Entry and Exit
In a LQE, national reputation is low and constant, i.e. µt = µ < q⇤ for all t. A firm
with quality µ would never export in a perfect information setting. Under asymmetric
information, we can show the following:
Lemma 4 In a LQE with country reputation k+ wqm < µ < q⇤, (i) Firms with quality q < qL
enter the export market and exit after selling for one period, where
qL ⌘ µ  kw < µ < q
⇤ (3.21)
(ii) Firms with quality q > qH enter and stay in the market until hit by the exogenous shock, where
qH ⌘ k  µ
 
1  Ar
 
Ar   w > q
⇤ (3.22)
and Ar ⌘ (1  d)Â•s=0 dsr (s) . (iii) Firms with quality qL  q  qH never enter the market.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.2.
Figure 3.2 shows the sorting of firms by quality into “fly-by-nights”, non-exporters and
continuous exporters. Fly-by-night firms exist as long as µ > k+ wqm, which ensures that
some low-quality firms realize positive first-period profits. These firms would not survive
under perfect information but gain from the information asymmetry. However, given µ < q⇤
and Assumption 2, they would make losses if they were to stay active in the second period,
after buyers have received a firm-specific signal. Firms below qL therefore exit immediately
after selling once.
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All firms with better quality than the country reputation µ are not profitable in the
first period when they enter export markets. Above qH, the present value of expected
profits is positive: expected profits from sales in later periods, when a larger portion of the
price reflects true quality, exceed initial losses. The negative profits in their first periods
of existence can be interpreted as investments in building a brand name or firm-specific
reputation, distinct from the country reputation.
An intermediate range of firms [qL, qH ] around q⇤ never become active exporters. Those
with qL < q < q⇤ have negative expected profits at all periods, while those with q⇤ < q < qH
would be profitable in the long run once enough buyers have gathered information about
their type. However, for the latter, the present value of their profit stream is negative: losses
incurred in the initial periods in order to establish a reputation are not made up for with
later profits (due to the exogenous exit shock which acts similarly to a discount rate). Hence
this range of firms is kept out of export markets by the information asymmetry and the cost
of revealing quality.
Lastly, if µ < k + wqm, then there are no active firms below q⇤, given that national
reputation is too low for any firm to realize positive first-period profits. This results in a
high average quality of exported goods. Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium with
endogenous reputation in this region.
3.4.3.2 Average Quality
In a steady state indexed by µ < q⇤, the number M (q, s) of active firms of quality q having
already exported s times is derived from Lemma 4 and equations (3.14) and (3.15):
M (q, s) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Eg (q) if q < qL and s = 0
0 if q < qL and s   1
0 if qL  q  qH
dsEg (q) if q > qH
(3.23)
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so that the number of active firms of quality q is Eg (q) if q < qL and 11 dEg (q) if q > qH.
Using (3.11) and (3.16), we derive the steady-state average quality of exports in a LQE as a
function of µ and the economy’s exogenous parameters:
q (µ) = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a 1
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a
1CA (3.24)
where qL, qH are defined respectively by (3.21) and (3.22). The volume of sales and average
quality are lower than in high-reputation equilibria, due both to the existence of a gap in
the distribution of active exporters, and to the fact that low-quality firms exit after selling
for one period only.
3.4.3.3 Existence Conditions
The industry has at least one LQE if there exists a fixed point of q (µ) in equation (3.24) such
that µ = q (µ) < q⇤. Specifically:
Proposition 5 If q (q⇤) < q⇤, there exists at least one LQE.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.4.
In other words, if condition (3.20) does not hold, there is an odd number of LQE and
no HQE. The lowest possible level of national reputation (µ = qm) results in the highest
average quality, as it drives out all low-quality firms and some high-quality firms. Hence
q (qm) > qm and if q (q⇤) < q⇤, there must be at least one fixed point in (qm, q⇤). However,
the equilibrium may not be unique, since q (µ) is not monotonic over the interval. In the
low reputation region, increasing µ has two consequences with opposite effects on average
quality. First, it enables more firms to realize positive profits from first-period sales (higher
qL). This fosters entry by firms with below-average quality, given that qL < µ in a LQE,
and it lowers the expected quality of active firms. Second, increasing µ reduces the loss
incurred by high-quality firms before they have been able to signal their quality to buyers,
allowing more firms with above-average quality to be active (lower qH). The net change in q
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depends on the balance between these two effects. As long as the economy remains in the
low reputation region (µ < q⇤), there is no effect of a better reputation on the exit rates of
exporters: all active firms below q⇤ sell for one period only, while all active firms above q⇤
stay as long as they are able to.
3.4.4 Summary: Industry Steady-States
To sum up, depending on parameters, the rational expectations steady-state falls into one of
two categories. The type of equilibrium will depend on whether the (not necessarily unique)
fixed point of q (µ) falls left or right of q⇤. In a "high-quality equilibrium", all firms produce
and sell for at least one period, firms above q⇤ remain active until they are exogenously
forced to exit, and firms below q⇤ exit in finite time after a number of periods increasing
in q. In a “low-quality equilibrium”, there is a gap around q⇤ where firms are never active.
Below qL, they exit after exporting for a single period. Above qH , they only exit exogenously.
In general, we cannot rule out multiple equilibria. If q (q⇤) < q⇤, there are an odd
number of LQEs. If q (q⇤) > q⇤, there is one HQE and there are either zero or an even
number of LQEs. 25 These multiple equilibria give rise to the possibility of self-fulfilling
reputation shocks, examined in Section 3.5.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the existence condition (3.20). In the dark region, the condition
holds and a unique HQE exists. This is true for low enough a and high enough d. In the
light grey region, there is no HQE: the steady-state of the economy is necessarily a LQE.
A higher k or w shifts the border to the left and expands the no HQE region. Conversely,
lowering k or w widens the HQE region.
3.4.5 Additional Predictions: Unit Prices and Hazard Rates
The model yields additional predictions on the patterns of price and exit rates. Although
these results are not the main focus of our paper, their consistency with existing empirical
25A graphical example of multiple equilibria is shown in Figure 3.7.
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Notes: Parameter values: qm = 1, k = 1.5, w = 0.5.
Figure 3.3: Parameter values for HQE and LQE
evidence lends support to our theory. First, we characterize the path of prices for a given
cohort of firms.
Theorem 6 Unit prices. In a steady-state low-quality equilibrium, the average unit price charged
at t+ s by firms born at date t is strictly increasing in s. In a steady-state high-quality equilibrium,
the average unit price charged at t+ s by firms born at date t is strictly increasing in s for all s if
µ > aa 1q1 and for s   T
 
a 1
a µ
 
otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix C.1.5.
At the firm level, there is a brand premium for high-quality firms both in a HQE and in
a LQE: the price charged increases over time for a given good provided that its quality is
higher than the country average. Result 6 establishes that on average, incumbents receive
higher prices than entrants, and the average price among a cohort of firms is higher, the
longer the cohort has been active on export markets. This result follows from the fact that
over time, an increasing fraction of prices reflect firms’ true quality parameters, and the
average quality of a cohort of firms weakly increases over time as the lowest quality firms
exit.
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Interestingly, these predictions are supported by the findings of Foster et al. (2008) on
the behavior of US firms in their domestic market. They show that entering businesses have
significantly lower prices than incumbents, and that prices rise with plant age.
Second, our model implies that firms’ exit rates vary systematically with their quality
and across cohorts.
Theorem 7 Hazard rate. In a steady-state equilibrium, the aggregate hazard rate is weakly
decreasing in quality and in firms’ export experience.
Proof: See Appendix C.1.6.
The first part of Result 7 establishes that across cohorts, the fraction of active firms that
exit per period is higher for lower-quality firms, both in a LQE and in a HQE. Low-quality
firms exit voluntarily in finite time while high-quality firms only exit when hit by the
exogenous death shock. The second part states that the probability of exit, across quality
levels, decreases with the age of a cohort. It derives from the fact that the distribution of
quality among older cohorts has a higher lower bound than among younger cohorts.
This last prediction is consistent with the findings of Besedes and Prusa (2004) on survival
rates in US import relationships at the disaggregated product level. They estimate that the
probability that the import relationship will end falls with its duration for differentiated
products. We confirm these results with our product-level data: within HS-2 manufacturing
industries, the average hazard rate of HS-10 products drops from 31% in the first year the
country exports the good to 8% after 10 years (see Appendix C.4 for details).
3.5 Policy Implications
How can countries improve their “national brand name” – and is it worth it? First-best
policies would involve conducting verifiable quality audits or taxing low-quality firms and
subsidizing high-quality ones. These policies are not feasible when policy-makers are not
better informed than consumers about firms’ quality levels. Here, we look at the effects
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of two main policy instruments on reputation, quality and welfare: export subsidies and
export promotion campaigns creating reputation shocks.
3.5.1 Export Subsidy
Consider a permanent26 unanticipated subsidy to fixed export costs, resulting in a lower
effective k for active exporters, financed by non-distortionary lump-sum taxes. Since there
are no domestic consumers in our model and foreign consumers are not taken into account
in national welfare calculations, welfare considerations abstract from changes in consumer
surplus. We will compare the effect of the subsidy on aggregate industry profits and its
direct cost in the steady states before and after the subsidy.
3.5.1.1 Starting from a LQE
In a LQE, a decrease in k induces more high-quality firms to start and continue exporting
(lower qH) and more low-quality firms to export for one period (higher qL). We prove that
the overall effect on average quality, and thus steady-state national reputation, is positive
with Pareto-distributed quality draws and d not too low: starting from a LQE, an export
subsidy increases long-run equilibrium quality.
Proposition 8 An export subsidy in a LQE increases the steady-state average quality and welfare of
the exporting country.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.7.
The welfare result is a consequence of the higher long-run reputation. The entry response
to the subsidy creates a positive externality on firms that would be exporting regardless of
the policy. They receive higher prices on their exports due to improved reputation. This
externality lies at the core of the beneficial effect of an export subsidy for a country that is
in a low equilibrium. New exporters also benefit from the better reputation as well as the
26We are comparing the long-run industry equilibria with and without the policy. With a temporary subsidy,
if the equilibrium is unique, the economy would return to the initial steady state in the long-run after the
subsidy expires.
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Notes: Parameter values: qm = 1, a = 3, d = 0.9, h = 0.1, E = 100, k = 1.5, ksubs = 1.2. q⇤ = 3. The initial
unique steady-state of this economy is a LQE with µ = q ⇡ 2.211..
Figure 3.4: Export Subsidy in a LQE
subsidy, so that the increase in aggregate profits exceeds the tax cost of the subsidy. Hence,
our model provides a new justification for export subsidies in countries exporting goods at
the low end of the quality ladder.27
Figure 3.4 provides a numerical example of the economy’s transition to its new, higher
steady state in a case where the LQE is unique. It shows the transition dynamics for average
quality, reputation, the thresholds qL and qH, as well as the number of active firms and
27In a setting where firms would set prices in a competitive way, we would have to balance this gain against
the argument that an export subsidy tends to subsidize foreign consumers.
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aggregate profits following an unanticipated permanent decline in k and assuming that
all firms correctly anticipate the future path of µ. In the first period in which the subsidy
is introduced, reputation is unchanged but the lower cost makes entry profitable for a
larger range of firms. The gap (qL, qH) immediately narrows. The immediate net effect
is a decline in average quality as the entry of low-quality firms dominates on impact for
an unanticipated subsidy. However, over time as new cohorts of high-quality firms enter
and decide to stay active, average quality q and reputation µ start rising, while qL further
increases and qH keeps falling. µ adjusts to q with a lag, further encouraging entry and
pushing up q. This continues until reputation has caught up with actual quality and the
economy has reached its new steady state.
3.5.1.2 Starting from a HQE
We have shown that an export subsidy enhances welfare in low-reputation exporting
countries. Can the same policy be beneficial for a country that already exports high-quality
goods? The next proposition states that instead of allowing a high-reputation country to
move further up the quality ladder, a subsidy is actually detrimental to average quality and
welfare in a high-quality equilibrium.
Proposition 9 An export subsidy in a HQE lowers the steady-state average quality of exports and
welfare of the exporting country.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.8.
This result hinges on the changed exit patterns of high-quality versus low-quality firms.
A decrease in k lowers q⇤ and induces low-quality firms to stay longer. It does not change
the incentives and decisions of high-quality firms. Hence, since average quality is initially
above q⇤, the subsidy lowers actual mean quality: the number of low-quality firms increases
while the number of high-quality firms remains unchanged.
This lower average quality, in turn, damages the country’s reputation, which adjusts
slowly to observed average quality. It has a negative effect on the profits of all active
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firms, all the more so as they have been active for a shorter time. Hence, the entry of
lower-quality firms induced by the subsidy exerts a negative externality on all other active
firms through its effect on national reputation. This externality explains why the overall
increase in aggregate profits of all firms receiving the subsidy is not large enough to cover
the cost of the policy, despite a higher volume of sales.
Intuitively, we can decompose the welfare effect into two components, respectively the
effect on the intensive and extensive margin of profits. For the combination of quality and
export experience for which firms are active both with and without the subsidy, the effect is
unambiguously negative: they receive lower prices and the additional profits brought about
by the subsidy are taken out of taxes. For the additional periods in which firms below q⇤
stay in the market because of the subsidy, their profits fall short of the cost of the subsidy:
otherwise, since the price is lower than in the absence of the policy, they would have been
exporting without the subsidy. Therefore, the net effect is unambiguously negative.
Figure 3.5 shows an illustration of the transition to the new steady state. When the
policy is introduced, low-quality firms immediately stay longer, leading to an increase in
the number of active firms and a steep decline in average quality. National reputation then
starts adjusting downwards until it reaches its new steady-state level. Aggregate profits
first rise above their long-term value, because reputation remains “too high” during the
adjustment period. Over time as µ falls and new cohorts of firms respond to the lower cost,
the economy converges to a steady state with lower reputation and quality. As subsidies
reduce firms’ costs, aggregate profits are higher than in the initial equilibrium, but the
increase in profits does not match the cost of the subsidy.
In a nutshell, in a HQE, a subsidy to the fixed cost k actually lowers average quality by
promoting entry of low-quality firms. Overall, the desirability of an export subsidy depends
on the tradeoff between encouraging entry by high-quality firms which are deterred by the
cost of establishing a reputation, and inducing entry by low-quality fly-by-nights.
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Notes: Parameter values: qm = 1, a = 2, d = 0.9, h = 0.1, E = 100, k = 1.5, ksubs = 1.2. q⇤ = 3. The initial
unique steady state of this economy is a HQE with µ = q ⇡ 3.461.
Figure 3.5: Export Subsidy in a HQE
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3.5.2 Export Promotion Campaign and Reputation Shocks
An export promotion campaign is an effort to promote the quality of foreign goods in Home,
e.g. through advertisements by export promotion agencies or exporters’ associations, or by
hosting "mega-events" to showcase the country – as we mentioned, the Olympics in Seoul
in 1988 and in Beijing in 2008 were explicitly assigned this goal by government officials. We
model it as a one-shot increase in the national image µt from the initial steady-state, absent
any changes in the underlying quality distribution of firms. More generally, the analysis
below applies to reputation shocks not driven by changes in the quality distribution. We
focus on situations in which the economy is initially in a stable low-quality equilibrium.
3.5.2.1 Unique Steady State
If the economy has only one long-run equilibrium, it must return to this steady state in the
long run. The export promotion campaign only has short-run effects on the distribution
of quality. Figure 3.6 provides an example of the transition dynamics associated with a
positive shock. An export promotion campaign results in a one-shot increase in national
reputation µt, starting from the steady state.
The initial jump in reputation fosters entry by firms in segments of the quality distribu-
tion where they were previously inactive: qH decreases and qL increases. The net effect of
the entry response is a drop in average quality q immediately after the shock occurs. Thus,
the gap between actual and perceived average quality leads national reputation to adjust
downwards in the following periods. As the country’s reputation moves back down, the
range of qualities for which entrants choose to stay inactive widens again, driving average
quality back up until it has reverted to its original steady-state value, along with reputation.
There are no long-run effects.
3.5.2.2 Multiple Steady States
If the economy has multiple steady states, there are several low-quality equilibria. Figure
3.7 provides an illustration of this case. Assume the country starts in a stable LQE µS. If
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Notes: Parameter values identical to Figure 3.4. µt rises exogenously to 2.5 at t = 1.
Figure 3.6: Positive Reputation Shock with a Unique LQE
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Notes: Parameter values: qm = 1, a = 2.2, d = 0.7, h = 0.1, E = 100, k = 1.2. q⇤ = 2.4. The steadystates of this
economy are µS ⇡ 1.900, µU ⇡ 2.230 and µ0S ⇡ 2.477.
Figure 3.7: Multiple Equilibria
there are no steady states with higher reputation than µS, an export promotion campaign
has the same effects as when the steady state is unique.
If there exists a steady state µ > µS, there must be an even number of steady states with
µ > µS. Let us define µU > µS such that µU is a steady state and for all µS < µ < µU , µ
is not a steady state. Similarly, define µ0S > µU such that µ0S is a steady state and for all
µU < µ < µ0S, µ is not a steady state. µU is unstable and µ0S is stable.
Starting in µS, a "small" promotion campaign moves national reputation to a level µt
such that µS < µt < µU . The impact of a small campaign is similar to the case with a unique
equilibrium: in the long run, the economy returns to µS. A "large" promotion campaign
moves national reputation to µt > µU . Then, the resulting entry by firms below the initial
qH and above the initial qL leads to an increase in average quality, magnifying the shock.
Actual quality follows reputation in a self-fulfilling manner. Quality and reputation keep
rising until the economy settles in the more favorable steady-state µ0S. In the example of
Figure 3.7, µ0S is a high-quality equilibrium. These results are summarized in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 Positive reputation shocks
(i) Starting from a unique LQE or from a LQE that has the highest µ among steady states, a
one-time positive shock to national reputation µt increases aggregate profits and decreases average
162
quality in the short-run, and has no effect in the long-run.
(ii) Starting from a stable LQE µS such that there exist other steady states above µS, a small
one-time positive shock (µt < µU as defined above) to national reputation increases aggregate profits
and may increase or decrease average quality in the short-run, and has no effect in the long-run.
(iii) Starting from a stable LQE µS such that there exist other steady states above µS, a large
one-time positive shock (µt > µU as defined above) to national reputation increases aggregate profits
and average quality both in the short-run and in the long-run.
Proof: see Appendix C.1.9.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the transition to the new steady state. With the parameter values
of Figure 3.7, the economy starts in the LQE µS and the unanticipated one-shot policy at
time 1 results in a jump of the country reputation above µU . Following the large shock,
the economy moves to the HQE µ0S. Note that the policy is not anticipated prior to time 1,
but once the shock is realized, we assume that all firms have correct expectations of the
subsequent path of µ. The immediate effect of the shock is to boost expected profits for all
firms, fostering entry by a range of firms that did not export in the initial steady state. For a
large shock as defined in Proposition 10, the net effect of additional entry around qL and
qH is to raise average quality, sufficiently so to ensure that reputation in the next period
remains above µU . As the policy was not anticipated by high-quality firms in the previous
periods, µ falls in the immediate aftermath of the shock. Reputation rises thereafter as new
cohorts of high-quality firms decide to enter and stay active, until the economy settles in the
new steady state µ0S with higher quality and higher aggregate profits.
To sum up, a policy which brings about a positive shock to national reputation has
only short-lived effects on the quality distribution of exporters and on aggregate profits
in a unique steady state or if the shock is small. However, a large shock starting from a
low-reputation, low-quality equilibrium is self-fulfilling when the economy has multiple
steady states. It encourages entry by high-quality firms. In the segments of the average
quality-reputation function where entry by high-quality firms drives up quality more than
entry by lower-quality firms drives it down, a one-shot increase in reputation brings about
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Notes: Parameter values identical to Figure 3.7. µt rises exogenously to 2.35 at t = 1.
Figure 3.8: Large Positive Reputation Shock with Multiple Equilibria
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a permanent increase in quality, profits and welfare. To be successful in the long-run, an
export promotion campaign based solely on improving the country’s brand image must
therefore induce a large jump in beliefs. A negative reputation shock has the opposite
effects, as stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 Negative reputation shocks
(i) Starting from a unique LQE or from a LQE that has the lowest µ among steady states, a
one-time negative shock to national reputation µt reduces aggregate profits and increases average
quality in the short-run, and has no effect in the long-run.
(ii) Starting from a stable LQE µ0S such that there exist other steady states below µ0S, a small
one-time negative shock (µt > µU as defined above) to national reputation reduces aggregate profits
and may increase or decrease average quality in the short-run, and has no effect in the long-run.
(iii) Starting from a stable LQE µ0S such that there exists other steady states below µ0S, a large
one-time negative shock (µt < µU as defined above) to national reputation reduces aggregate profits
and average quality both in the short-run and in the long-run.
This last result implies that there can be long-term consequences of a sudden large
drop in reputation, which moves a country to a less desirable steady-state equilibrium. In
particular, large product recalls or heavily mediatized consumer safety scandals concerning
exports of one country can permanently affect the structure of its industry, lowering both
quality and reputation in the long-run.28
Lastly, a policy instrument we have not dwelled on is quality standards. It might seem
that imposing a quality certification requirement, if the testing process is not too costly,
would be a desirable policy as it reduces asymmetric information concerns. This holds true
in a purely domestic setting when consumer welfare comes into play. The policy maker
28Chisik (2003) provides an example of such a negative reputation shock in the Colombian garment industry:
“Although expanding at a rapid rate throughout the early 1970s Colombia’s deteriorating reputation became a determining
factor in the contraction of this industry. Much of this demise can be attributed to a single Colombian garment firm
that took a contract (for 50,000 men’s suits) that was beyond their capability. The poor-quality result so tarnished the
American importer’s name that other high-quality importers became wary of Colombian-sewn garments. With the payoff to
high-quality production reduced, Colombian garment firms then concentrated on low-quality markets, and the newly-found
unfavorable reputation was justified.”
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would then choose where to set the bar by weighing improved reputation and consumer
surplus against the costs of testing and profits forgone by firms that do not meet the
standard. However, as regards exports, setting minimum quality standards does not yield a
clear-cut welfare improvement and may actually result in welfare losses for the exporting
country. The intuition behind this result is simple. On the one hand, a minimum quality
standard means that the “made in” label is a better quality signal. It raises the country’s
reputation and prices received by all firms that meet the standard. On the other hand, firms
below the threshold are forced to shut down. As the foreign consumers’ welfare is not
taken into account, this lowers the country’s welfare: the profits received by “fly-by-night”
low-quality firms at the expense of foreign consumers are forgone. As a result, such a policy
only improves welfare in our model under specific assumptions regarding in particular the
shape of the quality distribution. Hence, it is not the case in general that a quality standard
(even one that is costless to enforce) benefits the exporter.
3.6 Conclusion
We have shown that when consumers are not fully informed about the quality of what they
buy, national reputation matters for exporters. For new firms without established brand
names, the inability to reveal quality to consumers before purchase distorts the incentives
to enter export markets. Low-quality firms rely on the national brand, while high-quality
firms suffer from it. This framework helps explain the high observed turnover rate among
new exporters and a “brand premium” whereby incumbents receive higher unit prices than
entrants.
More broadly, unobservable quality tilts the long-run quality composition of an export-
oriented industry towards its low end, all the more so as the exporting economy has
a poor reputation for quality in the importing country. In that respect, reputation has
self-perpetuating features since future national reputation adjusts to past exports quality.
These issues are particularly relevant for developing countries trying to grow into exporting
increasingly sophisticated goods. National reputations create history dependence in the
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range of goods a country can successfully export. A damaged national reputation is a
barrier to entry for companies that develop more expensive high-quality products, threat-
ening the success of such a growth strategy. To overcome the adverse aggregate effects of
asymmetric information, the optimal policy critically depends on whether the country’s
initial equilibrium is a high-quality or a low-quality one. In cases with low initial reputation,
we find that policies that lower the cost of exporting can lead to a welfare gain by improving
the country’s long-run average quality and reputation. We also show that policies inducing
a positive jump in consumer beliefs can have self-fulfilling effects on the quality of exports
if the shock is sufficiently large, but have no long-run effects if the shock is small. Export
subsidies are, however, detrimental to both reputation and welfare in countries already
exporting high-quality products, as they encourage the entry of “fly-by-night” unreliable
firms.
This paper opens the way for new research in several directions. We have developed a
model with reduced-form import demand, abstracting from the determinants of demand
for domestic versus foreign goods. We could explore further the conditions under which
developing countries end up specializing in low-quality exports by introducing within-
sector competition between domestic and foreign firms and non-homothetic preferences for
quality. Both country reputations and the sensitivity of host market consumers to quality
will be determinants of within-industry specialization across countries. Specifically, as
long as the elasticity of demand to perceived quality rises with income, we expect that
asymmetric information concerns will affect exports from developing countries to advanced
countries more than to other developing countries. Hence, the relative force of factor-
driven comparative advantage and "reputational comparative advantage" will shape export
patterns differently both in more versus less differentiated industries and towards high-
versus low-income destination markets.
Regarding policy responses, we have focused on country-level economic and trade
policies, designed to enhance the position of a country’s exports along the quality ladder.
Going further, our analysis provides a framework for a richer understanding of firms’
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sourcing decisions through the lens of a strategic use of "made in" rules. Exporters can find
it optimal to resort to original equipment manufacturers or depart from the cost-minimizing
way of splitting the production process across locations, in order to obtain a favorable
country-of-origin denomination. The location of manufacturing and assembly will be
decided not only according to cost considerations, but also depending on the regulations
surrounding rules of origin, consumer sensitivity to quality, and the degree of asymmetric
information in the industry. An extension of our model along these lines would generate
testable predictions at the firm level. These topics will be investigated in future research.
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Chapter 4
Price Discrimination in a Two-Sided
Market: Theory and Evidence from
the Newspaper Industry1
4.1 Introduction
The newspaper industry is a canonical example of a two-sided market: newspapers serve
two distinct groups of consumers – readers and advertisers, where each group cares about
the presence and characteristics of the other. The resulting network effects lead to subtle
pricing policies that have received much attention recently (see for instance Rochet and
Tirole (2003) and Weyl (2010)). One feature of newspapers’ pricing policies is the observed
price discrimination between subscribers and occasional buyers; subscribers are typically
charged a lower per issue price than occasional buyers, and these price differences appear
not to be explained by cost differences entirely. Furthermore, this difference in prices has
recently increased and newspapers tend now to favor a more subscriber-based readership; a
tendency which is often interpreted as a response to the industry’s state of distress, itself in
part attributed to the continuing drop in adverting revenues.
1Co-authored with Charles Angelucci and Romain de Nijs
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In this paper we investigate how the reliance on advertising revenues interacts with the
incentives newspapers have to adopt subscriber-based readerships. To this end, we first
extend recent models of multi-sided industries to incorporate the scope for second-degree
price discrimination between subscribers and occasional buyers and, second, we carry out
an empirical analysis using a new dataset on the French local newspaper industry that we
build from archives data.
We build a general model of a two-sided market in which a monopolist newspaper re-
peatedly interacts with a continuum of readers and a continuum of advertisers. Newspapers
can be purchased by readers either by subscription or at the newsstand on a day-by-day
basis. Independently of the presence of advertisers, the scope for price discrimination stems
from (i) the readers’ uncertainty regarding their exact willingness to pay in future periods
and (ii) the readers’ heterogeneity in their average willingness to pay. Readers with a high
average willingness to pay subscribe at a low per unit price, while others buy the newspaper
at a high price whenever their willingness to pay is high.2
Advertisers are heterogenous in (i) their taste for subscribers, (ii) their taste for occasional
readers, and (iii) their outside option (i.e., their payoff when placing ads on alternative
platforms). The challenge is to disentangle how the presence of advertisers affects the
prices charged to readers. We characterize the optimal pricing formulas of the newspaper,
as well as the readers and advertisers’ demands. These formulas are intuitive and in the
spirit of Weyl (2010). When choosing its prices, aside from taking into account the various
marginal costs and demand elasticities, the newspaper must cater to (i) the average taste of
marginal readers – those indifferent between subscribing or buying occasionally on the one
hand, and those indifferent between buying occasionally or never on the other – and (ii) the
average taste of marginal advertisers for both subscribers and non subscribers, as well as
their outside options.
We also aim at providing some comparative statics. We are particularly interested in
2This rationale for price discrimination was first introduced by Glazer and Hassin (1982), but in a model
without advertisers.
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the impact on the extent of price discrimination of an increase in the outside option of
advertisers. In a simplified model we show that such a shock leads to an increase in the
prices charged to readers. Indeed, since less surplus may be extracted from advertisers –
and assuming that advertisers prefer more eyeballs to less – the newspaper will cater less to
the advertisers’ taste for large readerships and instead increase its margin on the readers’
side (as empirically observed in Seamans and Zhu (2012)). On the other hand, whether
the newspaper moves towards a more subscriber-based readership is a priori unclear as
it depends also on the average profile of the newly relevant marginal advertisers (and in
particular their average taste for subscribers versus non subscribers).
On the empirical side, the main empirical challenge is to isolate the “advertising revenue"
effect on price discrimination. To this end, we follow an empirical strategy in the spirit of an
event study. We exploit the introduction of advertisement on French Television in October
1968 by treating it as an exogenous negative shock on the advertising side of newspapers.
Television is state-owned in France from 1945 to 1981. The introduction of advertisement
on television is decided by law, despite strong resistances by the newspaper industry. This
introduction leads to an exogenous shock that shifts exclusively the incentives to price
discriminate stemming from advertising revenues. Indeed, reader heterogeneity and the
various marginal costs of producing and delivering newspapers are not affected. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to use this “quasi-natural" experiment.
Our identifying assumption is that the negative shock on advertising revenues has
affected national daily newspapers, but not local daily newspapers. Indeed, while national
newspaper advertising consists mostly of commercial ads that are relatively close substitutes
to those broadcasted on television (national brands, etc), a large share of advertising in
local newspapers is instead local in nature (local commercial ads and classified ads). We
thus use national newspapers as our “treated group", and local newspapers as our “control
group". Using novel annual data on local and national newspapers between 1960 and
1974, we compare the pre-1968-to-post-1968 change in price discrimination by national
daily newspapers to the change in price discrimination by local daily newspapers over the
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same period (Difference-in-Difference estimation). We find that the decrease in advertising
revenues leads to an increase in the extent of price discrimination, i.e., newspapers adopt
a more subscriber-based readership as a consequence to the drop in advertising revenues.
Our results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and controls. In particular, they
are robust to controlling for industry-specific time trends, and to allowing for flexible time-
varying effects of the negative shock on advertisement revenues (Laporte and Windmeijer,
2005).
Literature review This paper first contributes to the empirical literature that examines the
determinants of price discrimination. A growing number of papers investigate the role of
competition. Seminal contributions include Borenstein (1991) on retail gasoline markets and
Borenstein and Rose (1994) on airline tickets. More recent articles include Busse and Rysman
(2005) who investigate pricing in Yellow pages advertising, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) who
reexamine air ticket price discrimination, Dai et al. (2012) who study the non-monotonicity of
the effect of competition on price discrimination using data from the U.S. airline, and Seim
and Viard (2011) who study nonlinear pricing in cellular telecommunication markets. This
paper also aims at contributing to the growing body of research on price discrimination that
uses structural analysis approaches (McManus, 2007). All theses articles study one-sided
markets, while ours aims at understanding the consequences of network effects on price
discrimination.
There also exists a very recent vein of research that examines the role of consumers’
bounded rationality on price discrimination via subscription (see Grubb (2012) for an
insightful review). Prominent contributions to this literature are DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2004) for contracts in health sport centers and Grubb (2009) for cellular phone service plans.
Although we recognize that bounded rationality may play a role in consumers’ decision
as to subscribe or not to a newspaper, the scope for price discrimination in our model
instead stems from informational considerations. In addition, our aggregated data do
not allow us to investigate this issue. Finally Clerides (2004) discusses the definition of
price discrimination when products are differentiated. This is of particular importance to
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us. Indeed, we are considering here identical newspapers but whose cost of production –
through the cost of delivery – can vary depending on whether the reader is a unit buyer
buying in a newsstand or a subscriber. We show that at least part of the price differences we
observe cannot be explained by delivery cost differences. Our paper builds more specifically
on Glazer and Hassin (1982) who first study price discrimination by a newspapers based
on consumers uncertainty. We introduce the advertising side in the profit function of the
newspapers and discuss how this aspect modifies prices on the reader side.
Our paper also relates to the literature on two-sided markets. To the best of our
knowledge, Liu and Serfes (2010) is the only paper investigating price discrimination in
two-sided markets. However, their modeling approach does not fit well with the newspaper
industry as they consider perfect price discrimination on both sides in a Hotelling framework.
Our paper is closely related to several seminal papers on two-sided markets (without price
discrimination). Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide a widely applicable model of two-sided
markets and discuss markets for advertising, credit cards, software and web portal usage.
Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2010) further extend two-sided market models. We
contribute to this recent line of research by introducing second-degree price discrimination
on one side of the market. Anderson and Coate (2000) study broadcast markets in which
retailers pay for advertising to reach consumers, and where consumers dislike advertising.
Rysman (2004) provides an empirical analysis of the market for yellow pages. Further,
Seamans and Zhu (2012) look at the impact of the entry of Craig’s list on local newspapers’
pricing policies. They find that this negative shock on the advertisement side of newspapers
had led to an increase in subscription prices. Jin and Rysman (2013) study US sports card
conventions pricing though the lens of the two-sided market theory. Finally, Fan (2013)
endogenizes newspapers quality in a discrete choice model to better asses merger effects.
Naturally, much work on two-sided markets has focused on the Media Industry. Berry
and Waldfogel (1999) for instance analyze the effects of entry by radio stations. Argentesi
and Filistrucchi (2007) develop an analysis to estimate market power in two-sided markets.
While they also consider the newspaper industry (Italy), they do not focus their attention
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on second-degree price discrimination as they lack data on subscription prices. Finally,
their period of interest (1976-2003) is longer than ours, but our sample of newspaper is
significantly larger. There is also a line of research investigating whether consumers of
Media like/dislike advertising (it is typically assumed in theoretical analyses that consumers
dislike advertising). Kaiser and Song (2009) for instance use data on German consumer
magazines (between 1992 and 2004) to analyze the extent to which consumers (dis-)like
advertising.
Finally, this research project is a contribution to the empirical literature on media using
historical data to understand the evolution of the newspaper industry and its impact
on society. In a paper investigating the effect of newspapers entry and exit, Gentzkow
et al. (2011) find that newspapers have a robust positive effect on political participation in
the United States. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I instead show that increased
competition may have a negative effect on participation. In their recent work on competition
and ideological diversity Gentzkow et al. (2012) estimate a model of newspaper demand,
entry, and political affiliation choice, in which newspapers compete for both readers and
advertisers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 develops a model of
second-degree price discrimination by a platform. In Section 4.3, we present historical
background on the introduction of advertisement on French Television in 1968, and then
describe the new dataset we built for this study. In Section 4.4 we estimate the effect of
the advertising side of newspapers on price discrimination on the reader side using a
Differences-in-Differences analysis based on the introduction of advertisement on French
Television. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 A Model of Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Plat-
form
4.2.1 Set-up
To model the newspaper industry we consider the repeated interaction between a newspaper,
a continuum of readers of mass one (side R of the industry), and a continuum of advertisers
of mass one (side A). In the following we denote S the subgroup of readers subscribing to
the newspaper, and K the subgroup of occasional buyers (where K stands for “Kiosk"). The
newspaper sells n issues during the length of the period of interest, which we take as given.
Newspaper The profit-maximizing newspaper chooses (i) which price p to charge occa-
sional unit buyers, (ii) which price nh to charge subscribers to have the newspaper delivered
to their home for the n issues and (iii) which price nt to charge advertisers to have their
ad be placed for n issues. The marginal cost of serving unit buyers is denoted cK, that of
serving subscribers is cN , and, finally, that of serving advertisers is cA. We do not model the
actual production of news, and thus implicitly assume that the newspaper produces content
that is of interest to at least some readers.
Readers The gross payoff to reader i from reading the newspaper at date t is given by:
Ui,t = qi + et, (4.1)
where qi represents an individual specific taste for reading, while et captures a common
shock to all readers at date t (say elections, sport events, etc).3 We assume that q has support
going from minus infinity to plus infinity, and is drawn according to f R (q). Furthermore,
et takes value x with probability 12 , and zero otherwise. Reader i, if she has not subscribed,
observes the realization of e before deciding whether to purchase the newspaper at date t.
Not subscribing thus allows readers to make informed purchasing decisions.
3We thus disregard externalities stemming from the presence of ads.
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For a given subscription price h per issue (i.e., the actual subscription price is nh), and
prior to observing the n future realizations of e, reader i’s expected utility from subscribing
is:
US (qi, h, n) = n
⇣
qi +
x
2
  h
⌘
. (4.2)
The subscriber pays nh upfront to have the n issues delivered at home, and thus read all n
issues (since x > 0 by assumption), where the expected gross benefit per issue is qi + x2 .
A reader i’s expected utility from occasionally buying the newspaper at the newsstand
price p per issue is instead given by is:
UK =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
n
 
qi +
x
2   p
 
, if qi   p
n
2 (qi + x  p) , if p > qi   p  x
0, if p  x > qi
(4.3)
Recall first that non-subscribers make their purchasing decisions at date t knowing the
realization of et. Readers that have a very high taste for reading (that is, readers for which
qi   p) always buy the newspaper; their expected gross benefit per issue is thus again
qi +
x
2 . Buyers with instead an intermediary taste for reading (that is, readers for which
p > qi   p  x) only buy the newspaper when the shock et is positive (i.e., when et = x).
The expected number of purchases made by these readers is thus n2 ; and their gross payoff
when the shock is positive is equal to qi + x. Finally, readers with a very low taste for
reading never buy the newspaper.
Advertisers We assume that advertisers choose between either placing an ad in the news-
paper for n periods at price nt or never placing an ad. The gross payoff to advertiser j of
placing an add for n periods is taken to be Vj = nbSj N
S + nbKj N
K, where bSj captures adver-
tiser j’s taste for the average number of subscribers per period NS, while bKj captures his
taste for the average number of non-subscribers per period NK. In addition, advertiser j has
outside option navj. The 3-tuple (bSj , b
K
j , vj) is drawn according to the joint pdf f
A(bS, bK, v),
where each parameter is drawn from support going from minus infinity to plus infinity.
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We assume away any price discrimination by the newspaper on the advertisers’ side of the
industry (i.e., all advertisers face price nt).
We thus have that advertiser j places an ad in the newspaper for n issues at unit price t
if and only if:
Vj = nbSj N
S + nbKj N
K   nt   navj. (4.4)
One can already anticipate that the advertisers’ taste for large readerships may induce
the newspaper to set prices “artificially" low on side R so as to attract many readers (i.e.,
more than in a world without advertisement) and in turn charge high prices to advertisers. If
prices charged to readers are below the relevant marginal costs, advertisers de facto subsidize
readers. The parameter a captures the supply of alternative platforms to advertisers. These
alternative platforms could be other newspapers (therefore treated in a reduced form) or,
in the spirit of this paper, the television. It is reasonable to think that the introduction of
advertisement on television leads to an increase in a.
4.2.2 Solving the Model
We first compute the three relevant demand functions; that is, the demand for subscriptions,
the average demand per issue of newspapers at the newsstand, and the demand for
advertising slots.
Readers As long as p > h, when comparing payoffs (4.3) and (4.2), one derives that
high-valuation readers subscribe and average ones instead buy occasionally.4 In particular,
the demand by subscribers is equal to:
NS =
Z •
2h p
f R(q)dq. (4.5)
4Observe that it is weakly suboptimal for the newspaper to set p < h (and having no readers subscribe)
since the same outcome can be guaranteed by setting p = h. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that it is in fact
optimal to set p > h. In the simplified model we provide in Subsection 4.2.3, we provide a condition such that
this is indeed the case.
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Rather intuitively, more readers are willing to subscribe to the newspaper when the
subscription price nh decreases and/or the unit price p increases. The demand by unit
buyers is instead given by:
NK =
Z 2h p
p x
f R(q)dq, (4.6)
which is decreasing in the unit price p but increasing in the subscription price nh.
Readers with a high taste for reading would buy every issue of the newspaper at the
newsstand at price p (even when et = 0) if subscribing was not possible. Since subscribing is
instead possible, and since h < p, these readers prefer subscribing to enjoy the lower average
price. Readers with an average taste for reading instead have a low-enough gross payoff
when et = 0 that it is not interesting for them to have all n issues be delivered to their home;
they prefer buying it only when et = x, even though the per-issue price p is higher. Here
lies the scope for price discrimination. Setting h < p means extracting less surplus from the
readers with a rather high taste for reading (those who would have bought the newspaper at
the newsstand anyway), but allows the platform to extract more surplus from the informed
consumers; i.e., those who buy only when et = x. It is thus these informational differences
that the newspaper exploits through second-degree price discrimination. In other words, it
is not the presence of advertisers that explains the existence of price discrimination in this
model; though advertisers will certainly affect its extent.
Advertisers On the other side of the industry, the demand by advertisers is given by:
NA(NS,NK, t, a) =
Z •
 •
Z •
 •
Z 1
a (bSNS+bKNK t)
 •
f (bS, bK, v)dvdbSdbK, . (4.7)
Advertisers are more willing to place their ads in the newspaper as the average number
of readers increases (both subscribers and non-subscribers), as the price of advertising nt
decreases, and as their outside option decreases. The pricing policy of the newspaper must
thus take into account these network effects when choosing prices on the readers’ side.
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The newspaper’s problem Having characterized the relevant demands, the newspaper’s
profits are equal to:
P = PS +PK +PA (4.8)
=
n
2
⇣
p  cK
⌘
NK (h, t) + n
⇣
h  cS
⌘
NS (h, t) + n
⇣
t  cA
⌘
NA
⇣
NS,NK, t, a
⌘
The newspaper chooses h, p, and t to maximize (4.8). In the following proposition let eSh
denote the elasticity of the subscribers’ demand with respect to the subscription price h, eKh
that of the unit buyers’ demand with respect to the unit price p, etc.
Proposition 1 The optimal pricing policy of the newspaper is characterized by the following three
pricing formulas:
h  cS
h
=   1
eSh
  1
2
⇣
p  ck
⌘ ∂NK
∂h
1
NS
1
eSh
 
⇣
t  cA
⌘ ∂NA
∂h
1
NS
1
eSh
(4.9)
p  cK
p
=   1
eKp
  2
⇣
h  cS
⌘ ∂NS
∂p
1
NK
1
eKp
  2
⇣
t  cA
⌘ ∂NA
∂p
1
NK
1
eKp
(4.10)
t  cA
t
=   1
eAt
. (4.11)
Proof Differentiating (4.8) with respect to h yields:
NS +
⇣
h  cS
⌘ ∂NS
∂h
+
1
2
⇣
p  cK
⌘ ∂NK
∂h
+
⇣
t  cA
⌘ ∂NA
∂h
= 0, (4.12)
where
∂NA
∂h
=
Z •
 •
Z •
 •
f
✓
bS, bK,
1
a
⇣
bSNS + bKNK   t
⌘◆✓1
a
✓
bS
∂NS
∂h
+ bK
∂NK
∂h
◆◆
dbSdbK.
Note that this is nothing else than the average marginal change in payoff of the marginal
advertisers (those exactly indifferent between placing an ad or not). One may rewrite (4.12)
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as follows:
h = cS
eSh
1+ eSh
  1
2
⇣
p  cK
⌘ eKh
1+ eSh
NK
NS
 
⇣
t  cA
⌘ eAh
1+ eSh
NA
NS
.
Similarly, differentiating (4.8) with respect to p and rearranging yields (4.10), while
differentiating (4.8) with respect to t yields (4.11). ⌅
Intuition These pricing formulas are Lerner pricing formulas modified to take into account
the scope for price discrimination within readers as well as the presence of advertisers.
These pricing formulas, as well as the three demand functions, help us gain a good intuition
for the newspaper’s prices. In addition to taking into account the various marginal costs
and elasticities, the newspaper chooses its prices on the readers’ side taking into account
(i) the average marginal change due to a change in prices charged to readers in the payoff
of the marginal advertisers (those indifferent between placing an ad or not), as well as
(ii) the incentives for non-subscribers to become unit buyers, and finally the incentives for
non-subscribers to stop purchasing altogether. Not surprisingly, we also observe that the
relative sizes of each group of consumers matters as well. Finally, note that the formula
for the advertising price is nothing else but the standard Lerner pricing formula (since
externalities from advertising on readers are for now disregarded).
In addition to this, these formulas also offer us insights directly linked to the empirical
analysis carried out in this paper. Note first that
∂NA
∂h
=
Z •
 •
Z •
 •
f
✓
bS, bK,
1
a
⇣
bSNS + bKNK   t
⌘◆✓1
a
✓
bS
∂NS
∂h
+ bK
∂NK
∂h
◆◆
dbSdbK
is equal to the average marginal change in payoff of the marginal advertisers (those exactly
indifferent between placing an ad or not), scaled by the common component of their outside
option. This implies that an increase in the outside option following, say, the introduction of
advertisement on television, affects the extent of price discrimination through a composition
effect, i.e., through a change in the average "type" of marginal advertisers. The second effect
is, in a sense, less subtle: a change in the outside option of advertisers also changes the price
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the newspaper can charge them (it decreases it). Because of this effect, all else equal, the
newspaper will distort less the prices charged to readers. Finally, the magnitude of these
two effects is affected by the relative sizes of the groups of subscribers and non-subscribers
(as well as the absolute value of their own price elasticity of demand.)
4.2.3 A Simple Model
The main virtue of the general framework presented in the previous subsection is to identify
the relevant economic factors that determine a newspaper’s pricing policy. To gain further
intuition, and to carry out comparative statics, we however simplify the framework presented
so far in several ways. We first suppose that qi ⇠ U
⇥
0, q
⇤
. This implies that the revenues
from subscribers become:
PS = nh
 
q   (2h  p)
q
!
, (4.13)
while those from unit purchases are instead given by:
PK =
np
2
✓
(2h  p)  (p  x)
q
◆
=
np
q
⇣
h  p+ x
2
⌘
. (4.14)
Next we further simplify the framework by assuming that all advertisers care about is the
average number of readers per issue, i.e., Vj = nNR, where NR =
q (h  x2 )
q
.
In addition, let the newspaper engage in perfect price discrimination on the advertisers’
side, i.e., let the newspaper choose advertising price ntj for advertiser j.
Advertiser j has outside option av0,j, where v0,j ⇠ U
⇥
0,V
⇤
, and thus places an ad if and
only if:
nNR   ntj   naV0,j. (4.15)
Again, v0,j captures advertiser j’s payoff on alternative platforms, and a captures the
supply of these alternative platforms. The advertising revenue is thus equal to:
PA = n
Z V
0
max
h
NR   aV0,j, 0
i
dj
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= n
(Nr)2
2Va
The newspaper therefore chooses p and h to maximize expected payoff:
P = PS +PK +PA = ns
 
q   (2h  p)
q
!
+ np
✓
h  p+ x2
q
◆
+ n
 
NR
 2
2Va
. (4.16)
The following proposition captures the newspaper’s optimal prices.
Proposition 2 The optimal pricing policy of the newspaper is such that:
t⇤j = max
h
NR   aV0,j, 0
i
(4.17)
h⇤ = 1
2
 
qaV   1   2q + x 
2qaV   1 , (4.18)
p⇤ = h⇤ + x
4
(4.19)
Proof Differentiating with respect to h and p, and solving the system of two equations,
yields the formulas stated in the proposition.⌅
Not surprisingly, we find that the price charged to occasional readers is higher than
that charged to subscribers. Interestingly, in this simplified model, we find that it is always
optimal for the newspaper to engage in second-degree price discrimination on the readers’
side so long as x > 0, that is, so long as there is some uncertainty over the taste for reading
that can be exploited. Indeed, recall that it is without loss of generality for the newspaper to
set prices such that p   h since the outcome without subscription can always be replicated
by setting p = h.
Corollary 1 An increase in the common component of the advertisers’ outside options a leads to
an increase in the prices on the readers’ side.
Proof Follows from differentiating the formulas for the prices stated in Proposition 2 with
respect to a. ⌅
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Intuition The intuition for this result is as follows. The presence of advertisers whose
payoff increases with the average number of readers leads to the newspaper charging
lower prices to readers that it would choose absent advertisers. If the benefit of doing so
is high enough, readers could even be charged prices below marginal cost (they would
then be effectively subsidized). The benefit of doing so to the newspapers naturally comes
from the fact that the created surplus can be then extracted through the price charged to
advertisers. Now, if the advertisers’ outside option increases so that lower prices must be
charged, it becomes less interesting for the newspaper to cater to their taste, and we thus
observe a movement in the prices charged to the readers towards what they would be absent
advertising: higher.
4.3 Industry and Data Characteristics
The model we built in the previous section provided us with a general framework with
which to think about the determinants of pricing policies by newspapers, including the
extent of price discrimination. In this section, we study empirically how price discrimination
varies with advertising revenues. The empirical strategy we follow is in the spirit of an
event study. We exploit the introduction of advertisement on French Television in October
1968 as an exogenous negative shock on the advertising side of newspapers. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to use this quasi-natural experiment.
In this section, we first present some historical background on the introduction of
advertisement on French Television in 1968, and then describe the new dataset we built for
this study.
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Figure 4.1: TV Penetration in France, 1960-1974
4.3.1 Historical Background: the Introduction of Advertisement on French Tele-
vision
French Television is state-owned from 1945 to 1981.5 A national agency – the “Office de
Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française" (ORTF) – is in charge of providing radio and television
content.6 Only one channel (“La première chaîne" – the “First Channel") is available until
1963. A second TV channel (“La deuxième chaîne" – the “Second Channel") is introduced in
1964 and a third one (“La troisième chaîne" – the “Third Channel") in 1972. TV penetration is
increasing at the time, as shown in Figure 4.1. In 1970, nearly 70% of the French households
own a television (Parasie, 2010).
Channels are financed mostly through a fee (redevance) until 1968. By law, commercial
or brand advertising is forbidden, with the exception of “collective advertising". Collective
5During this period all TV channels are privately-owned in the US, while in the UK two TV channels are
state-owned (BBC 1 and BBC 2) and one is private (ITV).
6The first national agency, the “Radiodiffusion Française" (RDF), is created in 1945. It is eventually renamed
“Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française" (RTF) in 1949 and replaced by the ORTF in 1964.
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ads promote products, say fruits, without mention of a brand.7 In 1959, the time devoted to
collective advertising is only of five hours and ten minutes per year, but its importance is
growing; in 1966 it represents 3, 3% of the ORTF’s total budget (Parasie, 2010). From about
36 million francs (43 (constant 2009) million euros8) in 1966, collective advertising generates
40 million francs (e46.5 million) of revenues to ORTF in 1967 and 51 million francs (e56.8
million) in 1968 (Bellanger, 1969).9
The transition to color on the Second Channel and the need to produce an increasing
number of programs means that the ORTF experiences severe financial difficulties – it is
“on the edge of the abyss" (Bellanger, 1969).10 Secretly decided by the French Government in
March 1965, the introduction of advertisement on television is made public on October 20th
1967, thereby provoking a strong controversy both in Parliament and within the Newspaper
Industry. The then Prime Minister George Pompidou argues that the ORTF has no choice
but to find new sources of revenues to develop the Second Channel and eventually create a
third one. He also argues that the introduction of advertisement on television will “revitalize
the production by giving to our firms the possibility to develop their domestic market, essential
support to any exporter activity." (address in Parliament on April 24 1968).11
The introduction of advertisement on television: a threat to newspapers? Left-leaning
political parties and the Newspaper Industry were firmly against the reform. The Federation
of the Democratic and Socialist Left (“Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste3) – a
7These are allowed since the 1950’s and are also referred to as “compensatory advertising" (“publicité
compensée"), where the term“compensatory" captures the fact that the ORTF would receive a compensation
in exchange for the broadcast (Duchet, 2005). Not only advertisers have to constitute associations, but an
advertising campaign also needs the approval of the supervisory Ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture for
oranges).
8In the remainder of the paper, to save on space, we simply use the terminology “euros" when refering to
“constant 2009 euros".
9According to Duchet (2005), it represents 42,000 francs (e0.084 million) in 1951, 15 million francs (e19.5
million) in 1963, 19 million francs (e23.9 million) in 1964 and 28 million francs (e34.4 million) in 1965.
10Beginning on October 1st 1967, the Second Channel broadcasts twelve hours a week of programs in color.
11Commercial advertising is allowed much earlier in almost all other developed countries: it is allowed in
1941 in the US, in 1955 in the UK, in 1956 in Germany, and in 1957 in Italy and Spain (Parasie, 2010).
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conglomerate of French left-wing non-Communist forces – introduced various bills to ban
commercial advertising on television by arguing that it would lead to a decrease in the
quality of television content. More importantly – and consistently with the identification
strategy we use in this paper –, very much present is the idea that the reform would lead
to a decrease in newspaper advertising revenue.12 In fact, already in 1964, the Minister
of Information of the time, Alain Peyrefitte, was aware of this issue and claimed that the
introduction of advertisement on television would be worth considering only if the press
could survive it (Bellanger, 1969).
Similarly, newspapers are against the reform as they anticipate a decrease in their
advertising revenues. In the local daily newspaper La Marseillaise one can read on March
23rd 1968, in a page 9 article entitled “The weekly newspapers against advertising on Television":
“(...) the national federation of weekly and periodical newspapers reaffirms again its absolute opposition
to the introduction of commercial advertising on television that would lead to questioning the
existence of an important number of newspapers and harm the freedom of expression". And indeed,
as underlined by Bellanger (1969), “in terms of national advertising (...) in a limited market,
any drain leads to a decrease in the advertising revenues which the press lives off". The Federation
and the Confederation of the French Press estimated in a report that the press would lose
between 40 and 50% of its advertising revenues, i.e., between 20 and 40% of total revenues
depending on the newspaper (Bellanger, 1969).
Despite these strong resistances from the newspaper industry, the first advertisement
is broadcasted on French Television in October 1968. The time devoted to advertising is
of 2 minutes per day in 1968 – only on the First Channel –, 4 in 1969, 8 in 1970 (i.e. 2,720
minutes per year) – year in which advertising is introduced on the Second Channel, and
more than 12 in 1971 (Bellanger, 1969).
In order to provide a sense of the effect of the introduction of advertisement on television
12The Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left argues that the government wishes to introduce
advertisement on television so as to weaken newspapers, the only independent media (Parasie, 2010). In an
address to the Parliament on April 24 1968, Jacques Chambaz (from the Communist Party) claims that “the
introduction of commercial advertisement on television is but a new way to deal a blow to the broadsheet newspapers that
you consider not docile and flexible enough."
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on the advertising revenues of local and national daily newspapers, we first provide
aggregate evidence using data from the “Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes Publicitaires" (IREP),
a French research institute devoted to the study of advertising. As appears clearly in Figure
4.2, the advertising market is expanding in France between 1967 and 1974. In particular,
total advertising revenues increase from 3,137 million francs (e3,649 million) in 1967 to 3,451
million francs (e3,841 million) in 1968 and about 3,796 million francs (e3,971 million) in
1969 (Figure 4.2a). Importantly, this increase is almost entirely due to the new advertising
revenues generated by the ORTF, which increase by 69 million francs (e77 million) between
1967 and 1968 and by 197 million francs (e201 million) between 1968 and 1969. In 1971,
advertising revenues represent 22% of the ORTF total revenues (Bellanger, 1969).
In sharp contrast, total advertising revenues of national daily newspapers decrease by 21
million francs (e45 million) between 1967 and 1968, and then stabilize around 500 million
francs. The introduction of advertisement on television in 1968 can thus be considered as
a significant negative shock on the advertisers’ side of the newspaper industry. In Section
4.4, we provide econometric evidence of this shock, computing differences-in-differences
estimates to show that this shock affects negatively the advertising revenues of the national
daily newspapers, but not those of the local daily newspapers.
Before turning to the description of the newspaper industry characteristics, let us under-
line that this shock would in all likelihood have been much stronger had the introduction of
advertisement on television not been regulated. As emphasized by Jacques Chaban-Delmas,
Primer Minister of the time, in an address to the Parliament on November 8 1971: “the gov-
ernment has voluntarily limited the growth of brand advertisement" in order to avoid a “disruption
of the advertising market likely to cause damage to (...) the press" (Duchet, 2005). A 1972 law
indeed limits the share of advertising revenues in the total revenues of the ORTF to 25%
(Parasie, 2010).13 As we show below, however, National newspapers nevertheless suffer
from the introduction of advertisement on television.
13In fact, the ORTF is still loosing money in the early 1970s (Duchet, 2005).
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Figure 4.2: Advertising Revenues, 1967-1974, by Media Outlets
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4.3.2 Newspaper Industry Characteristics
The French daily newspaper industry is divided into two sub-industries: the local daily
newspaper industry and the national daily newspaper industry. During our period of
interest (1960-1974), there are around 100 (national and local) newspapers – with a small
decrease in this number.
There are 16 national newspapers at the beginning of the period and 13 at the end.14
Out of these 13 national daily newspapers, 10 are general information newspapers, while
the others are either sport or financial newspapers. Since local newspapers are general
information newspapers, we only consider national general information newspapers for
the sake of comparison.15 These 10 newspapers represent 95% of the total national daily
newspaper circulation. The total national newspaper circulation is stable during this time
period, with around 4.2 million copies sold every day. The number of local newspapers
during the same period varies around 90, with a total circulation amounting to around 7.8
million copies (see the first chapter of this dissertation for more details on the historical
evolution of the French local daily newspapers industry). On average, the circulation of
national daily newspapers amounts to nearly 350,000 copies a day and the one of local daily
newspapers to 100,000. Copies are sold either at the newsstand to unit buyers or through
subscription. The average share of unit buyers is 70%.16 As expected, the price charged to
subscribers is lower than the price paid by unit buyers at the newsstand. The average price
ratio is 0.86; it is lower for national daily newspapers (0.80) than for local newspapers (0.87).
(Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics on newspaper prices, revenues and costs as well as
on circulation and newspaper content for the entire daily newspaper industry.)
14Two general information newspapers – Libération and Paris Presse – exit the industry respectively in 1964
and in 1970 –, as well as one financial newspaper.
15We drop sport newspapers (e.g., L’Equipe) as well as financial newspapers (e.g., Les Echos).
16The statistical discrepancy between the share of unit buyers and the share of subscribers – that do not sum
up to 100 – stems from the fact that a number of copies is distributed for free every day.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
mean/sd
Prices
Unit Price 0.44
(0.20)
Subscription Price Per Issue 0.38
(0.17)
Price Ratio 0.86
(0.07)
Revenues and Costs
Total Revenues 26.51
(38.37)
Revenues from Advertising 12.90
(22.03)
Revenues from Sales 13.57
(18.47)
Share of Advertising
in Total Revenues (%) 45
(11)
Total Expenditures 25.67
(38.04)
Profit 0.89
(6.32)
Circulation
Total Circulation 135,332
(178,546)
Share Unit Buyers (%) 70
(23)
Share Subscribers (%) 27
(22)
Content
Total Number of Pages per Issue 16
(7)
Quantity of Advertising per Issue
(in number of pages) 2
(2)
Share of Advertising
in Newspaper Content (%) 11
(7)
Observations 1008
Notes: The Table gives summary statistics. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and the others are
averages. Time period is 1960-1974. Variables are values for newspapers. Unit price and subscription price per
issue are in francs. Revenues and costs are in million francs.
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Advertising in newspapers Overall, national daily newspapers generate 67.5 million
francs (e71.4 million) in total revenues each year, and local daily newspapers 19.9 million
francs (e20.4 million). These revenues come from sales and from advertising. On average,
between 1960 and 1974, the share of advertising revenues in total revenues is 45%. The
quantity of advertisement in newspapers represents around 2 pages per newspaper issue,
i.e., 11% of the content of the newspaper.
More advertising is found in national newspapers than in local ones. In addition, the
nature of advertising varies between national and local newspapers. In particular, we
argue that national newspapers are more affected by the introduction of advertisement on
television than local newspapers because their advertising consists mostly of commercial
ads that are relatively close substitutes to those broadcasted on television while a large share
of advertising in local newspapers is local in nature (local commercial advertisements and
classified advertisements). According to the IREP data, the share of local advertisements in
the advertising revenues of local daily newspapers is 43% in 1967 and increases up to 55%
in 1974, while the share of local commercial advertisements in commercial advertisements
increases from 52 to 72%.
Advertisements broadcasted on television tends to be relatively close to the ones pub-
lished in national newspapers. We collect data on all the advertisements broadcasted
on French Television between 1968 and 1974 from the website of the Institut National de
l’Audiovisuel (INA – National Audiovisual Institute), and classify them by group (e.g., alimen-
tation, automobile, household electrical goods,...) as well as by brand. When we compare
these advertisements to the ones published in both national and local daily newspapers
between 1960 and 1974, the substitution pattern between national newspapers and television
appears very clearly.
4.3.3 Data
In this section, we briefly describe the new dataset we have constructed for this paper from
archive data on newspapers’ price, revenues, expenditures and circulation, as well as on
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the quantity, type and price of advertisements in newspapers. Producing these data is an
important contribution of the research.
4.3.3.1 Newspaper Data
We collect an annual balanced panel dataset on local and national newspapers in France
between 1960 and 1974 in order to study the impact of the introduction of advertisement on
television in 1968. The data is paper data that we digitize and merge from the French Min-
istry of Information’s non-publicly available records in the National archives. Newspapers
were asked by the Ministry of Information to report annually on revenues and expenses.
We collect data by having direct access to their responses to these queries.
Local and national newspapers Our dataset includes data for 61 of the local newspapers,
i.e., more than three quarters of the local daily newspapers industry in 1971. These
newspapers are the only ones for which the data is available in the archives. They represent
on average more than 87% of the total local daily newspaper circulation. Our sample of
national newspapers include all the 10 general information national newspapers circulating
between 1960 and 1974.
Price, cost and revenue data For the 71 newspapers described above we collect data on
prices with information on unit price, subscription price, and the number of issues per year.
This allows us to compute a measure of price discrimination. We also have data on revenues
(from sales and from advertising), and on costs. Finally, we have data on circulation with
the share of unit buyers and the share of subscribers.
Advertising prices and quantity A change in advertising revenues can be driven by either
or both a change in advertising prices or a change in advertising quantity. We collect data
on both the price and the quantity of advertising in order to disentangle the two effects.
A first source of information for advertising prices are the listed prices per advertis-
ing slot. We digitize this data from “Tarif Media", an annual publication that provides
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information regarding advertising prices. However, a downside of using listed prices is
that discounts are common in this industry. Price lists are hence a relevant measure of
advertising prices as long as we assume that the potential bias between list prices and actual
prices does not differ too much across newspapers and over time.
Given this caveat, we propose three other measures of advertising prices. First, we
use a measure of advertising price common in the literature, which consists of the total
advertising revenues divided by the newspaper circulation. Second, we compute an “av-
erage" advertising price by dividing the total advertising revenues by the average amount
of advertisements in each newspaper issue, multiplied by the number of issues. Third,
we combine the two previous approaches and define the advertising price as the total
advertising revenues divided by the average amount of advertising per issue, multiplied by
the number of issues and normalized by the newspaper circulation.
We collect data on the amount of advertising per issue directly from the paper version
of the newspapers available in the French National Library. For each year and each
newspaper, we select two issues (Monday and Thursday of the third week of March17).
We measure the quantity of advertising on each page. We thus have information on the
total amount of advertisements in the newspaper, and the share of the newspaper that is
devoted to advertising. Moreover, we also collect information on the type of advertisements
in the newspapers and obtain information on the category of each advertisement (e.g.
alimentation, automobile, household electrical goods,...) as well as on the brand advertising
in the newspaper.
17The choice of the third week of March was dictated by the fact that this is the week used by the INSEE to
run all its surveys.
193
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Estimation Strategy
We use our panel data to compute differences-in-differences (DD) estimates of the effect of
the introduction of advertisement on television. The negative shock on newspaper advertis-
ing revenues following this introduction (our treament) only affects national newspapers
(treated group) but not local newspapers (control group). We thus compare the pre-1968-
to-post-1968 change in prices of national daily newspapers to the change in prices of local
daily newspapers over the same period.
Let Dnational news be an indicator variable for national newspapers and Dafter be a time
dummy that switches on for observations post 1968 (i.e., after the introduction of advertise-
ment on television). Our analysis is based on the following regression equation:
log price ration,t = a+ b1Dafter + b2Dnational news + b3 (Dafter ⇤ Dnational news)
+X0n,td+ ln + gt + en,t
(4.20)
where n indexes newspapers and t indexes years (t = 1960, ...1974). ln is a newspaper
fixed effect, gt is a year fixed effect, and en,t is a newspaper-year shock. X0n,t is a vector of
newspaper-level controls; it includes circulation and operating costs. Standard errors are
clustered at the newspaper level.
The dependent variable, log price ration,t, is the log of the price ratio of newspaper n
in year t defined as the subscription price per issue divided by the unit price. We assume
that the difference in prices charged to unit buyers and subscribers is entirely due to price
discrimination and use the price ratio as our measure of price discrimination (Clerides,
2004). Obviously, part of the difference between the prices charged to unit buyers and
subscribers may be driven by differences in costs, in particular costs of delivery. However,
our assumption is valid in the DD setting as long as the introduction of advertisement on
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television did not affect costs of delivery.18
Due to the inclusion of newspapers and year fixed effects, the coefficient b3 – our
coefficient of interest – measures the annual price ratio effect for national newspapers of
the introduction of advertisement on television compared to the general evolution of the
price ratio for local newspapers. The key identifying assumption here is that price trends
would be the same for both categories of newspapers (local and national) in the absence of
treatment. The treatment induces a deviation from this common trend. Figure 4.3 provides
strong visual evidence of treatment and control newspapers with a common underlying
trend, and a treatment effect that induces a sharp deviation from this trend. However, as an
alternative check on the DD identification strategy, we add an industry-specific time trend
to the list of controls. In other words we estimate:
log pricen,t = a+ b1Dafter + b2Dnational news + b3 (Dafter ⇤ Dnational news)
+µ1nationalt+ X0n,td+ ln + gt + en,t
(4.21)
where µ1national is a national newspapers industry-specific trend coefficient multiplying
the time trend variable t. The introduction of these industry-specific time trends allows
treatment and control newspapers to follow different trends in a limited but potentially
revealing way.
Finally, the unbiasedness of the DD estimates requires the strict exogeneity of the
introduction of advertisement on television. As we underline above, French Television is
state-owned from 1945 to 1981. There is thus no interaction between television owners
and newspaper owners, be they national or local. The introduction of advertisement on
television was decided unilaterally by the French government to answer the concerns of the
ORTF. It is exogenous to the newspaper industry.
18Future work will aim at isolating the part of the difference in prices which reflects differences in costs
(non-discriminatory price differences) using relevant observed cost shifters (delivery costs are unobserved).
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Figure 4.3: Descriptive Evidence: Changes in Price Discrimination.
4.4.2 Results
4.4.2.1 Benchmark Estimates
Table 4.2 reports estimates of equations (4.20) and (4.21). It appears clearly in column 1
(baseline estimation without controls and time trends) that there is a statistically significant
decrease in the price ratio – our measure of price discrimination – of national newspapers
compared to local newspapers following the introduction of advertisement on television.
Moreover, this negative effect is robust to controlling for a national newspapers industry-
specific time trend which is reassuring as to the validity of our DD identification strategy
(column 2). This result is also robust to the introduction of newspaper-level controls (column
3).
4.4.2.2 Timing of the Effect
This before-after event study approach enables us to control for time-invariant newspaper-
specific effects and general time trends. As an additional robustness check, we allow for
flexible time-varying effects of the negative shock on advertising revenues (Laporte and
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Table 4.2: The Effect of the Decrease in Advertising Revenues on the Price Ratio: Baseline Estimation
Price Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
National x Post-1968 -0.12⇤⇤⇤ -0.07⇤⇤⇤ -0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
News FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific Trend No Yes Yes
News Controls No No Yes
R-sq 0.14 0.14 0.20
Observations 968 968 955
Clusters (news) 71 71 71
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time period
is 1960-74. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. Newspaper controls are newspaper circulation and
expenditures. Variables are described in more details in the text.
Windmeijer, 2005). To quantify the dynamics effects of the event and control for lags and
leads, we define (“pulse") variables for two, non-overlapping, three-years spaced periods
around the event and a dummy variable isolating the long-run effect of the shock (see e.g.
(Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008)).
Our specification is:
log price ration,t = a+ d1d
1
n,t + d2d
2
n,t + d3d
3
n,t
+X0n,tD+ ln + gt + en,t
(4.22)
where d1n,t = 1 in 1966, 1967 and 1968 for national newspapers (pre introduction of adver-
tisement on television); d2n,t = 1 in 1969, 1970 and 1971 for national newspapers (at the time
of the introduction and in the following years); and d3n,t = 1 in 1972 and all subsequent
post-introduction years (until 1974). Each indicator variable equals zero in all other years
than those specified and for local newspapers. Thus the base period is the years before 1966.
Table 4.3 presents the results. In column 1 we report the results without controls, and in
column 2 we introduce newspaper-level controls. We find no statistically significant effect
(with a point estimate close to zero) for the pulse variable d1n,t = 1. This is reassuring as
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Table 4.3: The Effect of the Decrease in Advertising Revenues on the Price Ratio: Timing of the Effect
Price Ratio
(1) (2)
Pre Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1966-1968) -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Short-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1969-1971) -0.12⇤⇤⇤ -0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.02)
Long-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1972, onwards) -0.13⇤⇤⇤ -0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes
News FE Yes Yes
News Controls No Yes
R-sq 0.14 0.19
Observations 968 955
Clusters (news) 71 71
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time period
is 1960-74. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. Newspaper controls are newspaper circulation and
expenditures. Variables are described in more details in the text.
to the validity of our DD strategy. Moreover, as expected given the results of Table 4.2,
we obtain a negative and statistically significant at the 1% level d2: there is a statistically
significant decrease in the price ratio – i.e., in the extent of price discrimination – of national
newspapers compared to local newspapers following the introduction of advertisement on
television. This effect is long lasting: the d3 is statistically significant and the point estimates
is higher than for the short-run effect (column 1) and increases when we introduce controls
(column 2).
Finally in Table 4.4, we investigate the effect of the introduction of advertisement, using
the same empirical strategy, separately for unit prices and subscription prices. It appears
that the decrease in the price ratio is entirely driven by a decrease in the subscription price,
while there is no statistically significant change in the unit price charged to unit buyers at
the newsstand. Moreover, we find a statistically significant decrease in the advertising price
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Table 4.4: The Effect of the Decrease in Advertising Revenues on Different Prices: Timing of the Effect
Unit Price Subscription Price Advertising Price
(1) (2) (3)
Pre Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1966-1968) -0.02 -0.04 -0.17
(0.03) (0.03) (0.22)
Short-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1969-1971) 0.02 -0.10⇤⇤⇤ -0.52⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.02) (0.23)
Long-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1972, onwards) -0.01 -0.15⇤⇤⇤ -0.58⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.03) (0.26)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
News FE Yes Yes Yes
News Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.93 0.90 0.21
Observations 955 955 590
Clusters (news) 71 71 48
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time period
is 1960-74. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. Newspaper controls are newspaper circulation and
expenditures. Variables are described in more details in the text.
charged by national newspapers compared to local newspapers following the introduction
of advertisement on television. This effect is long lasting: the d3 is statistically significant
and the point estimates is higher than for the short-run effect when advertising price is the
outcome variable of interest.
4.5 Conclusion
We have built a model in which a profit-maximizing newspaper must attract both readers
and advertisers. Particular attention has been paid to the incentives the newspaper has to
engage in second-degree price discrimination between subscribers and occasional buyers,
and how these incentives interact with the advertisers’ side of the industry, and in particular
the reliance on advertising revenues.
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In our model, there is scope for second degree price-discrimination because of the readers’
uncertainty regarding their utility from reading in future periods. The newspaper sets its
prices such that readers with a high average taste for reading subscribe at a relatively low
unit cost, while readers with an intermediate average taste for reading only buy occasionally
– but at a high price – when their utility from reading on that day is high. One general
tendency that emerges is that, as long as advertisers prefer large readerships to smaller one,
prices charged to readers tend to be lower than absent the advertisers’ side of the industry.
Following a general increase in the outside option of newspapers we therefore find that
prices tend to go up. As for the extent of price discrimination, the interaction with the
advertisers’ side is more subtle since then elasticities, group sizes, as well as the average
taste of marginal advertisers (those indifferent between placing an ad or not) are all relevant.
According to the empirical evidence we obtain using French daily newspapers between 1960
and 1974, price discrimination increases when advertising revenues decline.
This empirical finding has implications for the 21st century newspaper industry. In
particular it sheds light on the observed current tendency for newspapers to favor subscriber-
based readerships through low subscription prices (and high newsstand prices). What our
paper suggests is that when newspapers are less capable of generating revenues from
advertising, all else equal, they tend to adjust their pricing policies on the readers’ side so as
to increase the share of subscribers. As advertising revenues continue declining, we should
thus expect this tendency to reinforce itself in the coming years.
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Chapter 5
The Economics of the African Media1
5.1 Introduction
Building State capacity. Making governments more accountable. Fighting corruption.
Improving the provision of public goods. These challenges are central for achieving long-
term sustainable and inclusive growth in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa.2 A common denominator and a necessary condition for these countries to succeed
and to develop democratically3 – condition that one tends to forget from today’s developed
countries’ perspective – is the power of information. An informative press is indeed a potent
check on corruption; it enhances effective and active monitoring of public goods delivery (for
example health and education) and is an instrument of public accountability.4 Moreover, not
1Prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics.
2The geographical coverage of this chapter is partial. Because North African and sub-Saharan African
newspapers developed differently at different time periods, and because the current state of the media market
differs from one region to the other, analyzing both cases is beyond the goal of this work. The focus of this
chapter is on sub-Saharan Africa; this geographical choice is driven both by the need to increase our knowledge
of the sub-Saharan African media market – I will come back to this point below but nearly no research in
economics has been done on this topic –, and by the lessons that can be learned from this special case for other
developing and developed countries.
3Of course many countries – China is but one example – have developed, i.e. grow economically, without a
free media. But in these countries corruption is still very high and economic growth tends not to be inclusive.
4Using the example of Sierra Leone, Casey (2013) shows that the quality of information available to voters
influences the choices they make in the polling booth and in turn affects the strategies of political parties
competing for their support in developing countries. Cagé (2009) finds that increasing the information available
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only a free and informative press is crucial to good governance and democratic development,
but it also affects economic development – through its impact on social capital (Olken, 2009)
or women empowerment (Jensen and Oster, 2009) – as well as the effective functioning of
markets.5
Despite this central importance of an informative press for the future of Africa, the
literature has overlooked the issue of what makes it viable.6 The media are businesses and
are shaped by many economic factors. The focus of this chapter is on the economics of the
sub-Saharan African media.7 Using the history of sub-Saharan African newspapers as well
as historical evidence from Europe and the United States, I study the rise – and sometimes
the failure – of market-oriented journalism and of an independent and informative press in
sub-Saharan Africa. Do sub-Saharan African newspapers have followed the same “steps" of
development than newspapers in other countries, moving from living off patronage and
government favors to moving more towards mass sales and advertising revenues? And is
the story of the sub-Saharan African media a simple story of catching up and convergence?
One may argue that it would be absurd to make too many broad generalizations about
media in sub-Saharan Africa. But when it comes to the economics of the media, sub-Saharan
African countries share certain features in common. Importantly, through the study of
the economics of the sub-Saharan African media, this chapter challenges two traditional
views of the media. First, the study of Africa shows that there exist multiple possible
to citizens increases the efficiency of official development aid in developing countries. Exploiting a newspaper
campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing the capture of public funds by providing schools with systematic
information to monitor local officials’ handling of a large education grand program, Reinikka and Svensson
(2005) show that public access to information can be a powerful deterrent to the capture of funds at the local
level and that the reduction in the capture of funds that resulted had a positive effect on school enrollment and
learning outcomes.
5Using the Market Information Service project in Uganda – that collected data on prices for the main
agricultural commodities in major market centers and disseminated the information through local FM radio
stations in various districts – (Svensson and Yanagizawa, 2009) show that market information improves farmers’
relative bargaining position vis-à-vis local traders.
6More generally, the focus of the media economics literature until now has been on developed countries,
especially the United States. In my view, one of the main challenges today is to study the media – and how it
affects the political process –in developing countries.
7The main focus of this chapter is on print media (newspapers) rather than on television or radio. I come
back to this point below.
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long-term paths in media development. In particular, this chapter questions the long-term
sustainability of advertising-dependent media systems; it discusses a new framework to
improve the financial sustainability of mass media while preserving the independence of
media outlets. Second, this chapter questions the view that more media competition is
always socially efficient and necessary to ensure diversity. Press freedom and diversity are
naturally desirable; but we learn from the history of sub-Saharan Africa media that chaotic
proliferation of low-quality media outlets may be bad. In order to analyze the optimal
industrial organization of the media sector, it is critical to better understand the economic
incentives of the media to deliver news (see e.g. Chapter 1 of this dissertation).
One may think that an analysis of the economics of the media with a focus on newspapers
in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is a misplaced emphasis. Not only
radio has the widest population reach in sub-Saharan Africa8 but, as we will see, newspaper
penetration is still very low in a number of African countries compared to developed
countries where the newspaper market is of much more importance. The point, however,
is that countries in Africa are among the only countries in the world where the reading
of newspapers will continue its expansion during the coming decades. While newspaper
sales are generally said to be falling, as traditional print media struggle to compete with
broadcasting and online media, newspaper circulations are growing in many countries
across sub-Saharan Africa: the newspaper market expands as literacy steadily increases,
whereas other media like television or the internet require capital that most sub-Saharan
Africans do not have. More importantly, newspapers tend to be relatively independent,
while in most sub-Saharan African countries, State-controlled radio and television services
still command the biggest audiences.9 On the whole, private newspapers tend to be more
8Television is less widely available, although it is seen as growing force.
9In Angola, the government has a monopoly on all TV and national radio. All terrestrial channels are
owned by the state. The state owns and runs the two major radio stations and has a monopoly on television in
Botswana. In Cameroon, the state-run Cameroon Radio Television (CRTV) is the only station with a national
footprint. Similarly, in Chad, the only radio station with nationwide reach is the government-run Radiodiffusion
Nationale du Tchad and the only TV station is the state-run TéléTchad. State-run Radio Television Ivoirienne
has an official monopoly on free-to-air television broadcasting in Cote d’Ivoire and is tightly controlled by the
government. In Ethiopia, nearly all radio and TV stations are owned by the government. While state-owned
203
outspoken than radio and television stations.
Before turning to the analysis, let me finally underline that there is a dearth of publicly
available data on the media sector in sub-Saharan Africa, both for historical and current
data; future research should aim at filling this knowledge gap. In this chapter, I use data that
I collected for previous research I did on sub-Saharan African media, as well as a number of
different data sets.10
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a very simple
conceptual framework to rationalize the relationship between the quality of the media and
political well-being. Section 5.3 discusses the historical development of the African Media.
Section 5.4 provides evidence on the current state of the African media and highlights that
the traditional media system models need to be enhanced to understand the complexity of
the sub-Saharan African situation and to draw lessons for the future and for the rest of the
world. Section 5.5 presents alternative economic models for the press. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 A Very Simple Conceptual Framework
What is the relationship between the quality of the media and political well-being? We
know at least since Condorcet (1785) that political institutions have a constructive role to
play in order to allow for an efficient aggregation of all the socially-useful information that
is dispersed among individuals (see e.g. Piketty (1999), who discusses this information-
Ethiopian Radio is the dominant radio player, the state-owned Ethiopian Television retains its monopoly on
domestic-free-to-air TV. In Ghana, the only nationwide radio broadcaster is the state-owned Ghana Broadcasting
Corporation and state-owned Ghana TV is the only station that has a national broadcast footprint. Similarly in
Guinea, Guinea’s state broadcaster Radiodiffusion-Television Guinéenne is the country’s only nationwide radio
and television services. These are but a few examples.
10Angola (AMDI), Benin (Afrobarometer), Botswana (AMDI, Afrobarometer); Cameroon (AMDI); Chad
(Infoasaid); Côte d’Ivoire (Infoasaid); Democratic Republic of Congo (AMDI, Infoasaid); Ethiopia (AMDI, Infoa-
said); Ghana (AMDI, Afrobarometer); Guinea (Infoasaid); Kenya (AMDI, Afrobarometer, Infoasaid); Lesotho
(Afrobarometer); Madagascar (Afrobarometer); Malawi (Afrobarometer); Mali (Afrobarometer); Mozambique
(AMDI, Afrobarometer, Infoasaid); Namibia (Afrobarometer); Niger (Infoasaid); Nigeria (AMDI, Afrobarometer,
mediaReach OMD); Senegal (AMDI, Afrobarometer); Sierra Leone (AMDI); Somalia (AMDI, Infoasaid); South
Africa (AMDI, Afrobarometer, mediaReach OMD); South Sudan (Infoasaid); Tanzania (AMDI, Afrobarometer, Ip-
sos); Uganda (AMDI, Afrobarometer; Ipsos); Zambia (Afrobarometer, AMDI); Zimbabwe (AMDI, Afrobarometer,
Infoasaid). AMDI stands for “American Media Development Initiative".
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aggregation approach to political institutions). While information pertinent to individual
decisions never exists in aggregated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete
information, efficient political institutions should allow for an efficient use of these dispersed
bits of information.
The so-called “Condorcet Jury Theorem" can be – in its simplest form – stated as follows.
First, assume that a population of size N has to choose between two possible policies
P = A or B and that all agents have the same state-dependent utility function U (P/s); in
other words, if the state of the world s is equal to sA, they all prefer policy A to policy B:
U (A/sA) > U (B/sA). Second, assume that all agents have the same initial prior beliefs
about the unobservable state of the world µ (sA) = µ (sB) = 12 . Finally, assume that all
agents receive a signal s = sA or sB drawn from the same conditional distribution, such that
Prob (sA/s = sA) = Prob (s = sB/s = sB) = p > 12 . The Condorcet Jury Theorem states
that if majority-rule voting elections are held, the probability that the efficient policy (A
in state sA, B in state sB) wins a majority of the vote tends to 1 as N goes to +•. In other
words, majority-rule voting allows efficient information aggregation.
The role of the media in this framework is key: the quality of the information framework,
i.e. of the signals received by the agents, is indeed central for the efficiency of the political
process. To understand why, one has to relax some assumptions of the very simple Condorcet
framework. While Condorcet (1785) assumes exogenous signal acquisition, central is to
explain why some agents choose to acquire information while others do not. Assume that
only a fraction q of the agents acquired a signal and that among the informed agents, the
fraction which observes the message s 2 {sA, sB} in state s is r 2 (.5, 1] (see e.g. Feddersen
and Pesendorfer, 1996; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006b,a). When r is close to .5 the message
is a very noisy signal of the true state, while when r is close to 1, the message almost
perfectly conveys the true state. The media enters this simple conceptual framework in two
important ways: first, the share of informed agents q that decide to acquire a signal depends
on the cost of information acquisition, i.e. on the cost (through their price or accessibility)
of newspapers (if one focuses on print media); second, the quality of the signal r is an
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increasing function of the quality of the newspapers (see e.g. Chapter 1 of this dissertation).
In such a framework, one can show that the information aggregation property of large
elections improves as the quality of information increases and also depends on the cost of
information acquisition.
The rest of the chapter presents the evolution of the sub-Saharan print media and
discusses different business models for an informative press – an accessible high-quality
press –, such an informative press being key for the information aggregation property of
elections, i.e. for democracy.
5.3 The Historical Development of the African Media
Do sub-Saharan African newspapers follow the same “steps” of development than other
newspapers?11 For instance, will a “social history” of American newspapers such as the
one of Schudson (1981) be of any help to understand the history of newspapers in other
countries in the world? While we tend to think that newspapers in the West historically
developed as a product either of the political world or the market economy12, the study of
the historical development of sub-Saharan African newspapers sheds a new light on the
development of media markets. The sub-Saharan African case indeed highlights important
aspects of what makes the media industry viable that have been overlooked in the existing
literature.
The press in sub-Saharan Africa is relatively young when compared to the rest of the
world. While the first newspapers in the West appeared in the 17th century13 in France for
11Part of this section relies on the second chapter of this dissertation, co-authored with Valeria Rueda.
12According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.90), “the media developed in Southern Europe as an institution of the
political and literary worlds more than of the market. In Northern Europe and North America, the commercial bourgeoisie,
whose success in a market economy depended on a steady flow of reliable information about trade, navigation, technology,
and politics, played a key role in the development of the first newspapers."
13There is an open debate in the literature on whether newspapers appeared in the non-Western world in the
first place. While some researchers point out that in China for example, the Pekin Gazette dates back to the 8th
century, others argue that such a publication cannot be considered as a newspaper and that newspapers did not
exist in East Asian countries before they opened to the West.
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example, the first newspaper was created in 1631 and the first daily in 1777 (Daubert, 2009);
and the first “corantos", the forerunners of the modern newspaper, came out in the urban
centers as early as 1607 in Amsterdam (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) – the first newspapers in
sub-Saharan Africa did not appear before the beginning of the 19th century. The Cape Town
Gazette appeared in South Africa in 1800 and the Royal Gazette in Sierra Leone a year later.
The first truly indigenous press – the black Africa’s press – was founded in Liberia in 1826
with the monthly Liberia Herald of Charles Force (Mytton, 1983), in Ghana in 1857 (the West
African Herald – the first newspaper of an African from Africa) and in Nigeria in 1859 (Iwe
Irohin – “The Newspaper").
Why is the press in sub-Saharan Africa so young? First and foremost because in order to
produce newspapers, one needs economic and technological development, and in particular
the printing press technology. In sub-Saharan Africa, Protestant missionaries – because they
needed to print Bibles and educational material in order to spread their religious beliefs14
– were the first both to import the printing press technology and to allow the indigenous
population to use it (Woodberry, 2012). This early availability of the printing technology
enabled the local development of a culture of writing and information diffusion. Thanks
to early access to the printing press, local newspapers developed first in certain African
regions and not in others.
Because Protestant missionaries made printing presses available to the native population,
most of the first indigenous newspapers were printed and sponsored by mission centers.15
The first newspaper intended for black readers, the Umshumayeli Wendaba (“Publishers of
the News"), written in Xhosa, was published as an irregular quarterly in 1837 and printed
at the Wesleyan Missionary Society in Cape Colony. The London Missionary Society and
Methodist missions also produced the earliest journals aimed at the Tswana Christian
14According to the principle of the Sola Scriptura central to the Protestant doctrine, every Protestant should
be able to read the Bible.
15The study of a possible agenda of these newspapers is well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is
important to highlight that these newspapers often provided spaces for intellectuals to discuss reform ideas;
criticisms of colonization and statements in favor of slavery abolitions were part of these newspapers that may
be viewed as the seeds for nationalist movements (see e.g. Woodberry, 2004).
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community from their stations at Kuruman and Thaba’Nchu. Mokaeri Oa Becuana, Le Muleri
Oa Mahuku (“The Teacher of the Bechuana, the Announcer of the News"), which started in
1857, is regarded as the oldest newspaper in the Tswana language (Switzer, 1984). Isigidimi
samaXhosa (“The Xhosa Messenger"), the first African newspaper edited by Africans, was
first released in 1876 and printed at the Lovedale Mission Press. Eight years later, in 1884,
the English/Xhosa weekly Imvo Zabantsundu (“The African Opinion") was published. It was
the first black-owned and controlled newspaper in South Africa (Switzer and Switzer, 1979).
The role played by Protestant missions in the introduction of the first newspapers is
thereby key; strikingly, in regions where Protestant missions were less active, the first news-
papers appeared only at the beginning of the 20th century and no indigenous newspapers
were created before World War I. While by the end of the 19th century, about thirty-four
newspapers had appeared in Sierra Leone, nineteen in the Gold Coast, nine in Nigeria16
and one in the Gambia (Mytton, 1983), before the war, the printing presses were still mostly
owned by the colonial powers in former French colonies. In these colonies, the only publica-
tions were religious or official publications; newspapers were made by and intended for
Europeans (Daubert, 2009).17 The first paper in Cote d’Ivoire to be owned and edited by an
African, the Eclaireur de la Cote d’Ivoire, only appeared in 1935 (Mytton, 1983).18 More impor-
tantly, this lag of more than one century in the timing of creation of the first indigenous
newspapers appears as one the determinants of the differences in the current state of the
newspaper industry in different sub-Saharan African countries. Newspapers take time to
consolidate. At the time of independence, 88% of the former English colonies had a private
press, against only 27% of the former French colonies (including Madagascar and Maurice)
16Between 1859 and 1937, a little more than four dozen newspapers were established in Nigeria (Omu, 1978).
17The situation is similar in former Portuguese colonies. In these colonies, the printing press was introduced
only in 1854. In May 1854, was published the Boletin do governo de Provincia de Moçambique, an official newspaper.
The first private newspaper, O Progresso, appeared in 1868 but was banned after the first issue, and one has to
wait until 1870 to see published a new newspaper, A Impresa (Tudesq, 1995).
18The French discouraged the establishment of indigenous African publishing. All the early newspapers –
such as Le Réveil du Sénégalais launched in 1886 and L’Union Africaine in 1896 – were published by Frenchmen
(Mytton, 1983).
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(Daubert, 2009).19 Moreover, in most sub-Saharan African countries, the newly-established
government tried to take control of the press after independence. These nationalizations did
not succeed in countries where newspapers were well established, stable and independent
before colonization (see e.g. Faye, 2008). In Nigeria, for instance, despite the coup d’état,
the ensuing military regime and the development of a state-owned press, independent
newspapers managed to survive. Similarly, even during Apartheid in South Africa, the
black press and anti-Apartheid white-owned presses continued to exist. The Daily Dispatch,
the SASO Newsletter or The World regularly diffused their anti-Apartheid stances. This was
not the case in former French colonies. In the second chapter of dissertation (co-authored
with Valeria Rueda), we find that proximity to a historical missionary settlement endowed
with a printing press significantly increases newspaper readership today within regions
located close to historical mission settlements.
What lessons can we draw from this brief overview of the history of sub-Saharan African
newspapers? First, that there is a lot of persistence in reading habits. In the sub-Saharan
African case, high circulation newspapers20 may have developed in some countries while in
other they do not because in some countries individuals became used to read newspapers
before getting access to the radio, while in others – in which a private newspaper industry
appeared after the radio – they do not. In the later, one may say that sub-Saharan African
media have skipped the print newspapers phase of media development, the countries having
gone straight from “nothing” to radio.
19In French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française – AOF) at the time of the independences, among the
132 “newspapers" registered in 1958, nearly half is made of handouts (trade-union, political or confessional
bulletins) of random existence. Only a dozen can be considered as real newspapers sold on a regular basis and
written by a permanent team (Perret, 2005).
20I cannot use the terminology “mass circulation newspapers" in the sub-Saharan African case; I come back
to this point below.
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5.4 The Current State of the African Media
The economics of a newspaper may be studied from different perspectives. In order to
discuss the sub-Saharan African situation, this chapter relies on – and challenges – the
different media system models developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in their path-
breaking comparative study of news systems.21
Hallin and Mancini (2004), focusing on the Western world, distinguish three media
system models:
1. The “Liberal Model", which prevails across the Britain, Ireland and North America
and is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial
media.
2. The “Democratic Corporatist Model", which prevails across northern continental
Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland) is characterized by a historical coexistence of commercial
media and media tied to organized social and political groups, and by a relatively
active but legally limited role of the state.
3. The “Polarized Pluralist Model", which prevails in the Mediterranean countries of
southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and is characterized
by integration of the media into party politics, weaker historical development of
commercial media, and a strong role of the state.
Their classification relies on four dimensions according to which media systems can
usefully be compared in their view:
1. The development of media markets, with particular emphasis on the strong or weak
development of a mass circulation press.
21Nor in Hallin and Mancini (2004) which consider eighteen advanced capitalist democracies in Western
Europe and North America neither in their follow-up book focusing of the non-Western world (Hallin and
Mancini, 2012) – to the exception of a chapter on South Africa –, the sub-Saharan African case is used to build
insights on the economics of the media all around the world.
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2. Political parallelism, that is, the degree and nature of the links between the media and
political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the
major political divisions in society.
3. The development of journalistic professionalism.
4. The degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.
This chapter highlights that these dimensions – despite their general relevance – are not
enough to understand the complexity of the sub-Saharan African situation as well as of
other countries. In particular, one has also to take into account (i) the business model of the
newspapers, and in particular their reliance on advertising revenues versus revenues from
sales or from other sources; and (ii) the issue of the access to the media – that one tends to
forget in developed countries but that is still a key issue in developing countries, as will
appear clearly below.
A mass circulation press? As it appeared clearly above, the state of the press varies from
countries to countries in sub-Saharan Africa – and some of these differences come from
differences in the historical development of the media in these countries. Nonetheless, it is
hard to argue that any of the sub-Saharan African countries have ever had a mass circulation
press. There are two ways to approach this question. First, by looking at the aggregate
newspaper readership at the country level. Second, by analyzing the number of newspapers
and studying the readership of each newspaper.
Before moving further, it is important to have some basic orders of magnitude in mind
about what mass newspaper readership means historically in Western democracies. Both in
Europe and in Northern America, the rise of modern democracy and universal suffrage has
come together with a state of affairs where at least half of the electorate – and usually as
much as two thirds or three quarters – reads a newspaper on a daily basis. For instance, in
France, the circulation – i.e. the number of daily copies sold – of local daily newspapers
has been of the order of 20-25% of the electorate throughout the 1950-2010 period (and
even more if one also takes into account national daily newspapers). The average number
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of readers per copy seems to have been relatively stable around 3, so this corresponds
to a readership rate around 60-75% (Chapter 1). In the United States, existing historical
evidence suggests similar magnitudes, and newspaper penetration tends to be even higher
in Northern Europe.22
As compared to this standard, African newspaper readership at the aggregate country
level varies from country to country but is everywhere very far from mass circulation.23
According to the 2005 Afrobarometer surveys24, on average only 33% of the individuals
surveyed read a newspaper at least once a month (while 86% listen news on radio and
45% watch news on TV) in sub-Saharan Africa. A recent survey made by the Lumina
Foundation in southern and middle-belt Nigeria finds that 13% of the individuals read
a national newspaper every day (Fraser, 2008). The order of magnitude is the same for
Ethiopia: 13% of the respondents to the ERIS Audience Survey Ethiopia 2011 said that they
receive information from newspapers. In the sub-Saharan African country with the highest
newspaper penetration, South Africa, 40% of the population read a newspaper at least once
a week.25 In Nigeria, depending on the surveys, newspapers achieved 20 to 40% penetration
among the adult population.
The number of newspapers also varies widely from country to country, but a high
number of newspapers does not always reflect a good state of the industry. In the Democratic
Republic of Congo for instance, while there were close to 700 registered publications in
22According to the World Association of Newspapers (World Press Trends), newspaper reach as a percentage
of all adults is 76% in Sweden, 73% in Finland and 68% in Norway in 2012.
23This low readership level may be due in part to low literacy rates. If more than half of the population is
illiterate (which is the case for example in Ethiopia), then one can hardly expect to observe a readership rate
above 50%. I come back below to the issue of the access to the media.
24There are 17 sub-Saharan countries in these surveys: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Surveys are based on interviews conducted in the local languages from a random sample of either 1,200 or 2,400
individuals of voting age in each country. Overall, they cover approximately 21,000 individuals sampled to
constitute representative groups at the national level.
25According to AMPS 2013 BA (July 2012 – July 2013), 29.4% of all adults aged 15 and over were reached
by the average issue of all 22 daily newspapers monitored by the survey, 31.8% by the for weeklies, and 47.7%
when consider all the AMPS newspapers. When also taking into account the magazines, this share increases to
63.6%.
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2012, fewer than 250 appeared on a regular basis. And all these publications tend to have
a very low circulation. The largest circulation newspaper – the private weekly newspaper
Le Soft – has a circulation of only 2,500 copies. Even the largest dailies in Kinshasa such
as Le Phare, L’Avenir and Le Potentiel, only print about 2,000 copies. In the same order of
magnitude, Chad’s only daily newspaper, Le Progrès, print 3,000 copies a day, and Chad’s
weekly and twice-weekly newspapers never sell more than 4,000 copies per edition. In Côte
d’Ivoire, the government daily Fraternité Matin has the largest circulation with 13,000 to
16,000 copies sold per day in 2010, but most newspapers sell only between 2,000 and 10,000
copies per day. Ethiopia’s biggest daily newspaper, the government daily AddisZemen has
a print run of fewer than 13,000 copies. The privately owned weekly Addis Admas has an
average print run of 21,000 to 25,000 copies; however, most titles in Ethiopia have small
print runs of only about 3,000 copies. On the contrary, South Africa has “only" 43 daily,
weekly and bi-weekly commercial newspapers but the Daily Sun, the South African daily
newspaper with the largest circulation, has a circulation of nearly 300,000 copies a day and
an estimated readership of 5,500,000 individuals.
It is hard to determine the minimum number of copies sold necessary for a newspaper
to be profitable, in particular because it depends on the reliance of the newspaper on
revenues from sales (versus revenues from advertising – which themselves are a function
of the number and types of readers – or other sources), as well as on the production and
distribution costs of the newspaper. Key for the analysis is the understanding of the business
model of the newspaper industry.
The business model of newspapers Newspapers are businesses and are shaped by many
economic factors. From the developed countries’ perspective, newspapers rely mainly on
revenues from sales and revenues from advertising, sometimes also on government subsidies.
As it will appear clearly below, this has not always been the case – papers were not run as
businesses in the United States before the end of the 19th century and relied strongly at
that time on political parties and corruption – and everywhere in the world, including in
developed countries, we still observe strong ties between newspapers and political parties or
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the government. This section highlights the extent of newspaper reliance on corruption in
sub-Saharan Africa, which does not mean that this is an African characteristic; but the lack
of advertising resources make corruption – in the broader sense – central for the survival
of many sub-Saharan African newspapers. In the majority of the sub-Saharan African
countries, the advertising market is indeed very tight and newspapers are thus unable to
rely on advertising revenues. In Angola for example, advertising is scarce and there are
few advertising agencies. Moreover, only long-established newspapers with a high-enough
circulation and a constant identifiable readership can capture the few advertising resources.
Only in a few countries, the advertising market is growing. This is the case for example
in Nigeria. According to mediaReach OMD Nigeria, the total money spent on advertising
(for all media sectors combined) rose by more than 50% between 2000 and 2004 (from
US$63.076 million to US$117.537 million). In Senegal, even if more slowly, the advertising
market is also expanding rapidly because of the development of the private sector, with
the creation of small businesses and bigger brands which need visibility. Similarly with
South Africa’s consumer boom, advertising has increased and newspapers have been able
to charge higher advertising rates. Total advertising spending on newspapers increased by
44% between 2002 and 2005 (Nielsen Media Research cited in OMD, 2005). And the main
newspapers are profitable in South Africa.
In the vast majority of the other sub-Saharan African countries, newspapers however
tend not to be profitable, or at least not profitable in a classic way, when looking at revenues
from sales and from advertising. The Vietnamese example is particularly relevant and may
apply to a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa: “A thriving local newspaper sector
in such countries might seem to reflect strong communities and emerging democracy – but not
necessarily. (...) Extortion business, digging the dirt on local politicians and businesspeople, and
asking to be paid not to publish it." (Hallin and Mancini, 2012, p.201). In other words, many
newspapers do not operate as conventional businesses. First, many newspapers – this is
the case for example in Chad and in the Democratic Republic of Congo – survive on the
generosity of politicians who dictate the publication schedule. Newspaper owners use their
214
publications to gain social and political influence and tend to subsidize their newspapers
from other sources of income. Second, many newspapers survive thanks to extortion and
coupage: “in the Democratic Republic of Congo, coupage journalism (literally, “taking a cut") is so
institutionalized that there are standard rates. For example, $20-30 will buy a story from a radio
journalist" (Susman-Pena, 2012). Evidence of coupage exists in many other countries, for
instance in Côte d’Ivoire (Waliyu, 2007). This practice is institutionalized not only from the
point of view of the coupage rates, but also from the one of media owners. A large number
of owners hire journalists without a contract, do not pay them a regular salary and expect
them to earn a living by publishing news reports – journalists receiving cash payments for
writing promotional pieces – or not (coupage) in exchange for money.
Paid journalism is also used in some countries by governments as a more subtle way
than censorship to limit criticism. On the one hand, governments tend to withdraw public
sector advertising from critical newspapers and inversely to reward publications which
support the official line with advertising.26 On the other hand, governments – this is the
case for example in Mozambique – invite journalists to accompany officials on trips. Not
only in these cases the government pays for the journalists’ travel costs and accommodation
but it also provides them with a per diem that is sometimes more than their monthly salary.
Hence many papers are not run as businesses. With low circulation figures and little
advertising to support them, they do not make money. Or more precisely they make
money with very little by way of conventional sales or advertising revenue. Again, reliance
on “corruption", e.g. through disguised forms of advertisement, is not a sub-Saharan
African specificity and sub-Saharan African newspapers do not intrinsically lack ethical
standards and make the voluntary choice of corruption; but the extent of this phenomena
is particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa because of the lack of other sources of
revenues. The exchange in “My Fair Lady" among Henry Higgins, Colonel Pickering, and
Alfie Doolittle, a Cockney dustman, quoted in Jones (2010, p.104), provides an interesting
26This is far from being specific to sub-Saharan African countries. In the case of Argentina between 1998 and
2007, DiTella and Franceschelli (2011) find for example that the more monthly government advertising, the less
coverage of the government’s corruption scandals in the four main newspapers.
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light on this issue:
“Have you no morals, man?" says Pickering.
Doolittle shakes his head self-pityingly and replies, “Can’t afford them, governor. Neither
could you if you was as poor as me."
With low sales levels and a tight advertising market, newspapers have in a way no
other choice that to rely on corruption to survive. Moreover, another key obstacle to the
development of viable newspapers is the size of the operating costs: in nearly all sub-Saharan
African countries, paper is expensive, operating budgets are high, there are scarce printing
facilities and there is nearly no official government subsidies to newspapers. A necessary
condition for newspapers to avoid extraction is thus economic growth and increase in
consumption, which will lead to an increase in advertising revenues.27 A second necessary
condition is an increase in the access to newspapers.
Access to the media While the literature tends to focus on media freedom, access to the
media is also of key importance. A free press that it is not accessible to citizens cannot be
of great help in making governments more accountable. Yet in many sub-Saharan African
countries the press is very urban because distribution outside the capital and the big cities
is too costly for newspapers and there is a flagrant lack of transport facilities.28
In Benin and in Togo for instance, there is no modern newspaper distribution corporation.
According to Faye (2008), Beninese and Togolese journalists, in order to sell their newspapers
in rural areas, have to go early in the morning to bus stations and request from the so-called
“bush taxi drivers" to deliver the copies to rural resellers. The risk born by newspapers in
this improvised system is too high and tends to deter them to sell outside the big cities. On
27“Ethics codes began when commercial success made them, as Doolittle would say, affordable. In the 19th and early
20th centuries, journalists typically took money to write favorable stories, and the concept of a conflict of interest was
laughable. Reporters were usually paid badly, had little education, and were looked on as a raffish and unscrupulous
brotherhood. Journalists worked in an atmosphere of dog-eat-dog competition, and bribing sources to get the jump on
sensational scoops was a part of the game. But as newspapers became more prosperous, they also became more respectable."
(Jones, 2010)
28The question of media access is also relevant when considering radio and television. In many countries,
people do not have access to television because they do not have electricity.
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the contrary in Senegal, where there is a newspaper distribution corporation – l’Agence de
Distribution de la Presse (ADP) – newspaper penetration in rural areas is higher, but the
distribution network is still very sparse.
The weakness of the distribution system may be viewed as an inheritance of the colonial
area. In many Francophone countries, a French company – Presstalis, the French media
distribution company – has had for years a monopoly on the distribution network. Analyzing
the extent to which the distribution network aims at protecting French interests is far beyond
the goal of this chapter, but it is important to stress that many have argued that this network
is often used as a form of censorship – not distributing a newspaper amounts to be the same
thing that censoring its content.
Another important impediment to media access is linguistic diversity – this chapter
abstracts from the literacy question which has already been considered extensively in the
existing literature. People do not have access to newspapers because newspapers are written
in a language they do not spoke. In Côte d’Ivoire, nearly all newspapers are written in
French while more than 60 African languages are spoken. In Chad, the official languages are
French and Standard Arabic, but very few people speak either of these as a first language.
Nevertheless, French is the language of most of the print media. Similarly in Mozambique,
while only 40% of the population speaks Portuguese, the main newspapers are published in
this language.
Moreover, access to the media is limited by the prohibitively high price of the newspapers.
In Côte d’Ivoire for instance, given the relatively high cover price of the main newspapers
(around US$0.44, that has to be compared to an average daily per capita GDP lower than
US$3), only affluent Ivoirians can afford to buy one on a regular basis, especially in the
interior where purchasing power is lower. Similarly, in Chad or in the Democratic Republic
of Congo – where newspapers cost at least US$1 each, i.e. half of the average daily per
capita income – most people cannot afford to buy a newspaper. Le Soft in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the private weekly newspaper with the largest circulation, costs US$7
and thus only prints 2,500 copies a day. On the contrary, the success of the people press in
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Senegal may be due to its low price (US$0.20) which makes it more affordable. Moreover,
this prohibitively high price of newspapers may explain why according to sub-Saharan
African surveys the ratio between newspaper readership and circulation varies between 10
and 20, while in other countries like France or the United States, the average number of
readers per newspaper issue is lower than 3.
These limits to media access have to be taken into account in an analysis of a viable
model for the press.
5.5 Toward a New Model of the Economics of the Media
It appears clearly from the previous section that with high levels of illiteracy, underdeveloped
consumer markets – low sales and advertising revenues –, an inadequate technology
infrastructure and high input prices, newspapers have no choice but to rely on corruption
and extraction. The problem is that corruption prevents newspapers to play their role of
potent check on corruption and to increase government accountability. Hence one has to
think of different economic foundations of the media. In this section, I first discuss what I
call the “advertising illusion", the idea that given that advertising has been the way out of
corruption in the United States it should be the case in any other countries of the world. I
then present alternative economic models for the press.
5.5.1 The Advertising Illusion
It has been widely documented – for example by Hamilton (2004) – that nonpartisan
reporting and an independent press emerged as a commercial product in the 1870’s in
the United States. At that time, advertising became an important way for companies with
nationally and locally distributed brands to raise awareness of their products. Papers with
larger audiences attracted more attention from advertisers. This incentivized newspapers to
increase readership, drop overt political bias and proclaim their independence in uncovering
news. In other words, advertising revenues created an independent press (see e.g. Gentzkow
et al., 2006; Petrova, 2011).
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One may argue that the fact that the commercial advertising market is reportedly
underdeveloped in most sub-Saharan African countries demonstrates that sub-Saharan
African newspapers are still in their infancy, and that with the future growth of consumption
and the advertising market, sub-Saharan African newspapers will follow the path of their
North American predecessors. However this might not be the case, for at least two reasons.
First because advertising funding sources for newspapers are shrinking all around the
world. And second because this decline is not new. It is often improperly associated to
the introduction of the Internet or the recent financial crisis, but advertising revenues in
newspapers have decreased since the 1950’s both for instance in the United States (Schiffrin,
2010) and in France (Martin, 2005). Advertisers opted for television well before the apparition
of the Internet. In the United States, the share of advertising in newspapers in total media
advertising has decreased from 26% in 1990 to 10% in 2009. In other words, as highlighted
by McChesney and Nichols (2010), “the economic downturn did not cause the crisis in journalism;
nor did the Internet."
Moreover, print advertising does not longer account for the lion’s share of newspaper
revenues, even in the United States where it now represents less than half of the total
revenues (Newspaper Association of America). The share of advertising in the total revenues
of national daily newspapers in France has similarly been decreasing since 2000, from nearly
60% of the total revenues to less than 40% today (Chapter 1).29 Even in the few sub-Saharan
African countries which have a growing advertising market and where advertising revenues
are important today for the profitability of newspapers – Nigeria and South Africa – we
observe a decreasing trend. In South Africa, there has been a dramatic decline in print
revenues between 1997 and 2012, from 40 to 29% of the total advertising expenditures,
in favor of both television and the Internet. Similarly, despite the increase in advertising
expenditures in Nigeria, advertising expenditures in the press began to decrease in 2011;
both the share of the press in total advertising expenditures and the amount of print
29Advertising revenues similarly represent less than 40% of the total revenues of French local daily newspa-
pers.
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advertising decreased.
In addition, note that the very large growth in advertising at the end of the 19th
century in the United States was not only due to a growth in consumer spending, but
to the development of what has been called “monopoly capital" (Baran, 1969). This type
of capitalism, typified by large corporations competing in oligopolistic markets, is best
exemplified by the United States. On average in the United States, advertising have
accounted for over 2% of GDP in the 20th century. But there is no evidence pointing in the
direction of a similar increase in sub-Saharan African in the forthcoming decades. Moreover,
even in the United States, advertising is becoming a smaller portion of the sales effort
while non-advertising marketing expenses – in particular direct marketing – are growing
(McChesney et al., 2000). Hence not only the share of the press in total advertising is
declining, but explicit media advertising may decline in the future.
This is a key point: in the long run, one needs to find a new business model for
newspapers that does not depend so much on advertising revenues.30 While one century
and a half of American newspapers relying mainly on advertising leads us to think that
it may be the Grail of the freedom of the press, not only it is no longer the case, but it
might never be the case for newspapers in sub-Saharan African. If and when the growth
of mass consumption and hence of advertising expenses finally takes place in Africa, it is
very likely that it will only be to the benefit of television and the internet. From this point
of view, sub-Saharan African newspapers have skipped the reliance on advertising revenues
business model period of newspapers.
5.5.2 Perspectives for a New Business Model
In this last section, using the evidence from the economics of the sub-Saharan African
media, I discuss perspectives for a new business model. This includes the following
30Another potential advantage – that I won’t discuss here – of having media system relying less on advertising
revenues would be that it may lead media to favor news over entertainment. A number of studies have indeed
found – both theoretically and empirically – that media tends to produce more entertainment when they rely
more on advertising.
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issues: (i) the pros and cons of ownership concentration; (ii) the development of synergies
between national and local newspapers; and finally (iii) the development of nonprofit media
organization.
Ownership concentration Advocating for higher ownership concentration in the media
sector may seem to be highly controversial. Media competition is indeed often viewed – with
good reasons – as a guarantee for press freedom and diversity and de facto media monopoly
is never a solution and raises the issue of media capture. However, chaotic proliferation of
low-quality media outlets – as it has often happened in sub-Saharan African countries in
the last decades, with very short-lived outlets – may be bad. Under certain conditions, an
increase in media competition can lead to a decrease in both the quantity and quality of
news provided – and so a decrease in government accountability (Chapter 1). With tight
advertising markets and low consumer purchasing power as in many sub-Saharan African
countries, a market can only support a limited number of media outlets, due to both the
endogenous and exogenous fixed costs of news production.
If we further examine the example of South Africa, one of the reasons of the recent
success – and growth – of the print media sector may come from concentration in ownership.
Publishers have indeed been able to keep their costs down by sharing resources and editorial
copy. The majority of South African newspapers are indeed owned by only four companies
(Naspers Ltd, Johnnic Communications Ltd, Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Ltd,
and Independent News & Media South Africa). Similarly in Guinea, though in a very
different media environment with low circulation and few advertising revenues, the oldest
and most respected independent weeklies, Le Lynx (7,000 copies a week) and La Lance (6,000
copies per week) are owned by the same publishing house. The Lynx-Lance group owns its
own printing press and employs 54 people. The only large privately owned multi-media
group in Mozambique, the Sociedade Independente de Comunicacões (SOICO), runs a TV
station, a radio station, Mozambique’s largest independent daily newspaper, O País31, and a
31Which prints 30,000 copies per day.
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monthly magazine, Fama. A team of about 20 journalists provides news for SOICO’s media
outlets. This may seem a small newsroom from the point of view of Western newspapers,
but in fact it is a large one compared to the average number of journalists working in
sub-Saharan African newspapers. O País can rely on such a newsroom – and provides
relatively high-quality news – thanks to the economies of scale enabled by several media
outlets owned by the same media company and thus sharing the same newsroom. Moreover
the group has provincial offices with correspondents who provide news coverage for both
the television and O País from cities in the interior.
Developing synergies between national and local newspapers Another way to take ad-
vantage of the increasing returns to scale that characterize the newspaper industry and
moreover at the same time to increase media access, will be to develop synergies between
national and local newspapers, between mass and small-scale media. As of today in sub-
Saharan African countries, only community-based radio stations communicate in local
languages in order to reach marginalized groups.32 Newspapers also have to develop local
content and languages. By doing so they will facilitate media access of an important share of
the population which is, as I underlined above, de facto excluded from newspapers because
of a language barrier, and increase their readership. But given the economies of scale
involved in news production, local content should be developed by national newspapers
publishing several local editions in local languages – editions distributed in rural areas –,
rather than by a variety of very small local newspapers which cannot be viable from an
economic view point (except of course if they chose to rely on extraction and corruption,
which cannot be considered as a good business model for newspapers).
This business model of newspapers sharing their newsroom – whether they are owned
by the same media company or not – may moreover be an interesting model for the future
of the news industry beyond sub-Saharan Africa. In the United States for instance, the
American Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA) (1970) – a broad antitrust exemption – permits
32Television stations also tend increasingly to do so.
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qualifying newspaper competitors to enter into a joint operating agreement and to combine
business operations (printing, delivery and advertising employees and expenses), thereby
reducing costs and boosting profits (Greenberg, 2012). Ohio’s eight largest newspapers33,
forming the “Ohio News Organization", share that way state, business, sports, arts, and
entertainment news reporting, as well as various kinds of features, editorials, photographs,
and graphics (Downie and Schudson, 2009). Similarly in France, daily local newspapers
from the news company “EBRA" decided in 2013 to pool their national and international
information pages through an agency based in Paris (Chapter 1).
Nonprofit media organizations Finally, there is an ongoing debate – in particular in West-
ern countries – on the efficiency of direct government subsidies for the press, in particular
because there is always a risk that subsidies may jeopardize newspapers’ independence.34
Given the weakness of many governments in sub-Saharan African countries, the issue of
corruption and government accountability and the low level of public good provision, such
subsidies may in any case not be relevant. However, an alternative to subsidies could be “phi-
lanthropy". Schizer (2011) proposes to provide a subsidy through the charitable deduction.
Greenberg (2012) similarly defends the idea of indirect support via tax benefits by facilitating
newspaper conversion to nonprofit status. Making independent nonprofit media as the
centerpiece of the press system – possibly in some sub-Saharan African countries with the
support of the international community – may indeed be an important step toward a viable
business model of independent newspapers which will fully play their role of watchdogs.35
Given the decline of advertising revenues and the high cost of producing high-quality news,
profit margins will never be high again in the newspaper industry, neither in the Western
33The Plain Dealer in Cleveland, The Akron Beacon Journal, The (Canton) Repository, The Columbus Dispatch, The
(Cincinnati) Enquirer, the Dayton Daily News, The (Toledo) Blade, and The (Youngstown) Vindicator.
34Even if there are various direct government subsidies in many European countries and these subsidies
do not seem to have had a noticeably chilling effect on newspapers’ willingness to print criticism of those
governments.
35There is a long tradition of nonprofit journalism in the United States, from the creation of the Associated
Press – which is cooperatively owned by the thousands of newspapers and broadcasting stations it serves – to
newspapers such as the Christian Science Monitor, the St. Peterburg Times or the Delaware State News.
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world nor in sub-Saharan Africa. A nonprofit model – with a commitment to journalism –
has this advantage that a reduction of the editorial budgets won’t be used as a systematic
answer – as it is unfortunately too often the case today – to a decrease in profit margins. In
my view, countries should also develop nonprofit news agencies that should be subsidized
by the government.36 Subsidizing nonprofit news agencies would be a way for government
funding to apply uniformly across the newspaper industry.37
5.6 Conclusion
“[Newspapers] may have a mission, but they are also business, with all that implies." (Jones, 2010).
Newspapers are businesses and are shaped by many economic factors. These factors
have to be taken into account when analyzing the economics of the newspapers.
But newspapers are particular businesses. They cannot be considered just as any firms.
Information is a public good, but one that cannot be delivered by the government, an
informative press being a check on government accountability. Hence a good business
model for newspapers is one that guarantees both newspaper viability and independence, as
well as access to newspapers.38 One of the crucial lessons of this chapter is that advertising-
dependent media systems may not be sustainable in the long run; and may never be a
solution for many sub-Saharan African countries. Advertising revenues have historically
been the principal source of income for daily newspapers, but they are declining everywhere.
It is thus necessary to think about a new business model. This chapter presents some
perspectives for such a new model. It discusses the pros and cons of ownership concentration
36The three largest news agencies in the world are Associated Press, Reuters and “Agence France-Presse"
(AFP). In France, government subscriptions to AFP are a way to subsidize news production by the agency.
37An important caveat that one has to keep in mind is nevertheless that such a nonprofit model of the media
may not work in those sub-Saharan African countries that are “weak states". As stressed by Monga (2009), it
is far from easy in weak states to “disentangle pro-democratic activities by civil society groups from routine power
struggle by political entrepreneurs who hide behind civic or charitable organizations to pursue an often unethical agenda".
In such weak states, the move towards a nonprofit model of the media would perhaps have to be done more
progressively, beginning first by a decrease in the tax barriers to media entry that exist today.
38The solution cannot be to have very costly newspapers reserved to an elite. Because an informative press
useful to monitor public good delivery must be a mass-circulation one.
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and argues in favor of the development of synergies between national and local newspapers
as well as of the development of nonprofit media organizations. I hope it will provide food
for thought for future research. There is an increasing demand for news content but the
economic base of the newspapers – particularly so in sub-Saharan Africa but also all around
the world – are fragile; we have to find a sustainable way to satisfy this demand.
African media did not follow the same development pattern as other parts of the world
and is not in a satisfactory state – to say the least. At the present time, this is a liability for
African democratic and economic development. But this can become an asset if Africa –
probably the only continent with sustained population growth in the century under way –
uses this opportunity to invent a novel model for offering information to new generations
of readers, viewers and citizens.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Sources
A.1.1 Newspaper Data
A.1.1.1 Number of Newspapers
To determine for each year between 1945 and 2012 the number of newspapers present in
each French “départment"/county, I use various sources of information that I digitize and
merge.
For the 1945-1958 period, I use as a first source of information Guillauma (1995) who
lists all the political and general information newspapers that have been published in France
over the period. I extract from this list all the local daily newspapers. I check the consistency
of Guillauma data by using three other sources. First, the Cahiers de L’Institut Français de
Presse, a standard publication from an important French institute of press studies. Second,
data from Ministry of Information reports on the state of French newspapers, that I collect
in the French national archives. Third, the Annuaires de la Presse et de la Publicité, an annual
directory of French newspapers. Newspaper directories are standard sources for historical
research on French newspapers, but have never been digitized before. They originated as a
guide to potential advertisers and were intended to be complete.
For the 1959-2006 period, I use the Annuaires de la Presse et de la Publicité as the first
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source of information.
For the 2007-2012 period, I use a more recent directory of newspapers (Tarif média. La
première source d’information sur les médias).
I always check the consistency of the data on the number of newspapers present in
each French county by using circulation data (see below). I also check that this data is
consistent with the information provided in history books on French newspapers (Kayser,
1963; Derieux and Texier, 1974; Guillauma, 1988; Le Floch and Sonnac, 2000; Albert, 2004;
Martin, 2005; Eveno, 2008).
Newspaper Owners To determine the identity of newspaper owners, I use (i) studies
by historians, especially Derieux and Texier (1974); (ii) the archives of Le journaliste (a
quarterly periodical published by the Syndicat National des Journalistes (SNJ) – National
Union of Journalists); (iii) the archives of the INA (Institut National de l’Audiovisuel – National
Audiovisual Institute); (iv) the archives of the newspaper Le Monde; and (v) information
provided on the website of the Graduate School of Journalism of Lille1.
A.1.1.2 Newspaper Circulation and Readership
I collect information on aggregate newspaper circulation at the newspaper level; and on
newspaper circulation in each county for newspapers circulating across nearby counties. I
also collect information on aggregate readership.
Aggregate circulation For the period 1945-1959, newspaper circulation data comes first
from Albert (1989) which is a standard source of historical research on this topic. I digitize
this data. I check its consistency and complete it by using archives data from the French
Ministry of Information’s reports on the state of French newspapers. I used three reports:
1. “Tirage des quotidiens de province au printemps 1945"(local newspapers circulation during
the spring 1945). These tables are from a file called “Local press, Political and news
1http://esj-lille.fr/
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publications". They originate from the French Ministry of Information’s regional
delegations in major cities and date from April 1945.
2. “Tirage des quotidiens de province de 1945 à 1952" (local newspapers circulation between
1945 and 1952). These tables provide for each city and year the average circulation of
all the local newspapers published in the city.
3. “Tirage des quotidiens de province de 1951 à 1958" (local newspapers circulation between
1951 and 1959).
For the period 1960-1974, I use French Ministry of Information’s non-publicly available
records in the National archives. Newspapers were asked by the Ministry of Information to
report annually on revenues, expenses and circulation. I collect and digitize data by having
direct access to their responses to these queries.
For the 1975-1978 period, I use data in paper format from “Proscop Media"2 reports that
I digitize. These reports are available in the French National Library.
Finally, for the period 1979-2012, newspaper circulation data is available in digitized for-
mat from the OJD, which is the French press observatory whose aim is to certify circulation
data.3
Circulation data with geographical dispersion For the 1945-1958 period, circulation data
with geographical dispersion is from the French Ministry of Information’s reports described
above.
For the 1959-1988 period, circulation data with geographical dispersion in paper format
is from “Opération Vérité", an annual survey on local newspaper circulation at the city
level conducted by the Centre d’Etude des Supports de Publicité (CESP). The CESP is a French
interprofessionnal association gathering the whole of the actors of the advertising market
concerned with the study of the media audience (advertisers, agencies and councils media,
2The Proscop Institute is a firm specialized in market research and marketing and geostrategic consulting.
3http://www.ojd.com/
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central merchandisings of space, advertising media and controls). Figure A.1 provides an
example of this data.
I check the consistency of this data by using data on geographical dispersion from
Proscop Media for 1968-1970, 1973, 1975-1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985-1987, 1989, 1991 and
1996.
For the 1990-2012 period, circulation data with geographical dispersion is available in
digitized format from the OJD.
Readership For the 1957-1992 period, the data on newspaper readership is from the
CESP which publishes every five years between 1957 and 1967 and annually starting from
1968 a study of French newspaper readers (Etude sur les lecteurs de la presse française). The
representative sample of the survey is drawn from all French people above 18 years old
living in metropolitan France using electoral lists. It is a random sample including between
250,000 and 300,000 individuals depending on the years. The survey is conducted using
a questionnaire whose main aim is to describe the behavior of French readers at the time
of the survey. The main information provided is about the reading of a newspaper during
the last period. The survey is available in paper format in the CESP. I digitize it for the
following years: 1957, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984,
1986, 1988, 1990 and 1992. Figure A.2 provides an example of this data.
For the 1996-2012 period, the data on newspaper readership is available in digitized
format from the Syndicat de la Presse Quotidienne Régionale (SPQR – Local daily press
syndicate).4 This annual data is from audience studies conducted to measure newspaper
readership.
A.1.1.3 Newspapers’ Price, Expenses and Revenues
I collect annually for local daily newspapers between 1960 and 2009 a number of important
economic indicators, namely sales, profits, value-added, operating expenses (payroll, inputs,
4There is a gap in the dataset for 1993-1995. To the extent of my knowledge there is no survey covering this
period. The data is also missing for the year 2005 in which no survey was conducted.
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Figure A.1: Example Showing the “Opération Vérité" Circulation Data in Paper Format
247
Figure A.2: Example Showing the CESP Readership Data in Paper Format
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taxes), operating revenues (revenues from sales and revenues from advertising), and the
number of employees.
For the 1960-1974 period, the data is from the French Ministry of Information’s non-
publicly available records in the National archives described above (newspapers were asked
by the Ministry of Information to report annually on revenues, expenses and circulation).
Figure A.3 provides an example of this data.
For the 1984-2009 period, the data (in digitized format) is from the Enterprise Survey
(Enquêtes Annuelles d’Entreprise – EAE) conducted by the French national institute for
statistics (INSEE) and the files constructed for the tax regime (Bénéfice Réel Normal – BRN)
by the Finance Ministry (Direction Générale des Impôts – DGI). I identify newspapers in the
dataset using the French registry of establishments and enterprises (“Sirene"). For the
newspapers not covered in the Enterprise Survey, I use information from the Bureau van
Dijk’s websites (in particular ORBIS).
Finally, the data on the number of journalists, covering the period 1999-2012, is from
the local daily press syndicate (SPQR). I complete it using data I obtain directly from
newspapers.5
A.1.1.4 Newspapers’ Content
Front pages Newspapers’ front pages come from the SPQR website which publishes every
day the “front pages of the day" of 54 local daily newspapers.6 I download these front pages
in “.pdf" format using an automated script, convert “.pdf" files in “.txt" files using an OCR
software and count the number of words on each frontage.
Entire content I collect data on the entire daily content of each newspaper issue by using
an automated script to retrieve for each day all the articles published in the issue. I download
5Contrary to the United States, there is no media directory available with information on the number of
journalists by newspapers in France.
6http://www.pqr.fr/editeurs/les-unes-du-jour/
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Figure A.3: Example Showing the Expenses and Revenues Data in Paper Format
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the data from two different websites which aggregate content from newspapers (Factiva7
and Lexis-Nexis8).
Hard news and soft news To divide newspaper content between hard news and soft
news, I use the information provided by the website Lexis-Nexis. When I retrieve the
entire newspaper issues, I also retrieve all the metadata (tag) associated with each article on
Lexis-Nexis (title, topic and subject). Figure A.4 provides an example of the format of the
information I obtain from Lexis-Nexis. This example covers the May 8th, 2011 issue of the
newspaper Berry Républicain. In this issue, they are 114 articles. The length of the article in
this example is 330 words. The topic is sport; I classify this article as soft news.
Combining information from the title, topic and subject, I determine for each article
its category. I create 13 different categories: agriculture, culture, economics, education,
environnement, health, international, leisure activities, movies, “news in brief" (faits divers),
politics, religion and sports.
I define as hard news the articles on agriculture, economics, education, environnement,
international or politics.
I define as soft news the articles on culture, health, leisure activities, movies, “news in
brief", religion or sports.
7The data from Factiva covers 18 newspapers (beginning date in parentheses): Berry Républicain (2010-
04-01); Charente Libre (2005-05-06); Centre Presse Aveyron (2006-09-01); Est Républicain (2008-02-27); Indépendant
(2006-09-01); Maine Libre (2011-03-04);Midi Libre (2006-09-01); Montagne (2010-04-01); Nouvelle République (2011-
01-12);Ouest France(2002-07-17); Parisien (2005-06-15); Populaire du Centre (2010-04-01);Presse Océan (2008-10-01);
Progrès (2003-10-23); République du Centre (2011-05-02); Sud Ouest (2003-09-22); Voix du Nord (2011-02-01); Yonne
Républicaine (2010-04-01).
8The data from Lexis-Nexis covers 21 newspapers: Berry Républicain (2010-03-22); Centre Presse Aveyron (2010-
03-22); Est Républicain (2008-02-07); Havre Libre (2008-01-05); Havre Presse (2008-01-07); Indépendant (2007-05-11);
Journal Du Centre (2010-03-22); Maine Libre (2011-09-05); Midi Libre (2006-11-01); Montagne (2010-03-22); Nouvelle
République (2004-03-23); Ouest France(2006-04-20); Paris Normandie (2004-09-02); Parisien (2006-12-20); Populaire du
Centre (2010-03-22); Presse Océan (2010-12-08); Progrès de Fécamp (2008-01-022); Sud Ouest (1994-05-07); Tégramme
(2002-02-01); Voix du Nord (2009-09-14); Yonne Républicaine (2010-03-22).
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Figure A.4: Example Showing the Format of the Lexis-Nexis Data
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Table A.1: French Local Juridictions, Descriptive Statistics (2008)
Région Département Canton Cities Cities over
State County 9,000 inhabitants
Number 22 96 3,883 36,570 1,011
Average population (nb) 2,839,500 650,719 16,088 1,722 61,789
Average area (km2) 24,865 5,698 141 14.88 541
Sources: French national institute for statistics (INSEE).
A.1.2 French Voting System, Electoral Data and Demographic Controls
Local juridictions France is organized in six different levels of local juridictions: (i) ré-
gions (states); (ii) départements (counties); (iii) arrondissements; (iv) cantons (administrative
districts); (v) “intercommunalités" (intercommunal consortium); and (vi) cities. Four levels
correspond to electoral circumscriptions: (i) “régions"/states (regional elections); (ii) “dé-
partements"/counties (legislative elections); (iii) cantons (cantonal elections); and (iv) cities
(mayoral elections).
A “départment"/county is a French administrative division. There are 101 French
counties. The median land area of a county is 2,303 sq mi, which is slightly more than
three-and-half times the median land area of a county of the United States. There are 36,570
cities in metropolitan France. There are 2,282 cities with more than 3,500 inhabitants outside
the area of Paris. Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics on local juridictions.
Voting system The French voting system for local (mayoral) elections is the two-round
list system with proportional representation (“scrutin de liste à deux tours avec représentation
proportionnelle"). For cities with more than 3,500 inhabitant – which are the focus of this
paper –, the system functions as follows: if a list obtains the absolute majority in the first
round, then a number of seats equal to half of the available seats is attributed to this list. The
other seats are shared between all the other lists following the proportional representation
with the highest averages method. If no list obtains the absolute majority in the first round,
then a second round takes place. The only lists that can take part in this round are the ones
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which obtained more than 10% of the recorded votes in the first round. A number of seats
equal to half of the available seats is attributed to the list which obtains most votes and the
other sears are shared between all the other lists following the proportional representation
with the highest averages method.
Mayoral elections take place in France every six years.
Electoral data Between 1947 and 2008, 11 local elections took place: in 1947, 1953, 1959,
1965, 1971, 1977, 1983, 1989, 1995, 2001 and 2008.
Before 1983, data on French mayoral elections have never been digitized. I construct the
first electronically available dataset on French local elections results at the city level between
1945 and 1982, using official data sources in paper format.
For the 1947 and 1953 elections, I digitize data from the National archives in Paris
(available in various boxes beginning with shelf mark “F/1cII/"). The data covers all the
cities with more the 2,500 inhabitants. Figure A.5 shows an example of this electoral data
(for the 1947 election).
For the 1959, 1965, 1971, and 1977 elections, I digitize data from the newspaper Le
Monde. This information is available only for cities with more than 9,000 inhabitants. I
supplement the 1959 data for cities under 9,000 inhabitants using data from the National
archives.
For the 1983, 1989, 1995 and 2001 elections, I use the data from the Centre de Données
Socio-Politiques (CDSP) of Science-Po Paris for all the cities over 3,000 inhabitants.
Finally, for the 2008 election, the data is available in digitized format from the Interior
ministry for all the cities over 3,500 inhabitants.
Demographic Data City-level demographic data from the French census is available in
electronic format from the French national institute for statistics (INSEE) website for 1968,
1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2009 and 2010.9 The 1962 census data is from the Centre Maurice
9http://www.insee.fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=statistiques-locales.htm
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Figure A.5: Example Showing the Turnout Data in Paper Format
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Halbwachs.10
First, the census provides information on the total population, and on the share of the
population by age group.
Second, the census provides information on the share of the population by occupation.
Individuals (the working population between 15 and 64 year old) are classified into 6
different socio-economic groups:
1. Farmers;
2. Artisans, shopkeepers and company managers (“artisans-commercants-chefs d’entreprises");
3. Senior executives and knowledge workers (“cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures");
4. Intermediate occupations (“professions intermédiaires");
5. Employees;
6. Laborers.
Third, the census provides information on the share of the population by degree.
Individuals above 15 years old are classified into 6 different education degrees:
1. No diploma;
2. “Certificat d’études primaires" which is a diploma awarded at the end of elementary
primary education in France (which was officially discontinued in 1989);
3. “BEPC" or “brevet" which is a diploma given to French pupils at the end of the “3ème"
(which corresponds to year 10 or ninth grade);
4. “Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle" (CAP) or “brevet d’études professionnelles"
(BEP) which are secondary and vocational education diplomas;
5. “Baccalauréat" which is an academic qualification taken at the end of the lycée (sec-
ondary education) and the main diploma required to pursue university studies;
10http://www.cmh.ens.fr/greco/adisp.php
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Figure A.6: Total Number of Local Daily Newspapers by Year in France
6. Higher (post-secondary) education.
I digitize data for the 1936, 1946 (INSEE, 1947) an 1954 (INSEE, 1958) censuses from
original publications by the French national institute for statistics. However, I only obtain
information on the size of the population and the share of the population by age group for
this time period.
A.2 The Local Daily Newspaper Industry in France, an Overview
In this section, I give an overview of my data and of the evolution of the local daily
newspaper industry in France between 1945 and 2012.
Figure A.6 shows the total number of newspapers by year in France. This number
decreases strongly between 1945 and 2012. There are 186 local daily newspapers in 1945
and 64 in 2012.
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Figure A.7: Newspapers Circulating in More than One County
Circulation across nearby counties Despite this decrease, it is important to underline that
between 1945 and 2012 there are nearly as many entries than exits. This comes from the fact
that many newspapers circulate across nearby counties. In Figure A.7 I report the number
(and the share) of newspapers circulating in more than one county. In 1950 (respectively
2000), 42 (27) newspapers over a total of 137 (61) are circulating in more than one county.
This represents respectively 30% and 44% of the total number of newspapers in France at
the time. On average, these newspapers circulate across 4 counties in 1950 (3.7 in 2000) as
shown in Figure A.8.
Newspapers sell on average 85% of their copies in the counties in which they are
headquartered. This ratio decreases strongly over time, from 98% to 73% in 2000 as shown
in Figure A.9. It is below 55% if one only considers newspapers circulating in more than one
county. This decrease may be due to improvements in transportation technology. Moreover,
counties in which at least one newspaper is headquartered gets on average only 70% percent
of their copies from in-county newspapers.
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Figure A.8: Average Number of Counties across which Newspapers Circulating in More than one County
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Figure A.9: Share of their Copies Newspapers Sell in the Counties in which they are Headquartered
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Figure A.10: Total Number of Newspaper-County Pairs by Year in France
Newspaper-county pairs Entries can thus come either from the “creation" of new newspa-
pers, or from the expansion of existing newspapers in nearby counties.11 Figure A.10 shows
the total number of newspaper-county pairs by year in France. This number decreases
between 1945 and 2012 but is still above 150.
Over this period, I observe a total of 276 county-years with net entry and 361 county-
years with net exit. Figure A.11 shows for each year the number of counties with net
newspaper entry (upper figure A.11a) and the number of counties with net newspaper exit
(bottom figure A.11b). The high number of entries/exits between 1945 and 1955 comes from
the 1944-1945 tabula rasa of the past in the newspaper industy described in more details in
the article (Section 1.4.1), with the entry of a lot of new titles and the rapid exit of a number
11My sample includes a total of 264 newspapers and 630 newspaper-county pairs.
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of these new papers whose owners are inexperienced. Between 1955 and 2012, there are 79
county-years with net entry and 22 county-years with net exit.
Figure A.12 shows the average number of local daily newspapers in a county by year.
On average, in 1960, there are 3.3 newspapers circulating in each French county. In 2003, the
first free daily newspapers appear in France. The figure shows the evolution of the number
of newspapers/owners with (blue line with circles) and without (red dashed line with plus)
these free newspapers.
The size of the local daily newspaper industry Figure A.13 shows the evolution of the
aggregate circulation of local and national daily newspapers. The total circulation of local
daily newspapers in France varies between 9 million copies at the beginning of the period
and around 6 million today. Local newspapers are a key provider of information over the
1945-2012 period. In comparison, the circulation of national newspapers (including the
Paris area) is below 2 million. If one only focus on the circulation of general information
newspapers (dropping sport and financial newspapers) outside Paris, then it is below one
million.
However, it is important to underline that if in aggregate terms the circulation of local
newspapers is much higher than the circulation of national newspapers, the average total
circulation of a given national newspaper is higher than the average total circulation of
given local newspaper. National newspapers are on average bigger than local newspapers,
but there are few of them.12 Figure A.14 shows the evolution of the average total circulation
of a local and a national newspaper. It varies around 200,000 copies for national newspapers,
and its just below 100,000 copies for local newspapers.
Figure A.15 shows the evolution of the average total circulation of a local daily newspaper
in a county. The average number of copies decrease varies between 30,000 and 40,000 during
the period 1945-2012 (left axis). This number represents 50% of the eligible voters in 1945,
12There are only 6 general information national newspapers as of today (Aujourd’hui en France; La Croix; Le
Figaro; L’Humanité; Libération; Le Monde), to which one can add 7 sport newspapers (L’Equipe and 6 dedicated
horse racing newspapers: Bilto; La Gazette des Courses; Paris Courses; Paris Turf ; Tiercé Magazine; Week-End) and 1
financial newspapers (Les Echos).
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Figure A.11: Number of Counties with Net Newspaper Entry / Net Newspaper Exit by Year
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Figure A.12: Average Number of Daily Newspapers in a County by Year
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Figure A.13: Aggregate Circulation, Local and National Newspapers
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Figure A.14: Total Circulation of a Newspaper, Local and National Newspapers (Average)
just below 30% in 2012 (right axis).
Finally, in Figure A.16, I plot the evolution of the average total county circulation.
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Figure A.15: Circulation of a Local Newspaper in a County (Average)
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Figure A.16: Total County Circulation (Average)
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A.3 Additional Summary Statistics
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics on Incumbent Newspapers’ Revenues, Expenses and Number of Employees
the Year before an Entry
Entry
mean/sd
Profit -501
(5,783)
Total Revenues 77,662
(37,603)
Sales Revenues 43,552
(23,267)
Ad Revenues 32,648
(13,876)
Total Expenses 78,140
(40,893)
Labor Expenses (Payroll) 33,019
(17,713)
Intermediate Goods Expenses (Inputs) 41,956
(23,684)
Number of Employees 508
(271)
Notes: All variables (excepted the number of employees) are in (constant 2009) thousand euros. Time period is
1960-2012. The table presents the average and the standard deviations (between parentheses) of the variables.
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Table A.3: Low- vs. High- Heterogeneity Counties’ Characteristics
(1)
High Heterogeneity Low Heterogeneity Diff/se
Education
Elementary primary
education (%) 0.57 0.59 -0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Secondary education (%) 0.33 0.32 0.01⇤⇤
(0.00)
Higher (post-secondary)
education (%) 0.10 0.09 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Socio-Economic Group
Farmers (%) 0.09 0.13 -0.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Artisans, shopkeepers
and company managers (%) 0.09 0.08 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Senior executives
and knowledge workers (%) 0.07 0.06 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Intermediate occupations (%) 0.17 0.16 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Employees (%) 0.25 0.23 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Laborers (%) 0.33 0.34 -0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Age
Below 20 years old (%) 0.28 0.29 -0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Between 20 and 40 years old (%) 0.26 0.26 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Between 40 and 60 years old (%) 0.24 0.24 0.00⇤
(0.00)
Above 60 years old (%) 0.21 0.21 0.00
(0.00)
Total Population (100,000) 5.04 5.27 -0.22
(0.11)
Newspapers
Number of Newspapers (1945-2012) 2.73 2.66 0.06
(0.04)
Number of Newspapers (1960-2012) 2.50 2.49 0.01
(0.04)
Observations 5866
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares the characteristics of counties with high and low
heterogeneity. Column 1 presents the results for counties with high heterogeneity. Column 2 presents the results
for counties with low heterogeneity. In Column 3 I perform a t-test on the equality of means (standard errors in
parenthesis).
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A.4 Additional Results
A.4.1 Newspapers’ Entry Decision
In this section, I provide evidence that, on the one hand, the market size is a good predictor
of the number of active newspapers, and that on the other hand, newspapers move in where
there is a trending population.
My estimating equation is:
yct = a+ b1 populationct + b2 population growthct + b3 population densityct + µt + #ct
(A.1)
where c indexes counties, t indexes years and µt is a year fixed effect. Table A.5 presents
the results of the estimation. yct, the dependent variable, is alternatively the number of
newspapers in county c and year t (columns 1 to 5); an indicator variable equal to one when
a newspaper enters in county c and year t and to zero otherwise (columns 6 to 9); and an
indicator variable equal to one when a newspaper owner enters in county c and year t and to
zero otherwise (columns 10 to 13). The independent variables are population (above 20 years
old), population growth, and population density. I control for population density because
delivery costs may be lower in densely populated areas and thus the number of newspapers
may be higher in these areas. As expected given existing empirical evidence (see e.g. Berry,
1992), I find that the number of newspapers in a county is strongly correlated with the
county population (column 1). A one-standard deviation increase in population yields a
0.24 standard deviation increase in the number of newspapers. This positive correlation is
robust to controlling for the number of newspapers present in the county in 1950 (at the
end of the postwar adjustment period in the newspaper industry described below) even if
its magnitude is halved (column 5).
Given the latent variable model – newspapers move in when there is a growing popu-
lation – the entry decision should be correlated with population growth. It is indeed the
case: whether I control or not for population, I find that population growth is positively and
significantly correlated with the entry decision of newspapers (columns 6 and 9). Moreover,
271
once I control for population growth, population per se has no statistically significant impact
on the entry decision (column 9). This finding holds whether I consider all entries (columns
6 to 9) or I reduce the set of entries to episodes where not only a new newspaper but also a
new newspaper owner enters a county (columns 10 to 13). The magnitude of the positive
correlation between the entry decision and population growth is higher when I impose
this restriction. Importantly, all my empirical results are robust to controlling or not for
population and population growth.
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A.4.2 Other Additional Results’ Tables
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Table A.8: The Effect of the Number of Newspapers on Newspapers’ Content (Hard News)
(a) Share of Articles on Hard News
Share of Articles on Information in the Newspaper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Newspapers -3.55⇤⇤⇤ -2.77⇤ -3.68⇤⇤⇤ -3.09⇤⇤ -2.10⇤⇤ -3.77⇤⇤
(0.73) (1.54) (0.77) (1.27) (1.01) (1.70)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity -2.96 -2.36 5.10⇤
(1.96) (1.90) (2.73)
Low Heterogeneity 7.66⇤ 6.23 -27.48
(4.15) (4.06) (16.61)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.22
Observations 25,745 25,745 25,745 25,745 25,745 25,745
Clusters (County-Year) 88 88 88 88 88 88
Mean DepVar 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73 33.73
(b) Number of Articles on Hard News
Number of Articles on Information per Issue
Number of Newspapers -64.6⇤⇤⇤ -79.3⇤⇤⇤ -61.0⇤⇤⇤ -80.0⇤⇤⇤ -68.7⇤⇤⇤ -92.8⇤⇤⇤
(8.6) (20.4) (8.1) (16.3) (6.1) (15.6)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity -6.4 6.3 30.7⇤
(21.0) (17.5) (17.0)
Low Heterogeneity 56.8 24.6 -6.2
(38.3) (33.9) (75.8)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.25 0.29 0.37 0.40 0.55 0.56
Observations 25,575 25,575 25,575 25,575 25,575 25,575
Clusters (County-Year) 92 92 92 92 92 92
Mean DepVar 103.1 103.1 103.1 103.1 103.1 103.1
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county*year. Time period is 2005-
2012. In the upper table (Table A.8a), the dependent variable is the share of articles on hard news which is defined as
the number of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environnement, international or politics, divided by the total
number of articles classified by topics. In the bottom table (Table A.8b), the dependent variable is the number of articles on
hard news. The controls include demographic controls (the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education,
the share of the working population between 15 and 64 year old which is senior executive or knowledge worker and the
total population in county c and year t) and the demographic controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable.
Variables are described in more details in the text.
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Table A.9: The Effect of the Number of Newspapers on Newspapers’ Content (Soft News)
Number of Articles on Entertainment per Issue
Number of Newspapers -111.3⇤⇤⇤ -116.5⇤⇤⇤ -107.5⇤⇤⇤ -117.9⇤⇤⇤ -107.5⇤⇤⇤ -140.9⇤⇤⇤
(14.6) (30.6) (13.8) (27.0) (13.8) (23.8)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Heterogeneity -77.1⇤⇤ -64.0⇤⇤ -28.7
(32.0) (27.7) (26.3)
Low Heterogeneity 264.2⇤⇤⇤ 230.1⇤⇤⇤ 284.6⇤⇤
(58.3) (52.6) (133.5)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.27 0.42 0.35 0.47 0.35 0.64
Observations 25,696 25,696 25,696 25,696 25,696 25,696
Clusters (County-Year) 92 92 92 92 92 92
Mean DepVar 197.3 197.3 197.3 197.3 197.3 197.3
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county*year. Time period is 2005-2012.
The bottom table (Table A.9) the dependent variable is the number of articles on soft news. The controls include demographic
controls (the share of the population with higher (post-secondary) education, the share of the working population between
15 and 64 year old which is senior executive or knowledge worker and the total population in county c and year t) and the
demographic controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable. Variables are described in more details in the
text.
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Table A.10: The Effect of the Number of Newspapers on Newspapers’ Specialization
Newspaper Specialization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of newspapers 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤⇤ 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.078⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of Newspapers
* Low Political Heterogeneity -0.054⇤⇤⇤ -0.063⇤⇤⇤ -0.047⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017)
Low Political Heterogeneity 0.073⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤ 0.245
(0.027) (0.024) (0.169)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.17
Observations 28,180 28,180 28,180 28,180 28,180 28,180
Clusters (County-Year) 94 94 94 94 94 94
Mean DepVar 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county-year. Time
period is 2005-2012. The dependent variable is newspaper specialization computed alternatively on a daily
basis. “Newspaper specialization" is an Herfindahl index of newspaper differentation. This index is equal to
the sum of the squares of the shares of the different newpaper topics in each newspaper issue: agriculture,
culture, economics, education, environnement, health, international, leisure activities, movies, “news in brief",
politics religion and sports. The controls include demographic controls (the share of the population with
higher (post-secondary) education, the share of working population between 15 and 64 year old which is senior
executive or knowledge worker) and the total population in county c and year t), and demographic controls
interacted with the heterogeneity dummy. Variables are described in more details in the text.
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A.5 Proofs of the Theoretical Results
There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1 and two profit-maximizing newspapers under
duopoly, newspaper 1 and newspaper 2 (only one newspaper under monopoly, newspaper
m). I study the production choices (price and quality) of newspapers under monopoly and
duopoly. The analysis is based on a two-stage non-cooperative sequential game. Newspapers
first choose simultaneously their quality and then compete simultaneously in price.
A.5.1 Model Set-Up: Consumers
Consumers choose whether to buy a newspaper: a 2 A = {B,NB} (B: buy; NB: do not
buy). I assume that there is unit-demand: consumers cannot buy more than one unit of
the newspaper. Moreover, in order to keep the model tractable, I assume that there is no
multi-homing: when there are two newspapers, consumers can only buy one of the two.
They cannot buy both newspapers at the same time.
Consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for quality (vertical differentiation). Con-
sumer i maximizes the following utility function:
Vi =
8>><>>:
ginj   pj, if she buys newspaper j
0, otherwise
where pj is the price of newspaper j, nj is its quality and gi is consumer i’s willingness-to-pay
for quality. I assume that this taste is uniformly distributed with unit density over the
interval
h
g,g
i
: U ⇠
h
g,g
i
.
In the monopoly case, consumer i buys newspaper j iff
ginj   pj   0 (A.2)
In the duopoly case, newspaper j’s (j = 1, 2) demand, Dj, is defined as the set of
consumer types who get greater surplus from its quality-price offering than from the other
firm’s quality-price offering or the outside option:
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Dj =
n
g ⇠ U
h
g,g
i
: gnj   pj   gnz   pz 8z = 0, 1, 2
o
(A.3)
Higher types (agents with a high g) more strongly prefer higher-quality newspapers
since they get an higher marginal benefit. They thus choose the higher-quality newspaper
under duopoly. Middle types choose the lower-quality newspaper. Finally, if the market
is not covered, lower types choose not to buy a newspaper. Importantly here I am not
assuming market coverage ex ante. The extent of consumers’ heterogeneity – measured by
the ratio gg – determines whether the market is actually covered or not. Market coverage is
an endogenous outcome of the quality game, as it will appear clearly below.
A.5.2 Model Set-Up: Newspapers
Newspapers maximize their profits by choosing their price p and their quality n:
max
(nj,pj)
"
pjDj (n,p) 
cn2j
2
  S
#
(A.4)
where S is the fixed cost for setting up a newspaper.13
The production cost is a quadratic function of the quality n and is given by
cn2j
2 . (The
production cost increases with quality at a faster rate than any agent’s willingness to pay
for quality.)
I assume that the news market is one-sided, i.e. I do not take into account newspaper
dependency on ad revenues. I recognize that newspapers derive revenue from both readers
and advertisers. Implicitly, I am considering advertising revenue as a per-reader proportional
subsidy.
A.5.3 Timing of the Game
The game proceeds as follows:
13This includes the annual costs that must be incurred in order to set up a newspaper (office space, equipment,
printing press, etc.) and to maintain a reputation as a media outlet (e.g. one needs to have minimal number of
journalists covering core issues, etc.).
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1. Newspapers simultaneously choose their quality n.
2. Newspapers simultaneously choose their price p.
This time ordering is standard. What is important is that newspapers first compete
simultaneously in quality before competing simultaneously in price. This allows newspapers
to differentiate in quality in order to soften price competition. I solve this game by backward
induction. I only consider pure-strategy equilibria.
A.5.4 Solving the Model
I compare the production choices of newspapers under monopoly and under duopoly. I do
not consider the cases with more than two newspapers. That is, I assume that the set-up cost
is sufficiently large (s > S) so that a third entrant would suffer losses. Whether monopoly
or duopoly prevails in equilibrium also depends on S. One can easily show that if S is
sufficiently small (S < S < S), the second entrant can make positive profits, so that there is
a duopoly. Conversely, for S sufficiently large (S > S), no entry is profitable, so there is a
monopoly.
A.5.4.1 Monopoly
Under monopoly, agent i buys the newspaper iff
gi >
pm
nm
The marginal consumer type is thus bgM = pmnm provided that bgM 2 hg,gi (non-covered
market case); otherwise the demand for the monopoly is 0 if bg > g and 1 if bg < g (covered
marked case).14
Thee market configurations may arise at the price equilibrium. They are characterized
by the following demand function.
14For the remainder of the proof and to save on space I will use the initials NCM for non-covered market
and CM for covered market.
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Dm(pm, nm) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if g < pmnm
1 
pm
nm g
g g if g <
pm
nm  g (NCM)
1 if g   pmnm (CM)
Figure A.20 shows how demand varies with the ratio pmnm for g = 1, i.e.
g
g = 2. In Figure
A.21 it appears clearly that the lower heterogeneity (gg = 2 for the red continuous line, and
1.5 for the blue dashed line), the higher the demand for a given ratio pmnm .
0 1 2 3 4
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Figure A.20: Demand Function of the Monopoly
The monopoly maximizes its profits according to equation (A.4). The Nash equilibrium
is the price subgame is:
p⇤m =
8>><>>:
gnm
2 if
g
g 2 [2,•[ (NCM)
gnm if gg 2 [1, 2[ (CM)
Computing the optimal quality n I obtain:
n⇤m =
8>><>>:
g2
4c if
g
g 2 [2,•[ (NCM)
g
c if
g
g 2 [1, 2[ (CM)
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Heterogeneity
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Figure A.21: Demand Function of the Monopoly and Heterogeneity
Proposition 11 (Monopoly Equilibrium) Depending on the ratio gg , the monopoly equilibrium
is characterized by the following price p⇤m, quality n⇤m, demand D⇤m and profit P⇤m :
2
If
g
g
2 [1, 2[ then
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
n⇤m =
g
c
p⇤m =
g2
c
D⇤m = 1
P⇤m =
g2
2c
If
g
g
2 [2,•[ then
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
n⇤m =
g2
4c
p⇤m =
g3
8c
D⇤m =
1+g
2
P⇤m =
(1+g)
4
32c
Figure A.22 represents the monopoly equilibrium a cost c = 1. It appears clearly that for
the monopoly profits decrease with heterogeneity.
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Figure A.22: Monopoly: Profit
A.5.4.2 Duopoly
The only Nash equilibrium is an asymmetric equilibrium in which one newspaper is of
higher quality than the other newspaper. Newspapers always choose to differentiate because
differentiation allows them to relax price competition while a symmetric equilibrium yields
Bertrand competition. The key point is thus to determine whether the high-quality duopolist
is of higher or of lower quality than the monopolist. It depends on the market coverage
(the extent of business stealing). Here I do not assume market coverage ex ante and I
determine the equilibrium for each market configuration. More precisely, for each market
configuration, I first determine the Nash equilibrium in the price subgame taking as fixed
n2 and n1. I then solve for the Nash equilibrium in the quality subgame.
Price Competition Without loss of generality, I assume that n2 > n1. The marginal
consumer type is bgD = p2 p1n2 n1 provided that bgD 2 hg,gi.
Three market configurations may arise at the price equilibrium. Let consider the demand
for newspaper 1. All consumers with a g such that g < bgD strictly prefer newspaper 1 to
newspaper 2. However, they could refrain from buying. Only consumers with a g such that
g > p1n1 buy newspaper 1. Hence if
p1
n1 < g, all consumers with a g such that g < bgD buy
newspaper 1, the market is covered and the demand for newspaper 1 is bgD   g. On the
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contrary, if p1n1 > g the market is not covered and the demand for newspaper 1 is bgD   p1n1
since all the consumers with a g 2
h
g, p1n1
i
refrain from buying a newspaper. Finally, if
p2
n2 < g then the market is preempted by newspaper 2.
The demand functions are as follows15:
(D1,D2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
⇣bgD   p1n1 ,g  bgD⌘ if g < p1n1  bgD (NCM)⇣bgD   g,g  bgD⌘ if p1n1  g  p2n2 (CM)
(0, 1) if p2n2 < g (Preempted)
The intuition for the preempted market case is as follows: since n2 > n1 all agents prefer
newspaper 2 to newspaper 1 when p1 = p2. Newspaper 2 thus benefits from the possibility
of preempting the market with a limit price: p2 = p1 + g(n2   n1). It is easy to show that
the market is preemted by newspaper 2 whenever gg 2 ]1, 2]. In this case if n2 > n1 only one
newspaper (newspaper 2) is active in the price game.
Nash equilibrium in the price subgame is obtained in two steps. First I compute
equilibrium candidates corresponding to each market configuration. Second I identify the
parameters constellations for which candidates effectively yield the corresponding market
outcome. I identify intervals for the values of gg whose bounds depend on (n1, n2).
Let first consider price equilibrium. The price equilibrium for the non-covered market
case is simply determined by maximizing the profits with respect to the price. For the
covered-market case, there are two possible solutions: a corner and an interior solution.
Price equilibrium are as follows:
15To simplify the notations I am simply using D1 for D1(p1, p2, n1, n2) and D2 for D2(p1, p2, n1, n2).
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(p⇤1, p⇤2) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
⇣
n1(n2 n1)g
4n2 n1 ,
2n2(n2 n1)g
4n2 n1
⌘
if g < p1n1  bgD (NCM)
⇣
gn1,
(n2 n1)g+gn1
2
⌘
if p1n1  g 
p2
n2 (CM corner)
⇣
g 2g
3 (n2   n1) ,
2g g
3 (n2   n1)
⌘
if p1n1  g 
p2
n2 (CM interior)
Given these price equilibrium, it is easy to show that the market is non-covered (NCM)
if gg 2
h
4n2 n1
n2 n1 ,•
h
; that the market is covered with a corner solution (CM corner) if gg 2h
2n2+n1
n2 n1 ,
4n2 n1
n2 n1
h
; and that the market is covered with an interior solution (CM interior) if
g
g 2
i
2, 2n2+n1n2 n1
h
.
The Nash equilibrium in prices is thus a function of the degree of population hetero-
geneity (gg ) and the degree of product differentiation (n1,n2). This appears clearly when
rearranging the conditions. The market is non covered if gg 2
h
4n2 n1
n2 n1 ,•
h
, n1 < n2 a 4a 2 .
The market is covered with a corner solution if 2n2+n1n2 n1 
g
g , n1 < n2 a 2a+1 .
In Figures A.23 and A.24 I plot the prices as a function of heterogeneity for different
degrees of product differentiation (n1,n2). The price of newspaper 1 p1 is given by the
continuous line and the price of newspaper 2 p2 by the dashed line. It appears clearly that
the more product differentiation, the higher the price newspapers charge.
Quality subgame Newspapers choose their quality in order to maximise their profits:
max
nj
Pj = p⇤j Dj
⇣
p⇤j , p⇤j0 , nj, nj0
⌘
  cn
2
j
2
, j = 1, 2
Assuming (n2 > n1), I first determine the local maximum for each of the three market
configurations – the three price equilibrium. (To simplify the notations I note here Pj the
net profit – after deduction of the set-up cost S).
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Figure A.23: Duopoly: Nash Equilibrium in Prices
(P1,P2) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
⇣
n1n2g2(n2 n1)
(4n2 n1)2   c
n21
2 ,
4n22g
2(n2 n1)
(4n2 n1)2   c
n21
2
⌘
if gg 2
h
4n2 n1
n2 n1 ,•
h
✓
gn1
2(n2 n1)
h
(n2   n1)
⇣
g  2g
⌘
  gn1
i
  c n212 , [
gn1+g(n2 n1)]2
4(n2 n1)   c
n21
2
◆
if gg 2
h
2n2+n1
n2 n1 ,
4n2 n1
n2 n1
h
✓
(n2 n1)(g 2g)2
9   c n
2
1
2 ,
(n2 n1)(2g g)2
9   c n
2
2
2
◆
if gg 2
i
2, 2n2+n1n2 n1
h
Let first consider the non-covered market case which corresponds to the parameters
constellation gg 2
h
4n2 n1
n2 n1 ,•
h
. Solving for the first order condition of the two newspapers
and combining them together I obtain:
4n32   8n31   23n1n22 + 12n21n2 = 0 (A.5)
Setting n2 = µn1 and dividing both sides by n31 I rewrite equation (A.5) as follows:
4µ3   23µ2 + 12µ  8 = 0 (A.6)
Equation (A.6) has only one real soluton: µ = 5.25123. Hence the non-covered market
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Figure A.24: Duopoly: Nash Equilibrium in Prices
solution is:
If
g
g
> 4.7
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
n⇤1 = 0.0482
g2
c
n⇤2 = 0.2533
g2
c
Second, I study the covered-market case with an interior solution (gg 2
i
2, 2n2+n1n2 n1
h
). In
this case newspaper 1’s profits are given by:
P1 =
⇣
1  g
⌘2
9
(n2   n1)  cn
2
1
2
These profits are strictly decreasing in n1 so newspaper 1 will produce the lowest possible
amount of n1.
Rearranging condition gg 2
i
2, 2n2 n1n2 n1
h
I obtain that the market is covered with an interior
solution whenever n1 > n2
1 g
1+3g . Newpaper 1 thus chooses n1 = n2
1 g
1+3g . Combining this
value with the first order condition for newspaper 2 the interior solution covered market
equilibria is:
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If
g
g
2 ]2,•[
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
n⇤⇤⇤1 =
1
3c
g(1 g)(2+3g)2
(1+2g)
2
n⇤⇤⇤2 =
1
3c
g(2+3g)
2
(1+2g)
2
When
⇣
g,g
⌘
take values such that a reply is defined for two configurations, I compare
corresponding profits in order to identify the best reply.
Finally I check that the local maximum I obtain are Nash equilibrium. In other words, I
check that (i) newspaper 1 has no incentive to “leapfrog" newspaper 2 and itself produce
the highest quantity; and that (ii) newspaper 2 has no incentive to deviate and produce a
quantity of news lower than that produced by newspaper 1. Comparing the production
choices of newspapers under monopoly and duopoly I obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 12 (Business stealing and returns to scale in news production)
Assume n⇤m is the monopoly equilibrium and (n⇤1 ,n⇤2) is the duopoly equilibrium. 9 l,l such that
If gg   l (high heterogeneity of tastes), n⇤1 < n⇤m < n⇤2 (i.e. under duopoly, one duopolist produces a
lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist, and the other one a higher-quality newspaper).
If gg < l (low heterogeneity of tastes), n
⇤
1 < n
⇤
2 < n
⇤
m (i.e. under duopoly, both duopolists produce a
lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist).
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A.6 Voting Model
The voting model I present in this section is closely related Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a,b). Society must choose between two candidates
by majority voting. There are two states of nature: one in which all voters prefer the
first candidate and a second state where all prefer the other candidate. Voters have state
dependent preferences: there are no partisans. I voluntarily chose to abstract from political
bias considerations. In the benchmark case of my model as well as in the general case
with vertical differentiation, readers do not have political opinions and individuals are only
heterogenous in their preferences for information and entertainment; there is no media bias
and newspapers are pure profit-maximizers. Agents are motivated to vote out of a sense of
ethical obligation. Each agent has an action she should take and receives utility from taking
this action. Hence each agent behaves strategically even though pivotal probabilities play
no role.
I assume that people learn information for their voting decision as a by-product of
newspaper readership. An important number of studies have shown that people often learn
politically relevant facts as a by-product of nonpolitical routines (Prior, 2007). Taking the
example of moviegoers sitting through a newsreel even though they came to be entertained
by the main feature, Downs (1957, p. 223) underline that political information is sometimes
obtained from entertainment-seeking behavior: “entertainment sources sometimes yield
political information as a surplus benefit from what is intended as an entertainment in-
vestment". Focusing on television, Baum (2002, 2003) argues that a mix of entertainment
and politics provides political information to people not sufficiently interested in politics to
watch hard news.16 Similarly, Zukin and Snyder (1984) show that many politically uninter-
ested New Jersey citizens who received their broadcast news from New York City stations
16According to Baum (2002, 2003, 2005), viewers select programs based on the desire to be entertained, but
still learn about politics because the programs they pick also contain information. He shows for example that
some people who would otherwise not watch any news at all pay attention to coverage of wars and foreign
policy crises in soft-news programs (Baum, 2002). He finds in the same way that when presidential candidates
appear on entertainment talk shows, they sway a segment of the population that would otherwise not heard
much about the campaign (Baum, 2005).
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recaled the names of New York mayoral candidates, even though they could not vote for
any of the candidates. In this paper, I assume along the same lines that even readers buying
a newspaper mainly for the entertainment pages it contains acquire information relevant in
the political process from the information pages of the newspaper. This information affects
whether or not they would go to the polls.
A.6.1 Model Set-Up: Nature
There are two equally likely states of Nature Q 2 {0, 1} that are unobservable. There is
a continuum of agents of mass 1 who share a common prior about the state of Nature
(one half). There are two candidates running for the election, candidate 0 and candidate 1:
W = {0, 1}. The candidate that receives the majority of the votes cast is elected (if there is a
tie, each candidate is chosen with equal probability). One can think of the two candidates
as being the “status quo" and the “alternative", and assume that there is some uncertainty
about the cost of implementing the alternative which can be either high or low.
A.6.2 Model Set-Up: Consumers
Consumers – which are also the potential newspaper buyers described in the previous
section – take two actions. First they choose whether to buy a newspaper, according to
the utility function described in more details above, and next they choose whether to vote:
s 2 S = {a, 0, 1}, where a denotes abstention, 0 denotes vote for candidate 0 and 1 vote for
candidate 1. There is no partisan. Voters have state dependent preferences, i.e. given a pair
(w, q), w 2 W and q 2 Q, the utility of a potential voter is:
U (w, q) =
8>><>>:
0, if w 6= q
U > 0, if w = q
Every voter receives a message m 2 M = {0, 1, f}. Voters who receive a message 0
or 1 are informed and all others are uninformed. As underlined above, I assume that the
information acquisition is exogenous in the voting stage of the game: voters who buy a
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newspaper are informed and all others are uninformed.17 I call q 2 (0, 1) the fraction of
informed voters in the population. Among the informed voters, the fraction which observes
the message m 2 {0, 1} in state m is r 2 (.5, 1]. When r is close to 0.5 the message is a
very noisy signal of the true state, while when r is close to 1 the message almost perfectly
conveys the true state.
I assume that r is an increasing function of n (the quality of the newspaper) s.t. r (0) =
0.5 and r0 (n) > 0. In other words, the higher the quality of the newspaper, the better the
quality of the signal received by the reader. Finally, there is a uniformly distributed cost of
voting C ⇠ U  0,C .
A.6.3 Timing of the Game
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Nature draws q 2 Q = {0, 1}.
2. Newspapers choose their quality n and price p.
3. Voters choose a 2 A = {B,NB} (whether to buy a newspaper, and which one).
4. Voters choose s 2 {a, 0, 1} (voting decision).
5. The state of nature is revealed.
I solve the game by backward induction.
A.6.4 Solving the Model
Proposition 13 shows how information provided by newspapers affects voting behavior.
Proposition 13 (Less information leads to rational abstention)
(i) Only informed voters (reading a newspaper) vote.
17A possible extension will be to endogenize the acquisition of information. However it will make the model
much less tractable without modifying its main predictions.
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(ii) Among informed voters, if there are different degrees of information (two newspapers with different
n competing on the market), then only the informed voters reading the higher-quality newspaper vote.
(iii) There is a cut-off point such that better informed voters with voting costs above this threshold
should abstain. This cut-off point is increasing in the quality of the newspaper n.
This is consistent with existing empirical evidence showing that individuals with high
level of information are much more likely to vote than those with low levels (Converse, 2006;
Parlfrey and Poole, 1987).
Combining Propositions 1 and 13, I obtain the following predictions on how the media
environment affects political behavior.
Prediction 1 (High heterogeneity)
If heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality is high, then
(i) Turnout is higher under duopoly than under monopoly.
(ii) Voters are better informed under duopoly than under monopoly.
Prediction 2 (Low heterogeneity)
If heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality is low, then
(i) Turnout is lower under duopoly than under monopoly.
(ii) Voters are less informed under duopoly than under monopoly.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data
B.1.1 Data on Mission Centers Location and Investments
The Geography Atlas of Protestant missions, published in 1903, was the result of an extensive
work of localizing all the missionary stations around the world and reporting all the activities
they were investing in. Of all the reports, conducted in 1896, 1903, 1911 and 1925, this one
(1903) is the most precise and extensive version as investments, denomination, number of
students, teachers (both native and foreign) and missionaries are reported for each mission
localized on the maps.
The Atlas contains maps of all the regions in the world and locates all the missions
active in 1903. Figure B.2 provides an example of these maps. All the missions are uniquely
identified in a statistical index providing detailed information on the type of infrastructure
available and the number of workers and students. Figure B.1 shows a section of this
statistical index.
List of variables available for each mission station
• Latitude: Latitude of the mission settlement. This variable was constructed from our
geocoding work and is only available for sub-Saharan Africa
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• Longitude: Longitude of the mission settlement. This variable was constructed from
our geocoding work and is only available for sub-Saharan Africa
• Society: Society to which the mission is affiliated
• Denomination Denomination of the society, if relevant
• Id: Unique identifier per mission
• Name: Name of the mission’s location as reported in the Atlas
• Printing: Number of printing presses in the mission
• Date: Date of arrival of the mission
• Anti foot-binding society: Binary variable equal to one if mission belonged to an
anti-foot-binding society
• Church building: Number of Churches in the settlement.
• Blind School: Binary variable equal to one if mission had a school for the blind or
conducted special work for the blind
• Deafmute school: Binary varuable equal to one if mission had a school for the
deaf-mute or conducted special work for the deaf-mute.
• Female helper: Number of female helper workers
• Insane Asylum: Binary variable equal to one if mission had an insane asylum
• High School: Binary variable equal to one if mission had a high school infrastructure.
• Male Foreign Missionary: Number of male foreign missionaries working in the
mission.
• Literary Worker: Number of literary workers.
• Orphanage: Binary variable equal to one if mission had an orphanage
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• Sunday-School: Binary variable equal to one if mission had a Sunday-school
• Rendez-Vous for training new missionaries: Binary variable equal to one if mission
had a center for training new missionaries
• Temperance Society: Binary variable equal to one if mission belonged to a temperance
society
• Number of Students: Number of students in the mission
• Foundling asylum or nursery mission: Binary variable equal to one if mission had a
foundling asylum
• Refuge for opium victims Binary variable equal to one if mission had a refuge for
opium victims
• Theological school Number of theological schools in the mission
• Native male teachers Number of native male teachers in the mission
• Medical or nurses’ class or school Binary variable equal to one if mission thaught
medical or nurse’s class
• Bible society: Binary variable equal to one if mission was a Bible society
• Dispensary: Number of dispensaries in the mission
• Leper asylum: Binary variable equal to one if mission had a leper asylun
• Woman who is unmarried or a widow: Number of unmarried or widow women in
the mission (probably from the country of origin of the mission).
• Society of young people: Binary variable equal to one if mission belonged to a society
of young people
• Day School: Number of elementary school infrastructure
• College or university: Number of college or university infrastructure
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• Wife of a missionary: Total number of women who were the wife of a missionary
• Hospital Binary variable equal to one if mission had a hospital
• Kindergarden Number of kindergarden infrastructure
• Anti-opium society Binary variable equal to one if mission belonged to an anti-opium
society
Figure B.1: Part of the Statistical index from the Geography Atlas of Protestant missions
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Figure B.2: Plate Representing all the Missionary Stations in 1903, West Africa
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B.1.2 Population Data
(a) 1700 (b) 1800
(c) 1900 (d) 2000
Notes: Population density in 1700 and 1800 varies between 0 and 20 in most of the sub-Saharan territory. Hence
the low level of variation observed in the images.
Figure B.3: Population Density from HYDE 3.1
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B.1.3 Light Data
Figure B.4: Light Density at Night in Africa
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B.1.4 Afrobarometer Data
We use data from the 2005 Afrobarometer survey, which is a comparative series of national
surveys on attitudes towards democracy, markets, and civil society in Africa. Surveys
contain representative information at the individual level of attitudes towards political and
social outcomes as well as individual evaluations of living standards. Table B.1 gives a brief
description of all the variables from the Afrobarometer used in our analysis.
A precise description of the survey, variables and sampling methods is available on
the Afrobarometer website, http://www.afrobarometer.org. Similarly, all the ques-
tionnaires used for the construction of the dataset are available on the http://www.
afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/questionairres website.
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B.1.5 Controls
Historical Characteristics
• Cities 1400: indicator variable that equals one if there was a city located on the land
inhabited by each ethnic group. Source: Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) using data from
Chandler (1987) on the location of African cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants in
year 1400.
• Distance to 1400 City: the distance is computed by the authors using ArcGIS. Source:
The information on the location of cities in 1400 is from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
• Distance to 1800 City: the distance is computed by the authors using ArcGIS. Source:
The information on the location of cities in 1800 is from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
• Distance to Catholic mission in 1889: the distance is computed by the authors using
ArcGIs. Source: The information on the location of missions in 1889 is from Nunn
(2009a). He geocoded the original map from Béthune (1889).
• Explorer contact: indicator variable that equals one if a European explorer traveled
through land historically occupied by the ethnic group (the variable captures explo-
ration routes between 1768 and 1894). Source: Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) using
information on the location of railway lines in the first decade of the twentieth century
from Company (1911).
• Initial population density: The average population density estimate in the 18th Cen-
tury in a buffer of 10 km around each location. From the HYDE 3.1 database.
• Malaria ecology of the land: Malaria stability index. The index takes into account
the prevalence and type of mosquitoes endemic to a region, their human biting rate,
their daily survival rate, and their incubation period. It has been constructed for
0.5-degree-by-0.5-degree grid-cells globally. Source: Kiszewski et al. (2004).
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• Railway contact: indicator variable that equals one if any part of the railway network
was built on land historically inhabited by the ethnic group. Source: Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011) using information on the location of railway lines in the first
decade of the twentieth century from Company (1911).
• Slave exports, per capita: estimates of the number of slaves taken from each ethnic
group disaggregated at the ethnicity level. These estimates were constructed by
combining data on the total number of slaves shipped from all ports and regions
of Africa with data on the slaves’ ethnic identities. The estimates cover Africa’s
transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades between 1400 and 1900. Source: Nunn
(2008).
Geographic Characteristics
• Accumulated temperature in the year: accumulated temperature or temperature
sums are calculated for each grid cell by accumulating daily average temperatures
for days when average tempature is above a certain threshold temperature. Source:
Global Agro-Ecological Zones data.
• Annual precipitation level: the annual precipitation level data refers to total yearly
precipitation. The model used to build this data has been applied considering the
baseline period 1961-1990. A detailed description of calculation procedures used to
build this data can be found in the GAEZ v.3.0 Global Agro Ecological Zones - Model
Documentation (Fischer et al., 2000). Source: Global Agro-Ecological Zones data.
• Average elevation: in meters. Source: Nunn (2008) using data from Parker (1997).
• Distance to the capital: the distance is computed by the authors using ArcGIS.
• Distance to the coast: the distance to the coast is identified by the authors using the
Proximity Utility in ArcGIS.
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• Number of agriculture growing days per year: number of days during the year
when temperature regime and moisture supply are conducive to crop growth and
development. This period is also termed the “length of the growing period" (LGP). It
is a proxy for the agroclimatic potential productivity of land. The LGP is determined
based on prevailing temperatures and water balance calculations for a reference crop.
Source: Global Agro-Ecological Zones data.
• Population density in 2005: population density of the respondent’s neighborhood.
Source: Afrobarometer (2005).
• Share of land within 10 km of water: in percent. Source: Nunn (2010) using data
from the Digital Chart of the World (DCW).
• Suitability for rainfed crops: rainfed suitability has been calculated for nine crop
groups that are important to most farming systems in developing countries, namely
cereals, fibre crops, oil crops, pulses, roots and tubers, stimulants, sugar crops, tree
fruits and vegetables. The algorithm examines in each gridcell all the crop types
belonging to a particular crop group. Among these it determines the crop type that
maximizes agronomic suitability. Source: Global Agro-Ecological Zones data.
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B.1.6 Newspaper Market
Newspaper Data The cross-country newspaper dataset we build relies on various sources:
• Tudesq (1995): Feuilles d’Afrique: étude de la presse de l’Afrique sub-saharienne.
• Daubert (2009): La presse écrite d’Afrique francophone en question: essai nourri par l’essor
de la presse française.
• The Standing Conference on Library Material on Africa (SCOLMA): it provides an
inventory of the available African newspapers in archives collected in 1973.
• The Directory of African Media (Maja-Pearce, 1996): digitized by the authors.
• The African book world and press: a directory (Zell, 1980): digitized by the authors.
• The Willings press guide (Redman and Group, 1993, 2003, 2012): digitized by the
authors (one issue every ten years).
• ICON: using a web-spider, we collect all the data from the Icon database which provides
information (first and last date published, title and frequency) on newspapers around
the world. This information comes from all the records available in a precise set of
institutions: the British Library, the Center for Research Libraries, Harvard University,
the Library of Congress, the Library and Archives of Canada, the New York Public
Library, the New York State Library, the Online Computer Library Center Inc., the
University of Florida, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Southern California, the University
of Washington.
• Readex: We collect the summary data from the Readex database. Over several decades,
Readex has published many of the most widely used collections of primary source
research materials in academic libraries, first as Readex Microprint Corporation and
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since 1984 as a division of NewsBank. These digital collections include information
for 40 African newspapers from 1800 to 1922.1
We merge the information from all these datasets/books together to build a consistent
database of African newspapers through history. This dataset is a panel from 1800 to 2012
with the number of newspapers published each year in each sub-Saharan country and their
date of creation. One caveat of this dataset is that some newspapers (especially small local
newspapers) may be missing. However we think that it provides an interesting overview of
the state of the newspaper market and of its evolution over time.
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Notes: The x-axis represents the country average distance of Afrobarometer to the closest mission with printing
press. The y-axis represents the country total number of newspapers in the dataset. Historical newspaper
supply data is described in the Appendix, section A.
Figure B.5: Distance to the Printing Press and Number of Newspapers
1http://www.readex.com
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Notes: The x-axis represents the country average distance of the villages in the Afrobarometer to the closest
mission with a printing press. The y-axis represents the publication date of the first newspaper in the country.
Historical newspaper supply data is described in the Appendix, section A
Figure B.6: Distance to the Printing Press and Publication Date of the First Newspaper
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Table B.1: Variables from Afrobarometer, Description
Type Description
Outcomes
Register BV Respondent registered for previous elections
Turnout BV Respondent voted at previous elections
Actions BV Respondent takes actions as citizens (attends to local
meetings, joins others to raise an issue or attends to
marches)
Listen BV Respondent feels people listen to him for political
discussions
Satisfaction BV Respondent is satisfied with the country’s democratic
environment
Read News BV Respondent reads news on a monthly basis
Listen News BV Respondent listens to the news on the radio at least
once a month
Watch News BV Respondent watches the news on TV at least once a
month
Controls
Education DI Level of education from none (0) to graduate studies
(9)
Cash Constraints DI How often respondent has gone without cash income
in the year from never (0) to always (4).
Water Constraints DI How often respondent has gone without enough
clean water for home use in the year from never (0)
to always (4).
Protestant Today BV Individual is Protestant
Urban BV Individual lives in an urban area
Notes: DI refers to Discrete Index, BV to Binary Variable
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B.1.7 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.2: Summary Statistics, Afrobarometer Data
All Sample 150km
Mean sd Mean sd
Read News 0.331 0.471 0.355 0.479
Listen News 0.858 0.349 0.857 0.350
Watch News 0.451 0.498 0.443 0.497
Education 2.997 1.998 3.176 1.919
Female 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.500
Age 36.519 14.680 36.465 14.698
Cash Constraints 2.099 1.345 2.065 1.350
Water Constraints 1.168 1.397 1.107 1.365
Observations 18469 13286
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Table B.3: Historical and Geographical Characteristics of Printing Presses With and Without a Publication
Record
No Publication Publication Diff/se
Geographic Characteristics
Accumulated Temp /1000 15.320 11.582 3.738
(5.989)
Annual Precipitation/ 1000 1.317 1.434 -0.117
(0.306)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops 5.750 4.000 1.750⇤
(0.704)
Number of Growing Days / 100 1.876 2.429 -0.553
(0.344)
Distance to Capital, 100 km 2.497 2.773 -0.275
(0.855)
Distance to the Coast, 100 km 1.307 3.828 -2.521⇤
(1.102)
Malaria Ecology 7.618 12.302 -4.685
(3.609)
Historical Characteristics
Slave Exports, per capita 0.058 0.032 0.026
(0.047)
Railway Contact 0.083 0.125 -0.042
(0.122)
Explorer Contact 0.250 0.312 -0.062
(0.179)
Initial Population Density 17.611 10.872 6.739
(8.418)
Distance to 1400 City, 100 km 6.097 7.624 -1.527
(1.678)
Distance to 1800 City, 100 km 8.963 12.010 -3.047
(3.203)
Observations 28
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares geographical and historical characteristics of
missions with a printing press depending on whether they had a publication record in 1923 or not. Column 1
presents the results for missions with no publication record. Column 2 presents the results for missions with a
publicatin record. In Column 3 we perform a t-test on the equality of means (standard errors in parenthesis).
Variables are described in the Online Appendix.
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Table B.4: Investments of Printing Presses With and Without a Publication Record
No Publication Publication Diff/se
Mission Characteristics
Arrival Date 1866 1876 -10
(10)
Bible Society 0.58 0.19 0.40
(0.23)
Number of Native Workers 2.58 1.19 1.40
(2.62)
Total Population 431 400 31
(230)
Investment in Education
Schools 2.33 1.12 1.21
(0.94)
Number of Students 408 389 19
(228)
Schools per Student (%) 2.52 0.47 2.05
(1.44)
Teachers per Student (%) 12.44 24.00 -11.57
(15.44)
Investments in Health
Health Facilities 1.67 1.31 0.35
(0.68)
Physicians per Capita (%) 0.04 1.63 -1.59
(1.81)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) 0.50 3.66 -3.16
(3.60)
Observations 28
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares investments‘ of missions with a printing press
depending on whether they had a publication record in 1923 or not. Column 1 presents the results for missions
with no publication record. Column 2 presents the results for missions with a publicatin record. In Column 3
we perform a t-test on the equality of means (standard errors in parenthesis). Variables are described in the
Online Appendix.
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B.2 Additional Results
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Notes: The graph plots the average light density in a 10 km buffer around each town (in logs) over the distance
to the printing press (in logs). The sample is restricted to towns located closer than 150 km away to a mission.
Figure B.7: Proximity to a Printing Press and Light Density
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Table B.5: Distance to a Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Baseline OLS Estimation, Reporting all
the Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All 200km 150km 100 km
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.014⇤⇤ -0.015⇤⇤ -0.013⇤ -0.015⇤⇤ -0.013⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance Mission 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Education 0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.066⇤⇤⇤ 0.063⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Clinic in Town 0.028⇤⇤⇤ 0.028⇤⇤⇤ 0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Protestant Today -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Catholic Now -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 0.004 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Water Constraints 0.005⇤ 0.005⇤ 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Cash Constraints -0.020⇤⇤⇤ -0.020⇤⇤⇤ -0.020⇤⇤⇤ -0.020⇤⇤⇤ -0.018⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age -0.002⇤ -0.002⇤ -0.002 -0.002 -0.002⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.070⇤⇤⇤ -0.070⇤⇤⇤ -0.072⇤⇤⇤ -0.072⇤⇤⇤ -0.077⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log Distance Capital City -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
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Ethnic Pop density 2005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Slave Export -0.003 -0.002 0.016⇤ 0.014 0.015
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Distance to the Coast 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial Population Density 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Pop Density 2005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Ethnic Initial Pop Density -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Malaria 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Elevation, over 100 0.005⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤ 0.005⇤ 0.004⇤ 0.005⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 15086 15086 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No No
Clusters 1809 1809 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.360 0.360 0.357 0.353 0.357
F-Statistic 205.5 201.6 185.4 174.9 158.3
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an
individual. The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
village. The baseline controls are the individual-, village-, and ethnicity-level controls described in the text. All
specifications include country fixed effects. In columns 1 and 2 we present results for the entire sample. In
columns 3 to 5 the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living 200 km (column 3), 150 km (column 4)
and 100 km (column 5) away from a historical mission settlement.
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Table B.6: Distance to a Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Baseline OLS Estimation, Standardized
(beta) Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All 200km 150km 100 km
beta/se beta/se beta/se beta/se beta/se
Distance Printing Press -0.032⇤⇤ -0.034⇤⇤ -0.028⇤ -0.034⇤⇤ -0.031⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance Mission 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Education 0.274⇤⇤⇤ 0.274⇤⇤⇤ 0.263⇤⇤⇤ 0.250⇤⇤⇤ 0.243⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 0.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.100⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Clinic in Town 0.029⇤⇤⇤ 0.029⇤⇤⇤ 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Protestant Today -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Catholic Now -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 0.004 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Water Constraints 0.013⇤ 0.013⇤ 0.008 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Cash Constraints -0.056⇤⇤⇤ -0.056⇤⇤⇤ -0.056⇤⇤⇤ -0.057⇤⇤⇤ -0.050⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age -0.055⇤ -0.055⇤ -0.059 -0.057 -0.071⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 0.042 0.041 0.044 0.043 0.059
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.074⇤⇤⇤ -0.074⇤⇤⇤ -0.075⇤⇤⇤ -0.075⇤⇤⇤ -0.080⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log Distance Capital City -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.024 -0.031⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
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Ethnic Pop density 2005 -0.014 -0.014 -0.021 -0.018 -0.023
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Slave Export -0.007 -0.005 0.036⇤ 0.032 0.035
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Distance to the Coast 0.015 0.010 -0.001 -0.004 -0.023
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial Population Density 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.001 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Pop Density 2005 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Ethnic Initial Pop Density -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.000 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Malaria 0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Elevation, over 100 0.054⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤ 0.057⇤ 0.052⇤ 0.055⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 15086 15086 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No No
Clusters 1809 1809 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.360 0.360 0.357 0.353 0.357
F-Statistic 205.5 201.6 185.4 174.9 158.3
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an
individual. The dependent variable is newspaper readership. The baseline controls are the individual-, village-,
and ethnicity-level controls described in the text. All specifications include country fixed effects. In columns
1 and 2 we present results for the entire sample. In columns 3 to 5 the sample is sequentially restricted to
individuals living 200 km (column 3), 150 km (column 4) and 100 km (column 5) away from a historical mission
settlement.
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Table B.7: Missions Characteristics in sub-Saharan Africa and “Society PP", OLS Estimation
(1)
Society PP
b se
Geographic Characteristics
Accumulated Temp /1000 -0.000 (0.000)
Annual Precipitation/ 1000 -0.014 (0.033)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops -0.004 (0.006)
Number of Growing Days / 100 0.001 (0.003)
Distance to Capital, 100 km -0.008 (0.007)
Distance to the Coast, 100 km -0.004 (0.004)
Malaria Ecology 0.005 (0.004)
Historical Characteristics
Slave Exports, per capita -0.012 (0.019)
Railway Contact -0.036 (0.034)
Explorer Contact 0.006 (0.023)
Initial Population Density 0.000 (0.000)
Distance to 1400 City, 100 km -0.006 (0.006)
Distance to 1800 City, 100 km 0.002 (0.002)
Mission Characteristics
Arrival Date 0.001 (0.001)
Bible Society -0.076 (0.072)
Number of Native Workers 0.000 (0.002)
Total Population -0.000 (0.002)
Investment in Education
Schools 0.030 (0.029)
Number of Students 0.000 (0.002)
Schools per Student (%) 0.011 (0.011)
Teachers per Student (%) -0.000 (0.000)
Investments in Health
Health Facilities 0.009 (0.012)
Physicians per Capita (%) 0.000 (0.003)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) -0.004 (0.004)
Observations 371
Country FE Yes
Clusters (Society) 48
R2 0.209
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table reports OLS estimates of mission-level regression of the share
of missions from the mission’s society equipped with printing presses in all the regions of the world outside
sub-Saharan Africa on mission characteristics, investments, geographical and historical characteristics. The unit
of observation is a mission. Standard errors are clustered by society.
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Table B.8: Missions’ Denomination
No Printing Printing Total
Anglican 25.2 29.6 25.3
Baptist 2.2 11.1 2.5
Disciples of Christ 0.3 0.0 0.3
Free Church 1.5 3.7 1.6
Independent 5.7 0.0 5.5
Lutheran 27.5 14.8 27.0
Methodist 17.0 14.8 16.9
Multidenominational 4.6 0.0 4.4
Presbyterian 8.3 22.2 8.9
Quaker 0.6 0.0 0.6
United Brethern in Christ 4.6 3.7 4.6
Undenominational 1.2 0.0 1.2
United Church 1.2 0.0 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The table reports the share of the missions in our sample from each denomination. In Column 1 we
report this share for the missions without printing press; in Column 2 for the missions with a printing press;
and in Column 3 for all the missions taken together.
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Table B.9: Determinants of the Probability of Having a Printing Press at the Mission Level, OLS Estimation
(1)
Mission PP
b se
Society PP 0.088⇤⇤ (0.033)
Geographic Characteristics
Accumulated Temp /1000 -0.001 (0.001)
Annual Precipitation/ 1000 0.154⇤⇤⇤ (0.054)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops -0.009 (0.012)
Number of Growing Days / 100 -0.013⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)
Distance to Capital, 100 km 0.002 (0.006)
Distance to the Coast, 100 km 0.007 (0.004)
Malaria Ecology 0.005 (0.003)
Historical Characteristics
Slave Exports, per capita -0.034⇤⇤ (0.015)
Railway Contact -0.031 (0.025)
Explorer Contact 0.024 (0.043)
Initial Population Density -0.000⇤⇤ (0.000)
Distance to 1400 City, 100 km 0.004 (0.003)
Distance to 1800 City, 100 km -0.000 (0.002)
Mission Characteristics
Arrival Date -0.001 (0.001)
Bible Society 0.005 (0.057)
Number of Native Workers -0.014⇤⇤ (0.006)
Total Population 0.014⇤⇤ (0.006)
Investment in Education
Schools 0.015 (0.024)
Number of Students -0.014⇤⇤ (0.006)
Schools per Student (%) -0.007⇤ (0.004)
Teachers per Student (%) 0.000 (0.001)
Other Investments
Health Facilities 0.034 (0.032)
Physicians per Capita (%) 0.006 (0.013)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) 0.005 (0.004)
Observations 371
Country FE Yes
Clusters (Society) 48
R2 0.373
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table reports OLS estimates of mission-level regression of a
binary variable indicating whether the mission has a printing press on mission characteristics, investments,
geographical and historical characteristics as well as on the share of missions from the mission’s society equipped
with printing presses in all the regions of the world outside sub-Saharan Africa. The unit of observation is a
mission. Standard errors are clustered by society.
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Table B.10: Impact of the Proximity to a Printing Press, IV Estimation: 40 km Radius
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Distance Printing Press
Village Printing (40) -0.609** -0.591** -0.444*
(0.199) (0.219) (0.233)
Panel B: Dependent Variable is News Readership
Distance Printing Press -0.050** -0.046** -0.049**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Observations 11925 10583 9059
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1401 1267 1093
R2 First Stage 0.629 0.627 0.625
F First Stage 51.390 52.433 49.811
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by village. The table reports the first and second stage of the IV estimation of the impact of
the distance to a printing press on newspaper readership. The distance to a printing press is instrumented
by Village Printingj(40). The construction of the variables “Village Printingj(50)" and "Denomination PPm" is
described in more details in the text. The controls are the individual-, village-, ethnicity- and mission-level
controls described in the text.
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Table B.11: Impact of the Proximity to a Printing Press, IV Estimation: 60 km Radius
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Distance Printing Press
Village Printing (60) -0.498*** -0.479** -0.386**
(0.150) (0.166) (0.181)
Panel B: Dependent Variable is News Readership
Distance Printing Press -0.041** -0.037* -0.038*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Observations 11925 10583 9059
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1401 1267 1093
R2 First Stage 0.639 0.635 0.630
F First Stage 58.725 62.539 58.945
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by village. The table reports the first and second stage of the IV estimation of the impact of
the distance to a printing press on newspaper readership. The distance to a printing press is instrumented
by Village Printingj(60). The construction of the variables “Village Printingj(50)" and "Denomination PPm" is
described in more details in the text. The controls are the individual-, village-, ethnicity- and mission-level
controls described in the text.
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Table B.12: Instrumental Variable: Distance to the Printing Press and Light Density: 40 km Radius
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Distance Printing Press
Village Printing (40) -0.828*** -0.805*** -0.768***
(0.240) (0.241) (0.227)
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Light Density
Distance Printing Press -0.597** -0.681** -0.647**
(0.263) (0.291) (0.304)
Observations 1428 1293 1118
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 346 343 335
R2 First Stage 0.804 0.800 0.800
F First Stage 140.623 110.505 58.996
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports IV estimates. The unit of observation is the town. The
controls are the average individual (per village)-, village-, ethnicity- and mission-level controls described in the
text. The dependent variable is the log of average light density in a 10km buffer around the town.
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Table B.13: Instrumental Variable: Distance to the Printing Press and Light Density: 50 km Radius
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Distance Printing Press
Village Printing (50) -0.864*** -0.860*** -0.836***
(0.199) (0.199) (0.191)
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Light Density
Distance Printing Press -0.545** -0.608** -0.570*
(0.252) (0.279) (0.294)
Observations 1428 1293 1118
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 346 343 335
R2 First Stage 0.806 0.802 0.802
F First Stage 142.030 111.244 91.390
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports IV estimates. The unit of observation is the town. The
controls are the average individual (per village)-, village-, ethnicity- and mission-level controls described in the
text. The dependent variable is the log of average light density in a 10km buffer around the town.
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Table B.14: Instrumental Variable: Distance to the Printing Press and Light Density: 60 km Radius
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Distance Printing Press
Village Printing (60) -0.851*** -0.879*** -0.874***
(0.189) (0.189) (0.194)
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Light Density
Distance Printing Press -0.517** -0.557** -0.511*
(0.245) (0.269) (0.285)
Observations 1428 1293 1118
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 346 343 335
R2 First Stage 0.807 0.803 0.803
F First Stage 143.773 117.279 66.379
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports IV estimates. The unit of observation is the town. The
controls are the average individual (per village)-, village-, ethnicity- and mission-level controls described in the
text. The dependent variable is the log of average light density in a 10km buffer around the town.
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B.3 Robustness Checks
B.3.1 Matching Strategy
Using a Logit model, we regress the binary variable indicating whether missions are endowed with
a printing press on all the observable characteristics available at the mission level (these observables
correspond to the variables reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4). From this regression we compute the
propensity score, which is the estimated probability of having a printing press. We then match each
mission with a printing press to the mission with the closest propensity score using a one-to-one
matching. The missions matched are extremely similar to the missions with a printing press but had
not imported it in 1903. We call the sample of missions similar to those with a printing press but
without a printing press PP. The sample of missions with a printing press is called PP. Tables B.15
and B.16 show respectively the results of the regression from which we compute the propensity score
and the balance check comparing samples PP and PP. There are no significant differences between
the two samples.
Each city from the Afrobarometer is then associated to the closest mission in the sample
n
PP [ PP
o
.
We define a binary variable “Treat" equal to one if a city is associated to a mission that did import
the printing press and to zero otherwise. We construct the treatment area as follows: we decompose
the map of Africa as a Voronoi diagram using the missions in
n
PP [ PP
o
as generators (Figure B.8).
A Voronoi Diagram is a way of dividing space into a number of regions (Thiessen Polygons). A
set of points (called seeds, sites, or generators) is specified beforehand and for each seed there is
a corresponding region consisting of all the points closer to that seed than to any other. For each
Thiessen Polygon, the binary variable “Printing Treatment" indicates whether the generator point
(mission) was indeed endowed with a printing press.
Equation (B.1) describes the identification equation:
Newsijec = d1Distance Missionj + d2Treatj
+ d3Treatj ⇥Distance Missionj
+ X 0i b2 + Y 0j b3 + Z0eb4 + dc + uijec
(B.1)
“Distance Mission" is the distance from town j to the closest mission station in the sam-
ple
n
PP [ PP
o
. “Treat * Distance Mission" is the crossed effect of “Treat" and “Distance Mission".
The controls are the same as in Table 2.5b.
Table B.17 gives the results of the estimation of equation (B.1). The effect of proximity to the
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Table B.15: Estimation of the Propensity Score: Importing the Printing Press and Missions Characteristics,
Logit
(1)
Mission PP
b se
Annual Precipitation level 0.000⇤⇤ (0.000)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops -0.016 (0.216)
Number of agriculture growing days -0.000⇤⇤ (0.000)
Accumulated Temperature -0.000 (0.000)
Historical Characteristics
Distance to 1400 City, 100 km 0.046 (0.073)
Distance to 1800 City, 100 km -0.048 (0.040)
Mission Characteristics
Bible Society -0.196 (0.728)
Number of Native Workers -0.213⇤⇤ (0.084)
Total Population 0.157⇤⇤⇤ (0.056)
Investment in Education
Schools 0.261 (0.327)
Number of Students -0.157⇤⇤⇤ (0.056)
Schools per Student (%) 0.129 (0.110)
Other Investments
Health Facilities 0.323 (0.301)
Physicians per Capita (%) 0.065⇤⇤ (0.029)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) 0.010 (0.040)
Observations 508
Country FE Yes Yes
Clusters (Society) 64
Pseudo R2 0.417
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports the first stage of the matching strategy. This first stage
estimates the propensity score at the mission-level. The propensity score is the estimated probability of importing
the printing press from the logit regression of the binary variable indicating whether a mission imported the
printing press on mission’s historical and geographical characteristics as well as mission investments.
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Table B.16: Propensity Score Matching: Balancing Test
No printing Printing Diff/se
Annual Precipitation level 1235.559 1484.559 -249.000
(243.329)
Suitability for Rainfed Crops 4.294 4.353 -0.059
(0.586)
Number of agriculture growing days 196.412 240.000 -43.588
(24.257)
Accumulated Temperature 16147.588 11601.765 4545.824
(5797.209)
Historical Characteristics
Distance to 1400 City, 100 km 7.764 6.886 0.878
(1.825)
Distance to 1800 City, 100 km 12.401 9.555 2.846
(3.107)
Mission Characteristics
Bible Society 0.353 0.471 -0.118
(0.228)
Number of Native Workers 0.000 2.941 -2.941
(2.078)
Total Population 473.000 507.059 -34.059
(301.932)
Investment in Education
Schools 1.412 1.941 -0.529
(0.926)
Number of Students 460.882 489.765 -28.882
(300.122)
Schools per Student (%) 2.716 1.951 0.766
(1.731)
Other Investments
Health Facilities 1.294 1.647 -0.353
(0.505)
Physicians per Capita (%) 1.596 1.533 0.063
(2.074)
Health Facilities per Capita (%) 4.481 3.438 1.044
(3.941)
Observations 34
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table compares geographical and historical characteristics of
missions with a printing press and the missions matched using the propensity score. Column 1 presents the
results for missions without a printing press. Column 2 presents the results for missions with a printing press.
In Column 3 we perform a t-test on the equality of means (standard errors in parenthesis). Variables are
described in the Online Appendix.
328
closest mission from
n
PP [ PP
o
is also more robust if the closest mission did invest in a printing
press. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect is comparable to the one in the previous section.
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Figure B.8: Voronoi Diagram of Africa using Historical Mission Settlements with the Printing Press and
Similar to those with the Printing Press as Generators
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Table B.17: Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Controlling for Observables, Matching Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
200 km 150 km 100 km
b/se b/se b/se
Treat * Distance Mission -0.018⇤ -0.020⇤ -0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Printing Treatment 0.111⇤ 0.108⇤ 0.080
(0.060) (0.062) (0.067)
Distance Mission 0.001 -0.005 -0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.360 0.357 0.363
F-Statistic 126.6 118.4 108.5
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors are clustered by village. The baseline controls
are the individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls described in the text and the distance to the closest
mission without a printing press. All specifications include country fixed effects. The additional controls are
the determinants of the location of mission stations, geographic characteristics, mission characteristics and
investments and the distance to the closest mission settlements with different kinds of investments described
in the text. In Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living 200 km (Column 1),
150 km (Column 2) and 100 km (Column 3) away from a historical mission settlement.
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B.3.2 Selection on Observables
Suppose there is a set of unobservable explanatory variablesW 0. Since these variables are unobserved,
they are not included in regression (2.1). The proportional selection assumption (PSA) states that
dCWX =
CW0X
VW0
. X is the treatment variable (here distance to the printing press), W is the set of
observed covariates, CW 0X is the covariance ofW 0 and X and VW 0 is the variance ofW 0. d is a measure
of the relationship between CWX and CW 0X . The PSA assumption is key in the approach as it states
that the relationship between the observed covariates W and the treatment X is informative about
the relationship between the unobserved covariates W 0 and X, from which the bias is coming.
Consider the following three regressions:
News = gX+W +W 0 + #max (M-max)
News = xX+ M+ #1 (M-1)
News = LX+W + #2 (M-2)
Let Rmax be the R-squared of the full model regression (M-max). R2 is the R-squared of the
regression (M-2) including all the observed covariates. R1 is the R-squared of regression (M-1)
including only a restricted set of covariates M. M is a set of observed controls that do not have a
related unobserved component and are orthogonal to W and W 0(Oster, 2013).
According to Oster (2013), under the PSA and when d is close to one, B(d) = d (x L)(Rmax R2)R2 R1 is
(i) equal to the unobserved bias if d = 1; (ii) a close upper bound on the bias if d < 1; (iii) and a close
lower bound on the bias if d > 1.2
We can the bias due to unobserved variables from the movements in the treatment effect due
to the added controls using the ratio B(d). However, to compute the ratio it would be necessary
to know the true value of Rmax. Because there is probably some randomness in the movements of
the outcome, it is unlikely that Rmax is equal to one. Oster (2013) uses the R-squared from different
randomized experiments as a measure of Rmax. We cannot use the same approach because we
analyze historical events. In the literature of the long-term consequences of historical events, in
particular of Protestantism (Becker and Woessmann, 2009) and the diffusion of the printing press
(Dittmar, 2011) the R-squared rarely exceed 0.65 and are usually close to 0.5. In our regressions,
the R-squared never exceed 0.5. Thus, in our computations we choose 0.6 and 0.7, two conservative
2If W is selected randomly from {W,W 0}, then d = 1. If W is the most important set of controls from
{W,W 0} then d < 1.
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values of Rmax.
Figure B.9a (respectively B.9b) plots the ratio of the treatment as given in Table 2.5b over the bias
B(d) for different values of d with Rmax = 0.6 (respectively Rmax = 0.7). In each graph, two different
restricted sets of controls M are chosen. The first set only includes country fixed effects; the second
one includes country fixed effects, age, age squared, gender, distance to the closest mission, and
distance to the capital city. All the regressions restrict the sample to cities located in 150-km radius
of a mission. In all the specifications, for all the values of d and the two values of Rmax, the ratio of
the treatment over the bias B(d) is higher than one. These results make it unlikely that the entire
estimated effect of the distance to the printing press is driven by unobserved variables.
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Notes: Each graph plots the ratio of the treatment over the bias B(d) using two different sets of restricted
controls M. The first set (“Resricted 1”) only includes country fixed effects. The second set (“Restricted 2”)
includes country fixed effects, age, age squared, gender, distance to the closest mission, and distance to the
capital city. Figure B.9a (respectively B.9b) uses the value Rmax = 0.6 (respectively Rmax = 0.7) to compute B(d).
Figure B.9: Magnitude of the Treatment Relative to the Bias for Different Values of d
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B.3.3 Additional Robustness Checks
Table B.18: Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, All Distance Controls
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.018⇤⇤ -0.023⇤⇤⇤ -0.021⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance Mission 0.008 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance Capital City -0.008 -0.008 -0.014⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Distance Coast 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance Health Facility -0.013⇤ -0.011 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Distance Any Schools -0.014 -0.016 -0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.359 0.356 0.361
F-Statistic 137.6 130.2 120.0
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an
individual. The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
village. The baseline controls are the individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls described in the text and
the distance to the closest mission without a printing press. All specifications include country fixed effects.
The additional controls are the determinants of the location of mission stations, geographic characteristics,
mission characteristics and investments and the distance to the closest mission settlements with different kinds
of investments described in more detail in the text. In Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially restricted
to individuals living 200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column 3) and 50 km (Column 3) away from an historical
mission settlement.
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Table B.19: Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Controlling for Observables, Probit Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Read News
Distance Printing Press -0.060⇤⇤ -0.077⇤⇤ -0.071⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
Observations 12297 10876 9307
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1454 1313 1134
Pseudo R2 0.331 0.327 0.333
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports Probit estimates. The unit of observation is an
individual. The dependent variable is newspaper readership nowadays. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by village. The baseline controls are the individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls described
in the text and the distance to the closest mission without a printing press. All specifications include country
fixed effects. The additional controls are the determinants of the location of mission stations, geographic
characteristics, mission characteristics and investments and the distance to the closest mission settlements with
different kinds of investments described in more details in the text. In Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially
restricted to individuals living 200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column 3) and 100 km (Column 3) away from a
historical mission settlement.
Table B.20: Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Controlling for Observables but not for Potential
“Bad Controls"
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.028⇤⇤⇤ -0.034⇤⇤⇤ -0.033⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 12508 11056 9449
Baseline Controls; Reduced Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.220 0.222 0.226
F-Statistic 68.67 64.30 58.67
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by village. The
baseline controls do not include “bad controls" (namely contemporary possible outcomes: education, religion,
water constraints, cash constraints, watching news on TV and listening the news on radio). All specifications
include country fixed effects. In Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living
200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column 3) and 100 km (Column 3) away from an historical mission settlement.
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Table B.21: Robustness Check: Distance to the Largest Missions
200km 150km 100km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Distance Large Mission -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Distance Printing Press -0.019⇤⇤ -0.024⇤⇤⇤ -0.021⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 12405 12405 10970 10970 9383 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1456 1315 1315 1136 1136
R2 0.359 0.359 0.355 0.356 0.361 0.361
F-Statistic 137.9 135.3 130.8 128.1 120.1 117.8
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an
individual. The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
village. The baseline controls are the individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls described in the text and
the distance to the closest mission without a printing press. All specifications include country fixed effects.
The additional controls are the determinants of the location of mission stations, geographic characteristics,
mission characteristics and investments and the distance to the closest mission settlements with different kinds
of investments described in more detail in the text. In Columns 1 to 6 the sample is sequentially restricted to
individuals living 200 km (Columns 1 and 2), 150 km (Columns 3 and 4) and 100 km (Columns 5 and 6) away
from a historical mission settlement.
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Table B.22: Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Two-Way Clustering at the Mission Level
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.018⇤ -0.023⇤⇤ -0.021⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster 1: Village 1456 1315 1136
Cluster 2: Mission 358 356 348
R2 0.359 0.356 0.361
F-Statistic 78.17 83.36 94.56
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
The dependent variable is newspaper readership. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the closest mission-
and village-levels. The baseline controls are the individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls described in
the text and the distance to the closest mission without a printing press. All specifications include country
fixed effects. The additional controls are the determinants of the location of mission stations, geographic
characteristics, mission characteristics and investments and the distance to the closest mission settlements with
different kinds of investments described in more detail in the text. In Columns 1 to 3 the sample is sequentially
restricted to individuals living 200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column 3) and 100 km (Column 3) away from a
historical mission settlement.
Table B.23: Printing Press and Newspaper Readership, Former Bristish Colonies
(1) (2) (3)
200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press -0.031⇤⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤⇤ -0.034⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 8760 7900 6948
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1025 938 839
R2 0.331 0.326 0.327
F-Statistic 132.3 116.3 107.0
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
The dependent variable is newspaper readership. The sample of countries is reduced to former British colonies.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by village. The baseline controls are the individual-, village- and
ethnicity-level controls described in the text and the distance to the closest mission without a printing press.
All specifications include country fixed effects. The additional controls are the determinants of the location of
mission stations, geographic characteristics, mission characteristics and investments and the distance to the
closest mission settlements with different kinds of investments described in more detail in the text. In Columns
1 to 3 the sample is sequentially restricted to individuals living 200 km (Column 1), 150 km (Column 3) and
100 km (Column 3) away from a historical mission settlement.
338
Table B.24: Falsification Test: Radio and Television
Radio News TV News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
200km 150km 100km 200km 150km 100km
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Distance Printing Press 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.012
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 12405 10970 9383 12405 10970 9383
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 1456 1315 1136 1456 1315 1136
R2 0.111 0.118 0.124 0.423 0.431 0.433
F-Statistic 15.74 16.52 15.34 159.4 189.5 186.9
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual.
In Columns 1 to 3 the dependent variable is listening to the news on the radio at least once a month. In Columns
4 to 6 the dependent variable is watching the news on TV at least once a month. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by village. The baseline controls are the individual-, village- and ethnicity-level controls described
in the text and the distance to the closest mission without a printing press. All specifications include country
fixed effects. The additional controls are the determinants of the location of mission stations, geographic
characteristics, mission characteristics and investments and the distance to the closest mission settlements with
different kinds of investments described in more detail in the text. The sample is sequentially restricted to
individuals living 200 km (Columns 1 and 4), 150 km (Columns 2 and 5) and 100 km (Columns 3 and 6) away
from a historical mission settlement.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume µ > k1 w . First, we have
µ k
w > µ > q
⇤ which ensures pt+1 (q) = µ  wq   k > 0 for all
firms born at t which have quality q < q⇤. Hence all such firms enter initially. Also, q < k1 w and
r0 > 0 imply that
Etpt+s (q) = (r (s  1)  w) q + (1  r (s  1)) µ  k
is decreasing in s and lims!• Etpt+s = (1  w) q   k < 0 so all firms below q⇤ expect to exit in finite
time when their profits turn negative. The expected number of periods a firm q born at t is active is
T (q) given by
[1  r (T (q   1))] µ > [w  r (T (q)  1)] q + k
and [1  r (T (q))] µ < [w  r (T (q))] q + k
The highest quality type qT that exits after selling for T periods (or the lowest quality type that exits
after selling for T + 1 periods) is defined by Etpt+T+1 (qT) = 0, hence
qT = max
⇢
k  [1  r (T)] µ
r (T)  w , qm
 
and qT is increasing with T:
∂qT
∂T
µ r0 (T) (µ (1  w)  k) > 0 as r0 > 0 and µ > q⇤
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Second, firms with q⇤ < q < µ expect positive profits at all periods: they have Etpt+s (q)
monotonically decreasing from
pt+1 (q) = µ  wq   k > µ (1  w)  k > 0 since q < µ
to
lim
s!• Etpt+s (q) = q (1  w)  k > 0 since q > q
⇤
Hence firms with q⇤ < q < µ always enter the market and stay until they are exogenously forced to
exit.
Finally, firms with q > µ have increasing expected profits over time. They enter the market if
and only if their expected intertemporal profits are positive, which requires:
Et
 
•
Â
s=1
ds 1pt+s (q)
!
=
•
Â
s=0
ds [(r (s)  w) q + (1  r (s)) µ]  k
1  d > 0
or equivalently:
q >
k  µ (1  d)Â•s=0 ds (1  r (s))
(1  d)Â•s=0 dsr (s)  w
⌘ qH
Let us show that qH < µ. Rearranging:
qH < µ iff µ
"
(1  d)
•
Â
s=0
ds (1  r (s)) + (1  d)
•
Â
s=0
dsr (s)
#
> wµ+ k
or equivalently iff µ > k1 w which holds by assumption in the high reputation case. Hence all firms
with q > µ always export until they are hit by the exogenous shock.
C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Assume µ < k1 w and µ > k + wqm. First, consider firms with q < µ born at date t. Since
their expected profits are decreasing with time, they are active in the first period if and only if
Etpt+1 (q) = µ   wq   k > 0, which requires q  µ kw ⌘ qL. We can immediately check that
µ < k1 w , qL < µ. Expected second-period profits are
Etpt+2 (q) = (r (1)  w) q + (1  r (1)) µ  k < (1  w) µ  k < 0
since q < µ and r (1) > w. Hence among firms with q < µ, those with q < qL are active in the first
period and exit afterwards, and those with qL  q < µ are never active.
Second, consider firms with µ  q < q⇤. These firms have Etpt+1 (q) < 0 since q > qL, Etpt+s (q)
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monotonically increasing in s since q   µ, and lims!• Etpt+s (q) < 0 since q < q⇤. Thus their
expected profits are negative in all periods and they optimally exit after drawing their quality
parameter.
Third, consider firms with q > q⇤. These firms have Etpt+s (q) monotonically increasing in s
since q > µ, and lims!• Etpt+s (q) > 0 since q > q⇤. If they decide to be active in the first period,
they expect to remain in the market as long as they survive the exogenous shock. However given
q > qL they incur a loss in the initial periods. The condition for a firm of type q > q⇤ to be active is
for intertemporal expected profits to be positive, which requires q > k (1 Ar)µAr w ⌘ qH as derived in
the proof of Lemma 1, where we define Ar ⌘ (1  d)Â•s=0 dsr (s). Finally,
qH > q
⇤ , k 
 
1  Ar
 
µ
Ar   w >
k
1  w , k
 
1  Ar
 
>
 
1  Ar
 
µ (1  w)
which is equivalent to k1 w > µ and holds by assumption in the low reputation case. Hence firms
with q⇤  q  qH are never active and firms with q > qH enter the export market and stay active.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
A HQE is a fixed point of q (.) where
q (µ) = µ0
0BB@1 Â
•
T=0 d
T+1
✓⇣
qm
qT
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqT+1 ⌘a 1
◆
1 Â•T=0 dT+1
⇣⇣
qm
qT
⌘a   ⇣ qmqT+1 ⌘a⌘
1CCA
= µ0
0B@1+Â•T=T˜ dT
⇣
qm
qT
⌘a 1
1+Â•T=T˜ d
T
⇣
qm
qT
⌘a
1CA
and T˜ is the lowest value of T such that qT > qm.
Step 1: Let us show that q (µ) is strictly decreasing in µ on [q⇤,•). We have
q = µ0
✓
1+ K (a  1)
1+ K (a)
◆
where K (a) ⌘
•
Â
T=T˜
dT
✓
qm
qT
◆a
∂K (a)
∂a
=
•
Â
T=T˜
dT ln (qm/qT)
✓
qm
qT
◆a
< 0
Consider a change in one of the thresholds, qS, leaving unchanged all other thresholds. Then all
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else equal, average quality rises:
∂q
∂qS
=
dS
qS
✓
qm
qS
◆a 1 
a
✓
qm
qS
◆
(1+ K (a  1))  (a  1) (1+ K (a))
 
=
dS
qS
✓
qm
qS
◆a 1
(1+ K (a))
"
a
✓
qm
qS
◆
q
µ0
  (a  1)
#
=
dS
qS
✓
qm
qS
◆a 1
(1+ K (a)) (a  1)
" 
q
qS
!
  1
#
> 0
which derives from q > q⇤ > qS for all S in a HQE. An increase in µ lowers all qT given Assumption
1 and differentiating:
∂qT
∂µ
=   1  r (T)
r (T)  w
Thus, in a HQE, q (µ) is a decreasing function:
∂q
∂µ
=
•
Â
T=T˜
∂q
∂qT
∂qT
∂µ
< 0
We have proved that q is strictly and continuously decreasing in µ on [q⇤,•).
Step 2: Let us show that limµ!• q(µ)µ < 1. As µ! •, it remains profitable for all firms to stay
active, so firms of all qualities continue exporting until hit by the exogenous shock: T (q)! • for
all q. Therefore, limµ!• = µ0 which is finite, so limµ!• q(µ)µ < 1.
By the fixed point theorem, we have established that if q (q⇤) > q⇤, q (.) has a unique fixed point
on (q⇤,•), which proves Proposition 1.
Step 3: Derive the condition for q (q⇤) > q⇤. At µ = q⇤, pt (q) < 0 for all t > 1 and q < q⇤. Then
q (q⇤) =
R q⇤
qm
qdG (q) + 11 d
R •
q⇤ qdG (q)R q⇤
qm
dG (q) + 11 d
R •
q⇤ dG (q)
= µ0
0B@1  d+ d
⇣
qm
q⇤
⌘a 1
1  d+ d
⇣
qm
q⇤
⌘a
1CA
So q (q⇤) > q⇤ is equivalent to µ0
 
1 d+d
⇣
qm(1 w)
k
⌘a 1
1 d+d
⇣
qm(1 w)
k
⌘a
!
> k1 w , which after substituting for the value
of µ0 and rearranging yields the following condition:
a
✓
qm (1  w)
k
◆
+
d
1  d
✓
qm (1  w)
k
◆a
> a  1
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C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2
A LQE is a fixed point of q (µ) where:
q (µ) = µ0
0BB@ (1  d)
✓
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1◆
+
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a 1
(1  d)
⇣
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a⌘
+
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a
1CCA
Step 1: The sign of ∂q(µ)∂µ is indeterminate. Differentiate with respect to each threshold:
∂q
∂qL
=
µo (a  1)
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a ✓ 1qL
◆✓
qm
qL
◆a 1 "
1  q
qL
#
< 0
∂q
∂qH
=
1
1 dµo (a  1)
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a ✓ 1qH
◆✓
qm
qH
◆a 1 " q
qH
  1
#
< 0
∂q
∂µ
=
∂q
∂qL
∂qL
∂µ
+
∂q
∂qH
∂qH
∂µ
=
µo (a  1)
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a ⇥ ...
... ⇥
h⇣
qa 1m
qaL
⌘ h
q
qL
  1
i ⇣
1
w
⌘
  11 d
⇣
qa 1m
qaH
⌘ h
1  qqH
i ⇣
1 Ar
Ar w
⌘i
∂q
∂µ
< 0 iff
1
1  d
✓
1
qH
◆a "
1  q
qH
#✓
1  Ar
Ar   w
◆
>
✓
1
qL
◆a " q
qL
  1
#✓
1
w
◆
This condition can be rewritten as
d > 1 
✓
qL
qH
◆a+1 qH   q
q   qL
!  
1  Ar
 
w
Ar   w
!
Then note that the bracketed terms are qLqH =
(µ k)(Ar w)
w(k (1 Ar)µ) and
qH q
q qL =
k (1 Ar)µ
Ar w  q
q  µ kw
= wAr w
✓
1  Ar(q µ)
k µ+wq
◆
.
Therefore q (µ) decreases in µ when
d > 1 
 
µ  k
k   1  Ar  µ
!a+1 ✓
Ar   w
w
◆a 1 
1  Ar
 
q   µ 
k  µ+ wq
!
and decreases in µ otherwise. The reason why q (µ) needs not be monotonic over [qm, q⇤] is that µ
has opposite effects on q coming from qL and qH . Which effect dominates depends on the position of
µ as well as the shape parameter a and the survival parameter d. This non-monotonicity is what
gives rises to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Step 2: If µ = qm, no firm below q⇤ finds it profitable to export, as national reputation imposes a
first-period loss on all firms. Some firms with high enough q have a positive NPV of future profits
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and enter. So since qm is the lower bound of the prior quality distribution, q (qm) > q⇤ > qm.
Step 3: From the derivation of Proposition 1 we know that
q (q⇤) < q⇤ , a
✓
qm (1  w)
k
◆
+
d
1  d
✓
qm (1  w)
k
◆a
< a  1
So we have proved that if this condition holds, there is no HQE and there must be at least one LQE.
C.1.5 Proof of Result 1
In a LQE, the set of continuing firms is [qH ,•) from the second period onwards, so the average price
plqet,t+s of cohort t at time t+ s is given by:
plqet,t+s
 
q
 
=
8<: q if s = 1q + r (s)   aa 1qH   q  if s > 1
As q < qH in a LQE and r (s) increases in s, it immediately follows that p
lqe
t,t+s increases with s.
In a HQE, the set of active firms of cohort t at time t+ s is [qs 1,•), and their average price is:
phqet,t+s
 
q
 
=
8<: q if s = 1q + r (s)   aa 1qs 1   q  if s > 1
r (s) and qs 1 increase with s. Immediately following the entry of cohort t, p
hqe
t,t+s may fall with s if
the distribution of q has low variance (a high), such that aa 1q1 > µ. In this case, there is initially a
large mass of firms at the bottom of the distribution of continuing firms and their prices are falling.
However, since µ < aa 1q⇤, there is some finite s0 such that for all s   s0, phqet,t+s+1
 
q
 
> phqet,t+s
 
q
 
and
thus at each given point in time, the average unit price is higher for older cohorts of firms.
C.1.6 Proof of Result 2
The first part establishes that across cohorts, the fraction of active firms that exit per period is higher
for lower quality firms. In a LQE, the hazard rate is 1 for firms below qL and 1  d for firms above
qH . In a HQE, the hazard rate is 1 d1 dT for firms between qT 1 and qT for all T, which is decreasing in
T, and 1  d for firms above q⇤.
The second part states that the probability of exit, across quality levels, decreases with the age of
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a cohort. In a LQE, the hazard rate of cohort t at time t+ s is
hlqet,t+s =
8<: 1  d+ d
G(qL)
G(qL)+1 G(qH) if s = 1
1  d if s > 1
It falls from t+ 1 to t+ 2 and remains constant thereafter. In a HQE, the hazard rate of cohort t at
t+ s is
hhqet,t+s = 1  d+ d
G (qs)  G (qs 1)
1  G (qs 1) = 1  d+ d
✓
1 
✓
qs 1
qs
◆a◆
Since qs 1qs is decreasing in s, h
hqe
t,t+s falls over time.
C.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3
In a LQE, average quality is given by:
q = µ0
0BB@ (1  d)
✓
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1◆
+
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a 1
(1  d)
⇣
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a⌘
+
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a
1CCA
Differentiate with respect to each threshold:
∂q
∂qL
=
µo (a  1)
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a ✓ 1qL
◆✓
qm
qL
◆a 1 
1  q
qL
!
< 0
∂q
∂qH
=
1
1 dµo (a  1)
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a ✓ 1qH
◆✓
qm
qH
◆a 1 q
qH
  1
!
< 0
∂q
∂k
=
∂q
∂qL
∂qL
∂k
+
∂q
∂qH
∂qH
∂k
=
µo (a  1)
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a
+ 11 d
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a ⇥ ...
⇥

1
1 d
⇣
1
qH
⌘ ⇣
qm
qH
⌘a 1 ⇣
1  qqH
⌘ ⇣
1
Ar w
⌘
 
⇣
1
qL
⌘ ⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1 ⇣
q
qL
  1
⌘ ⇣
1
w
⌘ 
∂q
∂k
> 0 iff
1
1  d
✓
1
qH
◆a  
1  q
qH
!✓
1
Ar   w
◆
>
✓
1
qL
◆a  q
qL
  1
!✓
1
w
◆
This condition can be rewritten as
d > 1 
✓
qL
qH
◆a+1 qH   q
q   qL
!✓
w
Ar   w
◆
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Then note that, starting from a steady-state (q = µ), the bracketed terms are qLqH =
(µ k)(Ar w)
w(k (1 Ar)µ) and
qH q
q qL =
1
Ar w (k (1 w)µ)
1
w (k (1 w)µ)
= wAr w . Therefore q decreases in k if and only if
d > 1 
 
µ  k
k   1  Ar  µ
!a+1 ✓
Ar   w
w
◆a 1
The RHS is decreasing in µ and a, so this holds for d not too low, a not too high and an initial µ not
too low. Then starting from a LQE, a decrease in k moves up the q (µ) function left of the initial µ.
The new steady-state equilibrium quality and reputation are necessarily higher. If the steady-state is
unique, the new steady-state has higher µ. If there are multiple steady-states, ranked by increasing
µ, either the new steady-state has the same rank and higher µ, or the new steady-state has higher
rank and higher µ.
The welfare effect of a subsidy s (s =  dk) has three components. First, for firms with q
parameters such that they sell both without and with the subsidy, the policy adds to their profits the
amount it costs to the government, plus the extra profits brought by a higher reputation µ0 > µ. The
total effect is unambiguously positive.
Second, for new exporters that enter around qL because of the policy (qL < q < qL0), the net
benefit NBL of the subsidy is positive:
NBL =
Z qL0
qL
 
µ0   wq   k+ s  dG (q)  Z qL0
qL
sg (q) dq
NBL =
 
µ0   k  Z qL0
qL
g (q) dq   w
Z qL0
qL
qdG (q)
=
 
µ0   k  ⇣⇣ qmqL ⌘a   ⇣ qmqL0 ⌘a⌘  w aa 1qm
✓⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqL0 ⌘a 1
◆ 
= wqm
✓
qL0
qL
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqL0 ⌘a 1
◆
  aa 1
✓⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqL0 ⌘a 1
◆ 
> wqma 1
✓⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqL0 ⌘a 1
◆
> 0
where we go from the second to the third line using wqL0 = µ0   k.
Third, for new exporters that enter around qH because of the policy (qH0 < q < qH), the net
benefit NBH of the subsidy is also positive:
NBH =
Z qH
qH0
 
•
Â
t=0
dt
 
r (t) q + (1  r (t)) µ0   wq   k+ s ! g (q) dq   ...
... 11 d
Z qH
qH0
sg (q) dq
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= 11 d
Z qH
qH0
  
Ar   w
 
q +
 
1  Ar
 
µ0   k  g (q) dq
= 11 d

   k   1  Ar  µ0  ⇣⇣ qmqH0 ⌘a   ⇣ qmqH ⌘a⌘+ a(Ar w)a 1 qm
✓⇣
qm
qH0
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqH ⌘a 1
◆ 
= 11 d
 
Ar   w
 
qm
✓⇣
qm
qH0
⌘a 1   qH0qH ⇣ qmqH ⌘a 1
◆
  aa 1
✓⇣
qm
qH0
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqH ⌘a 1
◆ 
> 11 d
 
Ar   w
  qm
a 1
✓⇣
qm
qH0
⌘a 1   ⇣ qmqH ⌘a 1
◆
> 0
So the overall welfare gain is positive.
C.1.8 Proof of Proposition 4
In a HQE, average quality is given by q = µ0
⇣
1+K(a 1)
1+K(a)
⌘
where K (a) ⌘ Â•T=T˜ dT
⇣
qm
qT
⌘a
and
qT =
k (1 r(T))µ
r(T) w . Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 1, we have
∂qT
∂k
=
1
r (T)  w > 0 for all T > T˜
∂q
∂k
=
•
Â
T=T˜
∂q
∂qT
∂qT
∂k
> 0
Hence a subsidy that lowers k shifts down the q (µ) function. As q is decreasing in µ in the HQE
region, the new steady-state equilibrium defined by q (µ) = µ necessarily has lower µ. So average
quality and national reputation are higher in the HQE steady-state without subsidies than with
subsidies.
C.1.9 Proof of Proposition 5
This appendix section provides a sketch of the proof of Proposition 5. It essentially relies on the
stability of µS and µ0S and the instability of µU . For (i) and (ii), let us show that if µS is a steady-state
LQE and ∂q(µ)∂µ < 0 at µS, then µS is a stable equilibrium for h < 1. Define qL,S ⌘ µS kw and
qH,S ⌘ k (1 Ar)µSAr w . At time t  1 the economy is in an initial steady-state where
µS = q (µS) = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
qm
qL,S
⌘a 1
+
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a 1
1 
⇣
qm
qL,S
⌘a
+
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a
1CA
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Suppose q is locally decreasing in µ. Then for all µS < µ < µU , q (µ) < µ. Now suppose there is a
perturbation at time t such that µt = µS + #, # > 0 and # < µU   µS. The entry thresholds at t are:
qL,t =
µt   k
w
=
µS + #  k
w
qH,t =
k  (1  d)Â•u=0 (1  r (u)) µt+u
Ar   w
where qH,t is determined by the zero intertemporal profits condition
•
Â
u=0
du [(r (u)  w) qH,t + (1  r (u)) Etµt+u   k]
and the absence of aggregate uncertainty allows us to remove the expectations operator.
Let us conjecture, to be verified, that µS  µt+u+1  µt+u  µS + # for all u   1. Then:
qL,S < qL,t+u+1 < qL,t+u < qL,t
qH,S > qH,t+u+1 > qH,t+u > qH,t
for all u   1
The average quality of exports is determined by the qL and qH thresholds in the periods after the
shock in the following manner: for u   0,
qt+u = µ0
0BB@1 
⇣
qm
qL,t+u
⌘a 1
+
u
Â
l=0
du l
⇣
qm
qH,t+l
⌘a 1
+
•
Â
l=u+1
dl
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a 1
1 
⇣
qm
qL,t+u
⌘a
+
u
Â
l=0
du l
⇣
qm
qH,t+l
⌘a
+
•
Â
l=u+1
dl
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a
1CCA
qL,t+u =
µt+u   k
w
qH,t+u =
k  (1  d)Â•l=0 (1  r (l)) µt+u+l
Ar   w
At time t, let us define qpermt as the average quality that would prevail if firms expected the shock
to be permanent, i.e. if Etµt+u = µt for all u   0. We calculate:
qt = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
qm
qL,t
⌘a 1
+
⇣
qm
qH,t
⌘a 1
+ d1 d
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a 1
1 
⇣
qm
qL,t
⌘a
+ d1 d
⇣
qm
qH,t
⌘a
+ d1 d
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a
1CA
qt < q
perm
t = µ0
0BBB@
1 
⇣
qm
qL,t
⌘a 1
+
✓
qm
q
perm
H,t
◆a 1
+ d1 d
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a 1
1 
⇣
qm
qL,t
⌘a
+ d1 d
✓
qm
q
perm
H,t
◆a
+ d1 d
⇣
qm
qH,S
⌘a
1CCCA
as qpermH,t =
k (1 Ar)(µS+#)
Ar w < qH,t from the conjecture µS  µt+u+1  µt+u  µS + # for all u   1.
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Also
q
perm
t < q (µS + #) < µt
The first inequality results from qH,S > q
perm
H,t . The second inequality comes from q (µ) < µ for
µ 2 (µS, µU). Hence qt < µt and therefore:
qt < µt+1 = µt + h
 
qt   µt
 
< µt
Additionally as long as h is not too close to 1, µt+1 > µS.
We can show, similarly, that in all subsequent periods, qt+u < µt+u as long as µt+u > µS. Thus
µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u and the conjecture that µt+u follows a decreasing path from µS + # to µS is
verified. In case of a negative shock to µ at time t starting from a steady-state where q is locally
decreasing in µ, the proof is identical with opposite signs. It follows that if µS is a steady-state
reputation and q (µ) is locally decreasing in µ at µS, then µS is stable. Any positive shock, starting
from µS, that brings µt to a value in (µS, µU) has no long-run effects as the economy moves back to
µS.
By the same reasoning, µU is unstable. Suppose there is a negative shock to µ starting from
µU = q (µU) = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
qm
qL,U
⌘a 1
+
⇣
qm
qH,U
⌘a 1
1 
⇣
qm
qL,U
⌘a
+
⇣
qm
qH,U
⌘a
1CA
where qL,U ⌘ µU kw , qH,U ⌘
k (1 Ar)µU
Ar w and q (µ) is increasing in µ at µU . At time t, µt = µU   #,
where # > 0 and # < µU   µS. We conjecture µS  µt+u+1  µt+u  µU   #, which implies
qL,S < qL,t+u+1 < qL,t+u < qL,U and qH,S > qH,t+u+1 > qH,t+u > qH,U for all u   0. Then
qt+u < µt+u and thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u   0.
For part (iii), consider a “large shock”, starting from µS, as a shock # > µU   µS such that if
µt = µS + #, then µ > µU , where qt is defined as in (ii) and µ is defined below. qt+u, qL,t+u and
qH,t+u are defined as in part (ii). Also, for µU < µ < µ0S, we know that q (µ) > µ. We can then show
that qt+u is increasing in u as long as qt+u < µ0S, and µt+u is increasing in u for u   u if µt+u > µU
for all u   0. u is the inflexion point of the path of µt+u, which can initially decrease but is eventually
increasing as long as µ < µ0S. Define µ = µt+u, a large reputation shock is a shock such that µ > µU .
It ensures that reputation and average quality both grow along the transition path until the economy
reaches the steady-state µ0S.
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Finally, note that more entry and higher reputation in the long-run imply higher aggregate
profits and higher average quality. The latter follows from q = µ in the long run. The former results
from a higher number of active firms and the fact that the range of firms which are active both with
the initial µ and with the higher final µ receive a higher sequence of prices.
C.1.10 Proof of Appendix C Results
Proposition 6: Part (i) follows immediately from qL =
µ
t k
w and qH =
k  1t (1 Ar)µ
1
t Ar w
. The proof of part
(ii) uses the derivations of Proposition 2. We know
q = µ0
0BB@ (1  d)
✓
1 
⇣
qm
qL
⌘a 1◆
+
⇣
qm
qH
⌘a 1
(1  d)
⇣
1 
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⌘a⌘
+
⇣
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⌘a
1CCA
∂q
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+ 11 d
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⌘a ⇥ ...
... ⇥

1
1 d
⇣
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1  qqH
⌘✓ (1 Ar)µ+ArqH
1
t Ar w
◆
 
⇣
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⌘ ⇣
q
qL
  1
⌘   µ
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  
∂q
∂t > 0 iff
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1 d
⇣
1
qH
⌘a ⇣
1  qqH
⌘✓ (1 Ar)µ+ArqH
1
t Ar w
◆
>
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1
qL
⌘a ⇣
q
qL
  1
⌘   µ
w
 
. This condition can be
rewritten as
d > 1 
✓
qL
qH
◆a+1 qH   q
q   qL
! 
w
1
tAr   w
 
1  Ar
 
µ+ ArqH
µ
!
Then note that, starting from a steady-state (q = µ), the bracketed terms are: qLqH =
( 1t µ k)( 1t Ar w)
w(k  1t (1 Ar)µ)
and qH q
q qL =
w
1
t Ar w
. Therefore q decreases in t if and only if
d > 1 
 
1
tµ  k
k  1t
 
1  Ar
 
µ
!a+1 1
tAr   w
w
!a 1 ✓
1  Ar + ArqHµ
◆
Under this condition, starting from a LQE, an increase in t moves down the q (µ) function. The new
steady-state equilibrium quality and reputation are lower.
Proposition 7: In a HQE with trade costs,
q⇤ = k1
t   w
qT =
k  1t (1  r (T)) µ
1
t r (T)  w
Part (i) follows from (C.2) and modified Assumption 1 that qT increases with t.
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Part (ii) is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. In a HQE, average quality is q = µ0
⇣
1+Kt(a 1)
1+Kt(a)
⌘
where Kt (a) ⌘ Â•T=T˜ dT
⇣
qm
qT
⌘a
and qT =
k  1t (1 r(T))µ
1
t r(T) w
. Then
∂qT
∂t
=
✓
1
t2
◆
(1  r (T)) µ+ r (T) qT
1
t r (T)  w
> 0 for all T > T˜
∂q
∂t
=
•
Â
T=T˜
∂q
∂qT
∂qT
∂t
> 0
using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 1. Hence an rise in the ad valorem tariff t shifts
up the q (µ) function. As q is decreasing in µ in the HQE region, the new steady-state equilibrium
defined by q (µ) = µ necessarily has higher µ. So average quality and national reputation are higher,
and the volume of trade is lower, in the new steady state.
C.2 Informed and Uninformed Buyers
Suppose the population of importers is divided into N equal-sized groups. There is perfect informa-
tion diffusion within groups but no information diffusion across groups. Thus, if any individual
in group n has previously consumed the output of firm j, then all buyers in group n are informed
about good j. When firm j is matched with buyer i, i 2 I if there exists i0 2 n such that i0 has been
matched with j in the past, and i 2 U if there is no i0 2 n such that i0 has been matched with j in
the past. Further assume that the firm observes in any period whether its buyer is informed or not,
but not which group the buyer belongs to; hence it does not know the exact proportion of informed
buyers in any period but only its expectation.
It follows immediately from this setup that r (0) = 0. After the firm has exported for one period,
one group is informed, so r (1) = 1N . For each subsequent period, if the fraction of informed buyers
after s export periods is r (s), then with probability r (s), the firm is matched with a buyer in an
informed group, and the proportion of informed importers stays at r (s) for the next period. With
probability 1  r (s), the firm is matched with a buyer in an uniformed group; then the fraction of
informed importers next period is r (s) + 1N .
Therefore, the expected fraction of informed buyers is given by the following path: for s   0,
r (0) = 0
r (s+ 1) = r (s)2 + (1  r (s))
✓
r (s) +
1
N
◆
= r (s)
✓
N   1
N
◆
+
1
N
We can check that this function satisfies Assumption 1.
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r (s+ 1)  r (s) = 1
N
(1  r (s)) > 0
r (s+ 1)  r (s)
r (s)
=
1
N
✓
1
r (s)
  1
◆
is decreasing in s
lim
s!• r (s) =
1
N
✓
1  N   1
N
◆ 1
= 1
So r (s) is increasing in s, rises with s at a falling rate, and converges to 1.
C.3 Ad Valorem Tariffs
A straightforward extension of the model allows for ad valorem trade costs. Suppose that when
a buyer pays pt+s (j) defined by (3.6) for the output of firm j, the firm receives 1t pt+s (j), where
t > 1. The price being set by the importer’s maximum willingness to pay, trade costs are borne by
exporters.
We modify Assumption 2 accordingly: let us assume 1t r (1) > w. With positive trade costs, the
values of the relevant thresholds are modified as follows:
q⇤ = k1
t   w
(C.1)
qL =
µ
t   k
w
(C.2)
qH =
k  1t
 
1  Ar
 
µ
1
tAr   w
(C.3)
qT =
k  1t (1  r (T)) µ
1
t r (T)  w
(C.4)
An increase in t lowers export profits for all firms. In a LQE, it widens the range of non-exporters.
In a HQE, it leads low-quality firms below q⇤ to exit sooner. Also, holding constant the economy’s
exogenous parameters (a, d, qm, k, and w), a higher t makes it more likely that the steady-state
equilibrium is a LQE. The existence condition for a HQE with tariffs is
a
0@ qm
⇣
1
t   w
⌘
k
1A+ d
1  d
0@ qm
⇣
1
t   w
⌘
k
1Aa > a  1 (C.5)
Proposition 14 An increase in the ad-valorem tariff t in a low-quality steady-state equilibrium:
(i) Lowers qL and raises qH;
353
(ii) Lowers the average quality of exports and equilibrium country reputation
if
✓
1
t µ k
k  1t (1 Ar)µ
◆a+1 ✓ 1
t Ar w
w
◆a 1 ⇣
1  Ar + ArqHµ
⌘
> 1  d.
See Appendix C.1.10 for proofs. In a LQE, an increase in t discourages entry by some relatively
low-quality firms (as qL falls) as well as some relatively high-quality firms (as qH rises). Under the
stated condition, the latter dominates in the net effect of t on q. Thus, a higher tariff, similarly to a
higher k, results in lower steady-state quality in a LQE.
Proposition 15 An increase in the ad-valorem tariff t in a high-quality steady-state equilibrium:
(i) Increases qT for all T and lowers the survival rate of exporters below q⇤;
(ii) Increases the average quality of exports and equilibrium country reputation.
See Appendix C.1.10 for proofs. In a HQE, from an initial steady-state where q = µ > q⇤, an
increase in tariffs induces firms with below-average quality in (qm, q⇤) to exit sooner, and has no
impact on the exit rate of firms with above-average quality (q > q). Hence higher trade costs lead
to a smaller mass of active exporters and a higher average quality of their products. Conversely,
trade liberalization raises the volume of exports and lowers their average quality in high-quality
countries, but brings about better average quality and unit prices, as well as higher trade volume, in
low-quality countries.
C.4 Hazard Rates
We calculate hazard rates at the 10-digit product level in US manufacturing imports (SITC codes 5-8)
over 1989-2006, using data from Robert Feenstra. HS-10 products in the data are the equivalent of
firms in our model. The exit rate is calculated for each country, HS-2 industry and export duration.
Specifically, the survival rate of products from country c, industry i and export experience s at time t
is the number of 10-digit products that are exported to the US for the (s+ 1)-th time from country c
in industry i , divided by the number of 10-digit products from the same country and industry that
were exported at time t  1 for the s-th time. The hazard rate is one minus the survival rate.
We find that across countries and industries, the average hazard rate falls with export experience.
Furthermore, hazard rates for products from non-OECD members are higher than those of OECD
members for all export durations, consistent with higher exit rates in countries exporting lower-
quality goods.
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Table C.1: Hazard Rates in US Manufacturing Imports.
Hazard rate
s All OECD Non-OECD
1 31.2% 23.2% 38.5%
2 20.2% 16.6% 24.2%
3 15.8% 13.5% 18.4%
4 13.6% 11.9% 15.7%
5 13.8% 13.0% 15.0%
6 10.9% 9.6% 12.4%
7 9.0% 7.7% 10.8%
8 7.5% 6.2% 9.2%
9 7.4% 6.3% 8.8%
10 8.5% 7.8% 9.2%
Notes: HS-10 level, 1989-2006.
Notes: Countries with s Years of Export Experience in US Imports, 1989-2006.
Figure C.1: Hazard Rates of Products from all Countries
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Notes: OECD and non-OECD Countries with s Years of Export Experience in US Imports, 1989-2006.
Figure C.2: Hazard Rates of Products from OECD and non-OECD Countries
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